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This volume presents seven comparative studies of cur-
rency crises, which happened in the decade of 1990s in Latin
America, South East Asia and in transition countries of East-
ern Europe and the former USSR. All the studies were pre-
pared under the research project no. OI44/H02/99/17 on
"Analysis of Currency Crises in Countries of Asia, Latin
America and Central and Eastern Europe: Lessons for
Poland and Other Transition Countries", carried out by
CASE and financed by the Committee for Scientific
Research (KBN) in the years 1999–2001. They will be sub-
jects of public presentation and discussion during the semi-
nar in Warsaw organized by CASE on June 28, 2001, under
the same research project. This is a continuation of two
other issues of CASE Reports containing eleven countries'
monographs related to currency crises episodes in these
three regions and a couple of other comparative studies
published in the CASE Studies and Analyzes series. 
Three first studies in this volume deal with broad issue
of current account, exchange rate and international reserves
of a central bank. 
Marcin Sasin discusses the importance of the real
exchange rate overvaluation and the current account deficit,
which are usually considered as the main causes of currency
crises. While generally confirming the importance of the first
factor, author shows that question of sustainability of current
account deficit has a very individual country characteristic. 
The next analysis of Ma³gorzata Jakubiak concerns the
choice of exchange rate regimes from the point of view of
both avoiding and efficient managing currency crises. Author
compares advantages and disadvantages of the fixed versus
floating exchange rate regimes from the point of view of
credibility of monetary policies, preventing currency crisis
and coping with its consequences. She demonstrates, basing
on an empirical analysis, that the most costly are changes of
exchange rate regimes (usually abandoning the peg) under
the pressure of speculative attack. 
Mateusz Szczurek provides the additional insight to this
discussion estimating the size of optimal international liquid-
ity taking into consideration potential costs of the crisis, on
the one hand, and costs of maintaining the international
reserves, on the other. 
The next study concerns interrelations between banking
and currency crises basing on extensive review of an eco-
nomic literature. Marcin Sasin analyzes the institutional and
structural sources of instability of the banking sector in
emerging markets. One of them is the direct and indirect
vulnerability of banks in relation to sudden interest rate and
exchange rate changes. On the other hand, collapse of the
some big banks must lead to credibility crisis of a domestic
currency. 
Lukasz Rawdanowicz addresses another hot issue in the
economic debates of the last decade, i.e. contagion effect of
a crisis in one country on the macroeconomic stability of its
close and more distant neighbors. He analyzes the impact of
the Russian 1998 crisis on the situation of CIS countries tak-
ing into consideration both trade and financial channels. 
Monika B³aszkiewicz and Wojciech Paczyñski try to
assess the economic and social consequences of currency
crises in the last decade. The main question discussed by
them is to what extent crisis plays a role of self-correcting
mechanism of previously unsustainable policies. 
Finally, Rafa³ Antczak, Ma³gorzata Markiewicz and Artur
Radziwi³³ analyze the role of the IMF in preventing the cur-
rency crises in five selected CIS countries – Russia, Ukraine,
Moldova, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, identifying the main
sources of Fund's failures. 
Warsaw, June 13, 2001
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1.1. Introduction
This paper investigates the links between real exchange
rate overvaluation, current account deficit and currency
crises. Particularly an attempt is made to answer the ques-
tion whether and to what extent overvaluation and current
account deficit is a cause of crises and how useful it is in cri-
sis prediction.
Overvaluation and current account deficit are, of
course, interrelated variables. As for real exchange rate mis-
alignment there is little disagreement that, indeed, it is a
warning signal against possible distress – the empirical reg-
ularities are presented along with a theory brief. The evi-
dence on the current account is much more complicated.
Not only there are various theories on how the current
account balance behaves and how sustainable it is but also
the empirical research produces contradictory results on
the role of current account deficits as crisis cause or its early
indicator. For this reason the current account issue obtains
more extensive treatment.
1.2. Overvaluation
1.2.1. Theory
Law of one price states that, abstracting from trans-
portation costs etc., prices of identical goods when con-
verted from one currency to another should be the same.
Otherwise an arbitrage would take place, the currency
demand/supply condition would change and finally equality
restored through a change in the exchange rate to its equi-
librium value.
s+ pi*=pi (1.1)
where pi is a (log) price of a good i, * indicates foreign vari-
able and s is a (log) nominal exchange rate. Because prices
for all goods are not observed (recorded) one can only use
aggregate price levels.
s+p*=p (1.2)
which brings the notion of purchasing power parity (PPP)
and real exchange rate
q=s-p+p*+k (1.3)
where q is a (log) real exchange rate and k is a constant.
Because consumption bundles are not identical and prices
of goods of which they consist can relatively change and
because aggregate price levels are only index numbers (not
real, direct prices), the "base year problem" arises – the
above expression holds only up to a constant k. In other
words, one have to explicitly state in what point of time the
real exchange rate is in equilibrium, set q to zero and
respectively calibrate the constant. 
Another problem is that there are various price indexes
out of which popular are: consumer price index (CPI), pro-
ducer price index (PPP), wholesale price index (WPI),
export unit value (EUV). They, of course imply different val-
ues for the real exchange rate. Composition of the same
indexes vary over countries making them imperfect mea-
sures of overall price level and at the same time distorting
the meaning of the real exchange rate index.
It is well known that PPP doesn't hold continuously, it
probably even doesn't hold for quite long periods. There-
fore a key question is whether there is any average value
of (such computed) real exchange rate, or put differently
whether it is mean reverting (stationary). If yes, then if
the rate is overvalued it will certainly depreciate in the
future (sometimes through a currency crisis), if not (if the
RER is nonstationary) than its level tells nothing about its
future development. The standard framework to test the
stationarity of time series is Augmented Dickey-Fuller
test.
(1.4)
where α, ϕ are parameters and ε is a disturbance term and
∆ is a backward difference operator. This test has, howev-
er, very low power against local alternatives, this is the rea-
son why it is very hard to detect mean reversion (or reject
Part I.
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nonstationarity) in the RER [1]. Soehow better alternative is
to use Johansen's approach and test for cointegration
between s, p and p*. 
On the other hand, the CPI-based RER can indeed be
nonstationary. Since there is a considerable share of non-
tradable goods in the consumer's basket and since the PPP
applies only to tradable goods it can happen that if there is
a different rate of productivity improvement in tradable
goods sectors between countries [2] the so-called Balassa-
Samuelson effect arises. This effect refers to an apparent
overvaluation of the CPI-based exchange rate: the price of
non-tradable goods must increase to assure equal wages
across sectors, this implies a (relative) rise in CPI in the
country where the productivity gains are higher. Since com-
petitiveness is not affected the (nominal) exchange rate
remains unchanged; hence CPI-based RER becomes over-
valued. This effect introduces a nonstationary trend in the
CPI-based RER, which means, that the RER would never
(systematically) come back to its historical average and the
appreciation can continue indefinitely. In this case the level
(overvaluation) of the RER would be almost meaningless,
and (theoretically) should not contain any (or not enough)
information for currency crisis prediction. Actually the case
is made, that the Balassa-Samuelson effect is present in most
emerging economies. Consequently, as evidence show, it is
indeed harder to prove CPI-based RER mean reversion. The
evidence of PPI- and WPI-RER nonstationarity is more
ample.
Another way of determining the real exchange rate is to
derive it from the theoretical model of exchange rate (a
monetary model). For example we can start from the
money demand function
m-p = φy - λi (1.5)
where φ, λ are parameters and m is money demand, y is
output, i is nominal interest rate. Together with purchasing
power parity (2) we obtain
st = (mt-m*t) - φ (yt-y*t) + λ (it-i*t) (1.6)
where m is money supply. In this model, by construction,
the real exchange rate is always in equilibrium. It is reason-
able to introduce rigidities in the goods market. When in
response to the shock prices adjust slowly the exchange
rate behaves the following way
Et(st+1)-st = -θ (st-st) + Et(πt+1-π*t+1) (1.7)
which implies regressive expectations [3]; Et is an expecta-
tion operator basing on the knowledge available at time t;
the last term on the right represents structural differences
in inflation rates. After some algebra model yields a Dorn-
busch-type equation (a Frankel model)
(1.8)
where r is real interest rate. Now, in response to the shocks
the nominal exchange rate overshoots its equilibrium value,
hence the RER becomes over- (under-) valued.
Until 1983, i.e. before tremendously influential paper of
Meese and Rogoff (1983), monetary models were believed
to be valid [4]. After that, the research on exchange rate has
been paralyzed and only resumed since MacDonald and Tay-
lor (1994) and Mark (1995) who has shown, using new
econometric tools, that monetary factors affect exchange
rates and that these models hold in the long-run. It meant
that the exchange rate actually comes back to its model-
predicted equilibrium value. 
1.2.2. How to Calculate a Real Exchange Rate
When the mean reversion of the RER is established it
makes sense to estimate the over- (under-) valuation of the
exchange rate. This is generally done in two ways:
The first approach (fundamental equilibrium exchange
rate or FEER approach) is based on the assumption that
equilibrium RER implies balanced current account. It
explores the general identity
current account = savings minus investment = change in
debt = capital account
In the beginning the long run sustainable level of
domestic savings and investment is estimated, then the
normal capital flows (at long run equilibrium interest rate
differential, growth rate of the economy, etc.) are deter-
mined. If the two sides are very different it means that the
real exchange rate is not in balance [5]. Afterwards, the
equilibrium value that would equate the two sides is
assessed basing on estimated coefficients of exchange rate
elasticities of various macroeconomic variables. Subtract-
ing prevailing exchange rate from the equilibrium one
gives the RER overvaluation.
[1] The above reasoning should as well incorporate trend-reversion, which is even harder to detect than mean reversion.
[2] The growth in productivity in non-tradable sector (usually services) is assumed to be the same across countries (e.g. zero).
[3] With rational expectations derivation would be somehow more complicated but yield the same results.
[4] Meese and Rogoff established that a simple random walk model performed better than monetary models in predicting exchange rate move-
ments.
[5] It can also mean that the current government policy is unsustainable. The procedure is explained in more detail in section 1.3.3.1.
)(
1
)()
1
()()( **** tttttttttt rrEyymms −−−++−−−= θ
ππ
θ
λφ
∧
11
Currency Crises in Emerging Markets – Selected Comparative ...
CASE Reports No. 41
The second approach uses the econometric and statisti-
cal tools and rather abstracts from detailed country-specific
knowledge. The easiest way is to explicitly use the notion of
purchasing power parity. One selects the price index (CPI,
WPI, PPI) and a period of time, and then decides that the
average of index-based RER over the chosen period consti-
tutes an equilibrium rate. Subtracting that average from the
current index-based RER gives the RER overvaluation.
Other popular method – the behavioral equilibrium
exchange rate or BEER approach – is slightly more demand-
ing and requires empirical estimation of the real exchange
rate determinants what is usually done through one-equa-
tion regression. Basing on the common knowledge and var-
ious models relevant theoretical fundamentals are selected
(these usually include the terms of trade, degree of open-
ness, government expenditures, etc.) and included in the
regression. Afterwards the fundamentals are decomposed
into permanent and temporary components – the perma-
nent components are included in the estimated real
exchange rate equation and equilibrium (fitted) rate is
inferred. Even more sophisticated method requires an
underlying model of the exchange rate – it is usually a mon-
etary model, like given by equation (1.6). First there is a
need to estimate parameters φ and λ what is done using his-
torical data. Then the parameters together with domestic
and foreign values for money supply, output, interest rate
and price levels are substituted to the model. If we are
(however unjustified) satisfied with a flexible model (6) the
subtraction of the result of (6) from a current exchange rate
gives the overvaluation measure. If we prefer the (more
realistic) sticky price model (7)-(8) by subtracting the result
of predicted exchange rate (8) from the current one, again,
we obtain RER overvaluation [6].
In practice the values obtained for RER are obviously not
precise. This happens primarily because of: different
method used, different composition of price indexes and
measurement errors. For example, Table 1-1 presents an
answer to the question whether the currencies of a country
in question were overvalued (before a crisis if applicable),
given by various authors and produced with various meth-
ods.
Although implications are quantitatively different, quali-
tatively they are similar. So, there is a point in estimating the
overvaluation, especially in light of a finding, that in general
the overvaluation helps predicting currency crises – as
explained in the next section.
1.2.3. Overvaluation and Currency Crises,
an Empirical Evidence
To fully understand the implications of the real exchange
rate overvaluation one has to analyze its sources. Generally
speaking, the overvaluation can arise as a consequence of:
– changes in the external environment: e.g. a change in
the terms of trade or a depreciation (devaluation) of major
trade partners' currencies. If these changes are temporary
the overvaluation is usually sustainable, if not (as in the case
of other currencies devaluation) they are the reason for an
adjustment;
– a change in domestic situation (e.g. supply-side
shocks), particularly and most interestingly macroeconomic
policy related causes. An exchange-rate-based disinflation
program, when economic agents fail to believe the authori-
ties about their targeted inflation and refuse to abandon
their (old) inflation expectations is one example. In such
cases inflation continues while the exchange rate is fixed
what results in real exchange rate overvaluation – a signal,
that the policy might have become unsustainable;
– financially related causes, most notably (excessive) for-
eign capital inflows which put an upward pressure on the
exchange rate.
The overvaluation can be undone basically by the exact-
ly opposite processes to the above-mentioned. However, in
practice, it seems more difficult to arrange a smooth real
depreciation (restore the equilibrium) than to allow the real
appreciation. This issue is tackled, for  example, in Goldfajn
and Valdes (1996). They assume that, after controlling for
other macroeconomic fundamentals, the real exchange rate
overvaluation can be undone in two ways: by cumulative
inflation differentials and by devaluation (among which a
currency crisis). Afterwards they calculate the probability
Table 1-1. The percentage overvaluation of currencies, as given by various studies.
Asia in 1997 MA PH TH IN KO SI Latin America MX BR AR CH CO PE VE
Chinn (PPI) ‘97 8 19 7 -5 -9 -6 STV 29
Chinn(WPI) ‘97 17 24 13 30 -2 12 G-S 16
Monetary     ‘97 2 -25 2 2 -12 35
1994
Dornbusch 30
G-S              ‘97 mo mo mo mo mo mo G-S 22 -11 7 5 -4 -2 44
Corsetti et.al.‘97 12 16 7.6 5.4 -13 18 JPM 3 1 13 -8 0 -5 9
Sachs    1990-97 10 30 10 20 - 10
2000
DB -2 5 17 0 10 5 -
mo- "moderately overvalued"; STV-Sachs, Tornell, Velasco (1995); G-S - Goldman and Sachs, G-S (2000); Chinn (1998), Monetary - Chinn (1998), mon-
etary model; JPM - JP Morgan; DB - Deutsche Bank; Dornbusch (2001), Corsetti et.al. (1998), Sachs (1997)
[6] On top of an (justified and sustainable) "overvaluation" (overshooting) predicted by the model itself.
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that the overvaluation would end smoothly without a sharp
devaluation (crisis) for a large set of countries over the peri-
od 1960–1994. They find that the probability of reverting
the prolonged (over six month) overvaluation successfully is
32% for an appreciation not exceeding 15%. For 20% the
misalignment the probability drops to 24%, for 25% it
stands at 10%, for 30% overvaluation it is only 3%, while
there is no undisturbed return from overvaluation more
than 35%. Goldfajn and Valdes also estimate the timing of a
currency collapse. Figure 1-1 presents their results – for
various levels of initial overvaluation it depicts the probabil-
ity that a devaluation (a crisis) would come within a given
period of time.
There is ample evidence that the real overvaluation can
explain currency crises. The simplest reasoning is: if the
exchange rate is up it must come down (with or without
government approval) – just because it is mean reverting. It
has also its indirect impact – first, if it stays high for a long
time this means that the authorities do not (want to) take
appropriate measures to bring it down, so, most probably
their policy is unsustainable. Second it has a negative impact
on the current account and if the deficit prolongs this intro-
duces nervousness among investors about the prospects of
debt repayment – they might cut off their credit to the
country forcing it to depreciate.
It may sound tautological but since the overvaluation is a
leading indicator of devaluation, it should be also a predictor
of a sharp devaluation, i.e. a currency crisis. Indeed, the eco-
nomic research provides strong support for that view. Table
1-2 presents the summary of various attempts to predict
currency crises – these papers usually included real
exchange rate overvaluation as one of explaining variables.
In the second column the t-statistics for the null hypothesis
that the overvaluation is irrelevant in crisis prediction is pre-
sented [7]. Whenever author tests more than one specifica-
tion additional t-statistics are presented. The result present-
ed in the table indicate strong support for the hypothesis
that real overvaluation is linked to currency crises. 
In my study the real exchange rate turned out to be the
most powerful crisis indicator. This result holds true even
when the model specification is changed. Both methods I
use – i.e. a normal probability binary choice method (probit)
and a panel fixed effect linear regression – produce similar,
significant results with respect to that variable. 
The advocates of the opposite view have only few argu-
ments. The most often raised is the (above-mentioned) Bal-
assa-Samuelson effect. According to it, real overvaluation
(as revealed by price index) shouldn't matter in emerging
economies because it does not impair competitiveness
(tradable goods sector productivity rise is higher). 
The results I obtained confirm that view to some extent.
I established that the significance of the real exchange rate
to currency crisis prediction is much lower for the emerging
economies which would indicate that this effect is present
and the exchange rate is usually only apparently overvalued
while the external situation is actually sustainable. On the
other hand, as Dornbusch (2001) argues, the Balassa-
Samuelson model is often used to justify the sustainability of
overvaluation in the presence of large current account
deficits, while, according to this model the apparent over-
valuation shouldn't cause an external deficit.
Some researchers, skeptical about the econometric
methodology prefer to use "before-after analysis" which is
usually done in graphs and depicts the stylized facts associ-
ated with currency crises. Aziz, Caramazza and Salgado
(2000) provide a recent example. They categorize crises
into subgroups: crises in industrial countries, in emerging
economies, crises characterized by currency crashes [8], by
reserve losses, "severe" crises, "mild" crises, crises accom-
panied by banking sector problems, crises with fast and slow
recoveries. Afterward, they analyze how the given variable
(real exchange rate) behaves on average in the neighbor-
hood of an average crisis. 
[7] Values over 1.9 indicate that, in about 95% confidence, the real overvaluation has an impact on the emergence of currency crises. For around
1.6 the confidence level is 10%.
[8] Crises in which currency depreciation accounts of more than 75% of a crisis index.
Figure 1-1. 
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1.2.4. Trade-link Contagion: Competitive
Devaluations
This section explores interrelation between real
exchange rate, current account balance and one specific
issue that connects them to currency crises, i.e. trade-link-
induced contagion.
When other currencies depreciate (devalue), while the
domestic currency remains unchanged it actually undergoes
overvaluation. The impact of these devaluations on the
given country is the stronger, the stronger are links with
devaluing countries. Particularly trade links seem to play the
major role. If the country belongs to the same trade block
as countries with depreciated currencies, or if they com-
pete on third countries' markets for an export share, the
devaluation of its partners may be a signal that the country
might have to arrange a devaluation as well. Unless its part-
ner's (real) devaluation is not undone by inflationary conse-
quences in sufficiently short time the country's competitive-
ness would be impaired and external situation become
unsustainable. Investors understand it and launch a specula-
tive attack on the given currency in anticipation of its deval-
uation. As a result the authorities are immediately forced to
devalue. After one country has devalued speculators attack
another, the most closely linked to the former one. This
results in the chain of competitive devaluation. Above-
described pattern is the essence of so-called trade-link con-
tagion.
Economists differ on the issue whether trade links are
important in the spread of crises. On one hand, theoreti-
cal models allow for it, for example Gerlach and Smets
(1994) build a model, which they then calibrate to fit the
case of Scandinavian countries. They show in simulation
that the devaluation of Sweden forces Finland in a short
time to devalue as well. The competitive devaluation phe-
nomenon was used as one explanation of recurrent deval-
uations within European Monetary System in the period
1992–1994.
The empirical evidence is, however, mixed but to the
advantage of the trade-link contagion. Eichengreen, Rose
and Wyplosz (1996a) is one of the first papers to deal with
the issue – the authors find strong support for the view that
trade links play an important role in the spread of crises.
Similarly Glick and Rose (1999), using different methodolo-
gy, try to explain why currency crises tend to be regional –
they find that the trade link is the most (or even the only)
important factor that can explain the coincidence of crises
in regional blocks. The phenomenon that during (recent)
crises stock market indexes tended to move together could
be given as a proof of contagion. This fact is explored by
Forbes (2000) – she finds that, although trade connections
do not fully explain stock market returns during crises they
CASE Reports No. 41
Table 1-2. The evidence on the significance of real exchange rate overvaluation in predicting currency crises
Study Results (t-statistics) Notice
Edwards (2001) 1) 0.03         2) 1.05
3) 0.59           4) 0.12
four definitions of crisis
overvaluation as deviations from PPP
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin
(1998)
1) 4.75        2) 4.9
3) 3.8          4) 3.04
5) 3.25        6) 3.75
7) 6             8) 5.6
9) 6             10) 2.8
different samples
1-4) during current account reversals
5-10) prediction of overall crash
Ahluvalia (2000) 1) 2.7         2) 3
3) 1.46       4) 2.48
two samples
two different set of contagion controls
Caramazza et.al. (2000) 1) 2.17       2) 1.70
3) .62         4) 1.07
different specification of crisis index
Bussiere and Mulder
(1999)
1) 1.9 early Warning System with 5 regressors
Frankel and Rose (1996) 1) 1.51       2) 2.53 1)default      2)predictive power
Berg and Pattillo (1999) 1) 15,9      2) 13,5
3) 3,35
1)'indicator model'        2)linear model
3)"piecewise linear model"
Goldfajn and Valdes
(1996)
1) 1.69      2) 1.53
3) 2.63      4) 1.51
different models and nominal vs. real devaluation
Kaminsky, Lizondo,
Reinhard, (1998)
not t-statistics, but
“noise to signal ratio”
1) 0.19 (the best result)
univariate "signal" analysis, "noise to signal ratio"; 0-perfect
prediction, 0.5-no information, >0,5 worse than unconditional
guess
Sasin (2001) 1)4.7         2)5.4
3)1.6         4)2.8
5)4.1         6)2.6
-1,3,5)fixed effect linear model; 2,4,6) probit; 1,2)full sample;
3,4)emerging markets; 5,6)developed economies -Actually
Sasin checks around 10,000 specifications and concludes that
an average significance for RER is 4 with standard deviation of
about 2.
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are undoubtfully economically and statistically important.
What is worth to notice is the fact that in the above-men-
tioned analyses other macroeconomic variables are more or
less insignificant with respect to contagion. Sasin (2000), in
turn, constructs an index of vulnerability to trade-link con-
tagion and proves that this index is highly significant in crisis
prediction.
On the other hand, Masson (1998) argues that trade
(which he categorizes as a "spillover") cannot explain the
coincidence of speculative attacks on Latin America's and
Asian currencies during, respectively, Mexican peso and
Thai baht crises. Baig and Goldfajn (1998) also reject the
importance of trade links in the spread of crises.
Finally several authors [e.g. Caramazza et. al., 2000] take
an intermediate attitude and claim that trade effects are
actually important but are usually overshadowed by other
(notably financial) factors. Apart from the evidence obtained
from econometric estimations, the pattern of competitive
devaluation is very appealing. This point of view, especially
when financial investors subscribe to it, can, of course,
become a self-fulfilling prophecy
1.3. Current Account
1.3.1. Evolution of the Point of View 
on the Current Account
It is interesting to notice that over past decades there
have been important changes in the way the economist view
the current account – a throughout survey is included in
Edwards (2001), on which this section draws. It can be said
that with respect to policy implications and/or currency
crises this evolution came from "current account deficit mat-
ters" through "current account deficit is irrelevant as long as
the public sector is balanced" and, again, "deficit matters"
finally to "deficit may matter".
1.3.1.1. The Early Views: the Trade/Elasticity 
Approach
The 1950s up to mid-1970s discussion on country's
external position was dominated by the "elasticity approach"
and stressed issues like trade flows or terms of trade. Dur-
ing this period most developing countries used to run large
and persistent current account deficits – the usual remedies
to counteract the problem were recurrent devaluations.
Economists, convinced that the external position should be
balanced, focused on issue whether devaluations brought an
improvement to the situation – the improvement, in turn,
depended on export and import price (exchange rate) elas-
ticities. These studies resulted in a so called "elasticities pes-
simism" – the inferred elasticities were small meaning that
the country had to arrange a large exchange rate adjustment
to improve its external position. Nevertheless, after exam-
ining 21 major devaluations during 1958–1969 Cooper
(1971) argued that on average devaluation succeeded in
bringing the current account back to balance. On the other
hand, other authors claimed that since developing countries
exported mainly commodities and since there was no
prospect for a surge in demand for such goods in the world
market – the devaluations were ineffective and brought
about only recession and income contraction. The answer
was not to devalue (one time after another) but to encour-
age industrialization through import substitution policies.
The view – advocated, among others, by prominent UN
officials – turned out to be totally wrong.
1.3.1.2. Intertemporal Approach: the Irrelevance of
the Current Account Deficit and the Lawson Doctrine
During the second part of the 1970s the world experi-
enced an oil shock and, partially because of that, most coun-
tries' current account worsened dramatically – between
1973 and 1979 the aggregate developed countries' external
position moved from an US$11 bln surplus to an US$28 bil-
lion deficit (reflected, of course, in enormous OPEC coun-
tries' surplus). These developments forced economists to
take a closer look on the determinants of a current account
and its further sustainability. The most important progress
was dropping the trade-flow/elasticity approach and focus-
ing on intertemporal dimension of the current account. The
fact that from the national accounting perspective the cur-
rent account is just equal to national savings minus invest-
ment was rediscovered. On the other hand, both savings
and investment decisions are based on intertemporal factors
– such as permanent income, expected return on invest-
ment project, etc. – so, as a consequence, the current
account is an intertemporal phenomenon. The (policy)
implication was that as long as (large) current account deficit
reflected new investment perspectives but not falling saving
rates there was no reason to be concerned about it. The
deficit meant only, that economic agents, expecting future
prosperity brought by new investment opportunities, were
only smoothing their consumption paths – the consumption
was moved from the future to the present and financed by
foreign sector (i.e. by debt accumulation), which would be
repaid later, when growth prospects materialize. The influ-
ential paper by Sachs (1981) insisted on this view.
In the beginning of 1980s, the intertemporal approach
also gave answers to concerns about mounting debt prob-
lem. Sachs (1981) claimed that because this debt reflected
increase in investment in the presence of rising (or stable)
saving rates it should not pose a problem of repayment. In
addition, the new approach made a distinction between the
deficits that result from fiscal imbalances and those reflect-
ing private sector decisions. The public sector was thought
to act rather on political than on economic and rational
CASE Reports No. 41
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grounds, so the current account deficit induced by the bud-
get deficit was "bad", while private sector's decisions were
assumed rational and the current account deficit responding
to them was optimal, i.e. "good" – in the future the private
sector would be able to make necessary corrective actions
(while public sector most probably not). The argument that
a large current account deficit is not a cause of concern if
the fiscal accounts are balanced is associated with former
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, and therefore
it is known as "Lawson's Doctrine" [9]. It has also became
widely accepted paradigm for the external situation analysis
– for example, in 1981, when Chile's current account deficit
exceeded 14% of GDP senior IMF officials assured that as
long as the "twin deficits" do not coincide there is absolute-
ly no reason to be concerned.
The debt crisis of 1982 exposed the obvious inadequacy
of prevailing views on the current account. In fact, the crisis
erupted in countries, of which most were running large cur-
rent account deficits simultaneously with balanced fiscal
accounts and/or increasing investment rates. The crisis had
rather profound implications. In Latin America, for example,
the net transfer of resources swung from more than US$12
billion yearly inflows between 1976 and 1981 to the average
US$24 billion a year outflows in the following five year peri-
od. The forced adjustment brought about through import
(of capital and intermediate goods) and investment contrac-
tion resulted in a serious recession. During much of the
1980s most developing countries were cut from the inter-
national capital market and running external surpluses or
moderate deficits. The Lawson Doctrine was (by majority)
abandoned and emphasis put again on the current account
and the (real) exchange rate (overvaluation). The reasoning
went, again, that large current account deficits were (often)
a sign of troubles and a rationale for devaluation.
1.3.1.3. Surge in Capital Inflows: from the 5% Rule of
Thumb to "Current Account Sustainability"
The end of 1980s and the beginning of 1990's witnessed
some major changes in the world economy, of which the
market oriented reforms in developing countries as well as
rapid development in the international financial market and
surge in capital flows were the most pronounced. Unprece-
dented amount of these flows was directed into emerging
markets, which were apparently not prepared to absorb
such a capital overabundance. The surge in inflows induced
a real exchange rate appreciation, loss of competitiveness
and, again, a current account deficit. Another problem was
that capital inflows in the presence of insufficient investment
opportunities crowded out domestic savings to some
extent. These processes were readily visible in Mexico; the
current account deficit during 1992–1994 averaged 7% of
GDP and, as the World Bank (1993) estimated, about two-
thirds of the widening of the current account deficit in 1992
could be ascribed to lower private savings. Eventually Mex-
ico experienced a currency crisis in 1994–1995 [10]. 
The importance of external balances in limiting country's
vulnerability to currency crisis was reiterated after the cri-
sis. The prevailing view was that large current account
deficits were likely to be unsustainable, regardless of the
underlying factors. The US Secretary of the Treasury Larry
Summers explicitly stated that close attention should be
paid to any current account deficit in excess of 5% of GDP.
This number has been, and still is, very popular in assessing
a vulnerability to a crisis. Indeed, studies show [11] that on
average a 4% of GDP is a threshold over which current
account deficit becomes a concern to private sector ana-
lysts. On the basis of this rule of thumb, warning has been
addressed to Malaysia and Thailand that they should contain
their deficits, which in the second part of 1990s went
beyond the safe line.
The overabundance of capital created a problem of its
efficient intermediation and in many cases problems of
speculation and moral hazard. In addition, as opposed to
1970s capital flows that took form of syndicated bank loans,
in the 1990s the capital streamed into equity and bond
instruments. Since portfolio flows are quite volatile an
apparently underestimated threat of (possible) sudden
reversals emerged. The focus on current account deficit
was not only with respect to its existence but also to how it
was financed. In contrary to short-term flows, the FDI flows
were thought to be desirable way of sustaining the deficit.
It is still a controversial and unresolved issue whether
current account deficits were a primary cause of the 1997
Asian crisis. Corsetti et.al. (1998) find some support for this
hypothesis and argue that a group of countries that came
under attack in 1997 appear to have been those with large
current account deficit throughout the 1990s. But this sup-
port is very limited – for five main Asian countries during
1990–1996 the deficit exceeded an arbitrary 5% only 12
out of 35 possible times, for two years preceding crises this
ratio even comes down to 3 out of 10 possible times.
The relatively balanced fiscal and external position of
Asian countries before the crisis only confused economists
and researchers. I try to distinguish between (generally
speaking) two ways of understanding the importance of cur-
rent account for currency crises. Both are connected with
each other and can be described as "current account deficit
may matter".
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[9] As will be discussed later, the Lawson Doctrine is not (directly) implied by the intertemporal model.
[10] Mexican officials still claim that large current accont deficit was not a main cause of the crisis because, what's interesting, the public sector
finances were under control.
[11] See, for example, Ades and Kuane (1997).
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First, many economists argue that the nature of curren-
cy crises has changed overtime. Dornbusch (2001), for
example identifies, that the old-style crises involved a cycle
of overspending and real appreciation that worsened the
current account – usually the external deficit was a counter-
part of a budget deficit. The debt rose, foreign reserves
declined and finally country had to arrange a devaluation. In
this respect they were current-account-crises. The new-
style crises are centered on doubts about the solvency of
the balance sheet of a significant part of the economy and
the exchange rate. The balance sheet may be undermined
by the large portfolio of non-performing loans or by maturi-
ty (or currency) mismatches. The crisis is triggered by sud-
den capital flight. This view recognizes that capital markets
rather than current account dominate exchange rate issues.
The role for real overvaluation and current account deficit is
secondary rather – it can act as a focal point in inviting cur-
rency crises to the country already having a balance sheet
problem. Dornbusch (2001) speculates that it is safe to say
that a rapid real appreciation amounting to 25% or more
and an increase in the current account deficit to exceed 4%
of GDP, without prospects of correction, take a country into
the red zone.
Secondly, various authors, suspicious of one-for-all 4%
threshold and believing that the current account deficit is a
basis and deeply underlying cause for external crises, try to
define the notion of "current account sustainability".
Because of the lasting improvement in capital market
access, persistent terms of trade improvement and pro-
ductivity growth emerging economies can, as it is predict-
ed by the intertemporal models, finance moderate current
accounts on an ongoing basis. The weakest notion of sus-
tainability implies that the present value of the (future) cur-
rent account deficits (plus debt) must equal the present
value of the (future) surpluses, or in other words that a
country will (in infinity) repay its debt. This criterion is cer-
tainly not satisfactory – the debt repayment prospect may
be too distant and it says nothing about the appropriate-
ness of a present deficit – virtually any present deficit can
be (somehow) undone by sufficiently large surplus in the
(unspecified) future. According to the stronger notion of
sustainability, the deficit is sustainable if it can be reverted
into sufficient surplus in the foreseeable future and debt
repaid on an ongoing basis (in a sense of non-increasing
debt/GDP ratio) without drastic policy changes and/or a
crisis. This definition is a starting point for a calculation of
a sustainable current account – if the actual deficit lasts
longer above sustainable level and a country doesn't
undertake corrective measures (devaluation or domestic
demand restrain) it can perhaps expect an externally
forced adjustment.
1.3.2. Models of the Current Account
1.3.2.1. Exchange Rate and Elasticity Approach [12]
It is natural to analyze the current account in the context
of (real) exchange rates, that is in the framework of mone-
tary models (variations of the quantity theory of money).
For example, it can be shown that in Dornbusch-type mod-
els (including covered interest rate parity, money market
clearing immediately and slow adjustment of goods market)
expansionary monetary shock results in so-called "over-
shooting", and until the price of domestic goods fully offset
the shock the real exchange rate is effectively overvalued –
the current account is in deficit.
In terms of elasticity, it is quite easy to derive the so-
called Marshall-Lerner condition saying that devaluation
brings an improvement to the current account only if a sum
of the elasticity of a foreign demand for domestic export and
the elasticity of a domestic demand for import is larger than
one.
1.3.2.2. Portfolio Approach
According to standard portfolio theory, agents are will-
ing to hold a constant share of each asset and this share
depends only on agent's risk aversion and asset's perfor-
mance (mean return and risk). We can transpose this rea-
soning to current account context. The net international
demand for country's liabilities is then given by
(1.9)
where D is a stock of country's gross foreign liabilities, FX is
a stock of country's gross foreign assets (for example foreign
exchange reserves), W* and W denote respectively world
and domestic wealth, α* and α denote world's desired hold-
ings of country's assets and country's desired holdings of
worlds assets as a share of respective wealths.
Assuming that the country's wealth is proportional to its
(potential) GDP (denoted Y) with proportionality factor θ
and that the country's wealth is a δ-proportion of total
world's wealth we can write
(1.10)
where the complex (but constant) expression adjacent to Y
is shorten to λ. It is important to notice, that λ can be inter-
preted as a net world desired holdings of country's assets as
a ratio to GDP or simply debt/GDP ratio.
Taking first differences, dividing by the GDP we obtain
(1.11)
[12] I don't include here the Mundell-Fleming model, which is a common tool to obtain (only) qualitative guidance on how the balance of payment
is going to behave depending on the exchange rate regime and capital mobility.
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which, after and moving foreign exchange to the right hand
side, is equivalent to
(1.12)
where cad is a current account deficit (as a share of GDP),
fx is a foreign reserves to GDP ratio, γ is a growth rate of
GDP. This simple equation says that in equilibrium the cur-
rent account deficit (corrected for foreign exchange
reserves accumulation) is a constant fraction of GDP
growth. In other words, it means that country, other things
kept constant, can run a deficit to a tune of its growth. Two
things should be made more precise. First, it is reasonable
to assume that the economy might want to hold a constant
foreign-reserves-to-import ratio (not a constant foreign-
reserves-to-GDP ratio). We can write
(1.13)
assuming a constant import growth η. Second, improve-
ment takes into account the difference in real exchange
rates. Due to world inflation or for example the Balassa-
Samuelson effect, the (emerging) country's real exchange
rate can get overvalued. Increase in the domestic currency
(real) value reduces both debt and foreign reserves, so we
have to make respective changes in the equation, which
now becomes
(1.14)
where ε is the real exchange rate overvaluation. The equa-
tion is ready for estimation and/or calibration and inferences
about steady state sustainable current account deficit. The
main message of (1.14) is that sustainable current account
deficit vary across countries and depend on the variables
that affect portfolio decision as well as economic growth.
1.3.2.3. Intertemporal Choice Approach
This model is based on a consumption smoothing and
permanent income theory and is a straight adaptation of
individual choices to the economy as a whole.
Consider a representative consumer that maximizes the
discounted value of (lifetime) utility given by
(1.15)
subject to 
(1.16)
where β is the domestic discount factor, u is the utility func-
tion [13], B is economy's stock of foreign assets, r is the
fixed world interest rate, Y is GDP, C is consumption, I is
investment and G is government spending. This infinite opti-
mization problem has no closed solution in general, but if
we assume that the utility function u(C) is quadratic and that
the world and domestic discount factors are equal (i.e.
β(1+r)=1) the solution for consumption path is given by
(1.17)
where Y-I-G i.e. GDP net of investment and government
expenditures can be referred to as the net output. The
equation states that along optimal path the consumption is
equal to the annuity value of expected future stream of net
output, or that it is proportional to the permanent income
rather than the income at any instant.
Using (1.16) we obtain the result for the current
account (CA=Bt-Bt-1, i.e. positive values indicate a surplus) 
(1.18)
This links the current account position to the expecta-
tions of future (net) output changes. In other words when a
country's economic prospect is bright, or if the investment
opportunities exceed saving propensity, its residents prefer
to move the consumption from the future to the present
and finance it externally, being sure of their ability to repay
it later – the current account imbalances, consequently,
reflect optimal and rational intertemporal decision of eco-
nomic agents, they are sustainable and should not be a mat-
ter of concern. 
The second version of the model can be obtain by max-
imizing (1.15) under assumption that the utility function u(C)
has constant elasticity of substitution σ, i.e. 
(1.19)
and that the worlds interest rate is a random variable. The
current account balance can be presented as
(1.20)
where βw is a world discount factor (from time t to time s)
and tilded variables indicate a "permanent" level of a vari-
able for example
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(1.21)
where
(1.22)
is a market discount factor.
The equation (1.20) states, that the current account is
primarily driven by the deviation of key variables (net output
and the world interest rate) from their permanent levels.
The last expression on the right hand side represent a "con-
sumption-tilting" effect: when the domestic impatience rate
(1/β) is larger than the world's one residents want to con-
sume their (permanent) income earlier, so they move con-
sumption from the future to the present causing current
account deficit to rise [14]. But the main conclusion of (1.20)
is that a country can run a current account deficit in
response to exogenous shocks that affect present and/or
future growth prospects as well as changes in the rest of the
world (reflected in changes of the world's interest rate).
Table 1-3 summarizes these implications.
First, net debtor countries in the presence of temporar-
ily low worlds interest rate [15] should save some of bene-
fits from lower debt payment and move (smooth) the con-
sumption into the future. A rise in the rate of savings will
improve current account. The opposite is a case for net
creditor countries. Consequently, if net debtor countries
rise their consumption in response to the temporary drop in
the world interest rate they destabilize their optimal con-
sumption paths. Investment is unaffected – only permanent
changes in output growth can increase it to assure optimal
capital/output ratio. Second, the response to shock improv-
ing growth prospects depends crucially on the expectations
whether the improvement is transitory or permanent. The
transitory surge in country-specific productivity (growth)
induces savings as agents save part of temporarily high
income for the future. Investment remains unchanged, so
the current account improves. The permanent rise in coun-
try-specific growth prospects rises permanent income and
induces higher investment. Consumption also increases, so
the country moves into a current account deficit. The tran-
sitory rise in global productivity increases (total) world sav-
ings and put a downward pressure on the world interest
rate, which decreases temporarily below average, with
above-explained consequences. The permanent rise in glob-
al productivity rises the permanent income and gives incen-
tives to consume more in present, but at the same time, the
permanent world interest rate goes up. Because the world
is a closed economy the current account can't change simul-
taneously in all countries – the world interest rate rise is suf-
ficient to squeeze (back) consumption in debtor countries
and induce saving necessary to pay increased debt service in
the future – and do the opposite in creditor countries.
Intertemporal models were further refined by incorpo-
rating other relevant variables in order to study policy impli-
cations of various shocks. For example Obstfeld and Rogoff
(1996) build a model in which demographic factors (fluctua-
tions in the labor force) play role. Their model (after some
simplifications) yields
(1.23)
where L is a labor force. The implications of the model
have been used to explain the current account deficit after
Israel has, during 1989–1997, incurred a demographic
shock – a large inflow of (former Soviet Union) immi-
grants amounting to 800.000 people or almost 20% of the
population.
Overlapping generations models have been analyzed in
context of the current account deficit to correct for life-
cycle considerations, establish its link with labor force com-
position, etc.
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Table 1-3. Current account reaction to various shocks as predicted by the intertemporal approach
Temporary Permanent
Shock
Saving Investment Curr. acc. Saving Investment Curr. acc.
debtor countries + 0 +World interest
rate below
mean creditor counties - 0 -
not applicable
country's + 0 + - + -
debtor + 0 + + + 0
Rise in
productivity global
creditor - 0 - - - 0
Note: + at current account position means improvement.
Source: Reisen (1998), extended by the author.
[14] There is evidence that this is a case with emerging economies.
[15] Permanent drop below the average is, of course, nonsense.
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In spite of being theoretically well justified the intertem-
poral models produce, under plausible parameter values,
bizarre and unacceptable results. Numerical simulations
show that the optimal reaction to external shocks is to run
very high current account deficits. After accumulating a very
large external debt and as the shock dies out the economy
switches to equally implausible surpluses. Obstfeld and
Rogoff (1996) demonstrate, that a small open economy with
constant return to scale production function, domestic pro-
ductivity growth exceeding that of the world, constant
world interest rate and no borrowing constraints should run
a steady state surplus of about 50% of GDP. Similar model
developed to understand the impact of financial liberaliza-
tion for the external position and adapted to the case of
Spain show that after a financial reform Spain should have
run a deficit peaking at 60% of GDP. Analysis of the eco-
nomic behavior of a small economy with investment instal-
lation costs implies that Brazil should have accumulated a
foreign debt of more than 300% of its GDP.
Such current account and debt/GDP ratios are not
recorded in reality and prove that relaying on the notion of
frictionless economy (principally perfect capital mobility and
no credit constraints) is of little help in explaining the actual
evolution of current account behavior. Other variables that
matter, sometimes hardly measurable, as the country's will-
ingness to pay and foreigner's willingness to lend, should be
included in the model.
Credit constraint received, particularly after the Mexi-
can crises, special attention,. Their main assumption is that
the authorities cannot borrow as much as they want on the
world market. When this constraint is introduced, the
model's behavior improves significantly. It also produces a
situation in which a change in the level of the borrowing
constrain (a switch in market sentiment for example) can
result in a currency crisis.
There is an ongoing research on the links between bud-
get and current account deficits or, in other words, whether
the Lawson Doctrine is valid (and to what extent and why
not). First, if Ricardian equivalence holds budget deficit
should not matter at all [16] and the current account bal-
ance is always an outcome of private sector decisions – so
people who believe in Lawson Doctrine prove that their
don't believe in Ricardian equivalence. On the other hand,
the government behavior is distortionary and in practice
there is ample evidence that Ricardian equivalence doesn't
hold – the estimated so-called Ricardian offset coefficient
average around 0.5, which means, that 1% (of GDP)
increase in government deficit raises the current account
deficit by 0.5% (of GDP). There are more reasons why
Lawson Doctrine shouldn't hold. It can be argued that much
of the private sector debt is actually contingent public liabil-
ity – governments have proven many times that when things
go wrong they step in and bail it out. Various deposit insur-
ances are other kinds of the same thing. Moreover private
sector may hold excessively optimistic expectations about
its permanent income level, financial market bubbles may
add to the problem by discouraging private savings through
wealth effect.
1.3.3. How to Calculate a Sustainable Current
Account Deficit
Generally speaking there are two ways of calculating the
sustainable current account. The first one bases on country
specific knowledge and involves less quantitative but more
narrative (or rather intuitive) methods. The second one is
model-based and requires the use (sometimes quite sophis-
ticated) econometric tools and estimations.
1.3.3.1. Underlying Current Account Balance
The former approach is usually implemented in the fol-
lowing way (known as "underlying current account bal-
ance"). First step is to estimate (or rather project) how the
current account would develop in the near future if no new
shocks arrive, i.e. at prevailing exchange rate, when the
country and its neighbors operate at usual level of capacity
utilization and when lagged effects of past shocks (changes
in policies, in the terms of trade, in prices and other tem-
porary factors) die out. This procedure yields an "underly-
ing" current account balance. Second step involves deter-
mining the sustainable (or "normal") level of savings-invest-
ment gap consistent with a long-run equilibrium when the
home country and all its financial partners operate with low
inflation and without financial sector disturbances – this pro-
cedure yields "normal" capital flows balance. In the third
step the two outcomes are compared and if they are far
apart it means, that the current account position is unsus-
tainable in the long run. This calculation requires relatively
much country specific knowledge – its export structure,
policy stance, past events and other factors should be
known and used in the procedure.
1.3.3.2. Model-based Calculations
The second approach is usually done in the framework
of the theoretical model of the current account. For exam-
ple, one can exploit the result that the current account
(deficit) is equal to the present value of expected declines in
[16] So-called Ricardian equivalence is an outcome of an analysis in a forward-looking rational expectations framework and states that (under some
assumptions) the way in which government finances itself does not matter for private sector decisions (consumption path). In this context it implies that
in the presence of increased budget spendings financed by bond issues private sector adjust immediately by increase in savings in expectations for future
increase in taxes (to buy the debt back).
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net output, as in equation (1.18). The only problem is that
this expression involves expectations, and the researcher
doesn't know how and on what information set does the
public sector build its expectations. To get around this prob-
lem it can be assumed that the current account itself reflects
all information about the future development in the net out-
put. Thus, including the current account in the conditioning
information set is equivalent to incorporating all information
that private agents use in their forecasting of this variable.
Therefore we can write
zt=Ω zt-1+et (1.23)
where z is a vector including relevant variables, particularly
net output and current account, Ω is a transition matrix and
e is a disturbance term. As all variables are stationary [17]
vector autoregression method can be used in estimating the
transition matrix Ω . When it is done we can calculate
Etzt+k= Ωk zt (1.24)
which can be incorporated directly into (1.18) and finally we
obtain an optimal current account
CA*= -[1 0]Ω/(1+r)][I- Ω/(1+r)]-1zt (1.25)
if we assume that net output is the first element of z, while
current account is the second one and I is an identity matrix.
Ostry (1997) uses this method to calculate the optimal
current account for ASEAN countries, and conclude that the
development of external balances of these countries fol-
lowed the consumption smoothing pattern rather closely.
Similarly Ghosh and Ostry (1995), using the data for a group
of developing countries, show that, overall, the intertempo-
ral model satisfactorily captures the main features of the
current account performance in the sample.
Another way to make sustainability operational is to
introduce the non-increasing debt/GDP ratio. Having
Dt = (1+r)Dt-1-Tt (1.26)
and Yt/Yt-1 = γ
where is foreign debt, T is trade balance and γ is economic
growth. In terms of ratios to GDP we can rewrite
(1+γ) dt = (1+r) dt-1-tt (27)
The condition of non-increasing debt/GDP ratio is dt=dt-1,
so we have that a trade surplus needed to stabilize this ratio
is t=(r-γ)d (share of GDP), which gives a sustainable current
account deficit as
cad*=rd-(r-γ)d=γd (1.28)
The portfolio approach also uses non-increasing
debt/GDP ratio (and yields similar results). Goldman and
Sachs Sustainable Current Account Deficit model (GS-
SCAD) is one example. Using a 25-country data set it esti-
mated the ratio of external liabilities foreigners are willing to
hold as well as each country's potential growth rate. Then
the long run sustainable deficit is computed in the above-
sketched manner – the results are included in Table 1-4.
With an exception of China calculated levels are rather
moderate, ranging from 1.9% to 4.5% of GDP.
Reisen (1998) also uses this methodology and controls
for a change in international reserves to the tune of import
increase. He estimated parameters γ,ε and η (growth rate,
pace of overvaluation, increase in import) and calibrated the
model assuming that investors wish to hold 50% of GDP of
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[17] If the is a consumption tilting effect the tilting component (which is nonstationary) should be first subtracted from the current account.
Table 1-4. 1997 current account deficits (Cad), sustainable Cads (Scad), Steady State Scads (SSScad)
Country Cad Scad SSScad Country Cad Scad SSScad
Argentina 2.7 3.9 2.9 Mexico 1.7 2.1 1.9
Brazil 4.5 2.9 1.9 Morocco 1.8 0.3 1.3
Bulgaria -2.6 0.4 2.4 Panama 6.1 0.8 1.9
Chile 3.7 4.2 2.9 Peru 5.1 3.3 2.9
China -1.4 12.9 11.1 Philippines 4.2 4.5 3.8
Colombia 4.8 2.6 1.9 Poland 3.8 4.7 3.6
Czech Rep. 8.6 2.1 1.3 Romania 0.5 2.3 1.9
Ecuador 2.0 -0.5 1.3 Russia -2.8 2.5 1.9
Hungary 4.0 0.8 1.3 S. Africa 1.8 3.0 1.9
India 1.8 3.8 2.8 Thailand 5.4 6.0 4.5
Indonesia 3.0 4.0 3.4 Turkey 1.2 2.1 1.9
Korea 3.8 4.9 3.6 Venezuela -4.6 2.2 1.9
Malaysia 4.1 4.9 3.4
Source: Goldman and Sachs (1997)
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a given country in its liabilities and the comfortable level of
foreign reserves is equal to six months of import. Values
obtained are rather modest as well (not included).
Unresolved question is whether foreign direct invest-
ment should be included when computing sustainable
current account deficits. The experience of Singapore,
which during 1970s ran a deficit of average 12% of GDP
financed in half by FDI flows (and in the presence of rising
saving and investment rates), or a recent case of Estonia
speaks in favor of the view that FDI inflows significantly
increase current account sustainability and decrease the
possibility of a balance-of-payment crisis. Table 5 presents
the proportions of a current account deficit financed by
FDI inflows for five Asian countries just before the
1997–1998 Asian crisis. This example also seems to sup-
port the above hypothesis – only Malaysia had a decent
ratio of about one. FDI is special in the way that they are
driven by non-cyclical consideration, are less subject to
sudden stops or reversals and their stocks are rather illiq-
uid. On the other hand FDI, stimulates the demand for
(intermediate and capital goods) import. Fry (1996)
argues that the long-run effect of FDI on the current
account is positive (through accelerated growth or
(increased national) saving effect), while in the short run
(three years for six Asian countries) it actually worsen
current account. This finding is consistent with intertem-
poral approach to the current account and speaks in favor
of FDI flows. The findings of Frankel and Rose (1996) and
Edwards (2001) also support this point.
Sustainable current account deficit calculation is subject
to serious limitations. They neglect some aspects of the
issue of how the current account adjusts to the shock, i.e.
the transition from old (long run) sustainable current
account to a new one. Take, for example, the portfolio
model and assume that suddenly foreigners wish to hold
more assets of the country in question – that can arise due
to many factors, such as shift in market sentiments or a pro-
ductivity-enhancing shock. Using chapter 1.3.2.2. notation
and neglecting the foreign reserves adjustment it implies
that α* increases, so λ increases as well (let's say from λ to
λ*). Assume that the current account adjustment follows
the process
(1.29)
Due to limited capital mobility and other rigidities the
desired change cannot take place immediately – the actu-
al share of domestic assets in foreign hands λt increases
gradually to reach its desired level λ*. φ is the coefficient
of the speed of adjustment. The dynamic behavior of the
current account deficit exhibits specific pattern; namely it
initially sizably overshoots its new long-run sustainability
level. A simulation for Mexico shows that if we assume
that (due to, for example, decrease in country risk) the
desired holdings of Mexican debt increase from 38.3% to,
say, 43%, than, under reasonable calibration, the long-run
sustainable deficit will change from 1.9% of GDP to 3.5%
of GDP, but initial overshooting of the current account
will send the deficit over 5% of GDP – it all happens
because of the small change in investors' preferences.
This simulation shows that the long-run sustainability
ratios computed using the theoretical framework might
be very misleading, and it's actually hard to conclude
whether in the short-run the current account deficit is
really excessive. 
This criticism is also related to other computational
difficulties like problems with proper estimation of
desired debt holdings, of time preference coefficient, util-
ity functions, and other elasticities. The proper extraction
of market expectation is exceedingly difficult as well. For
this reason caution should be exercised with respect to
the results and implications of such calculations.
1.3.3.3. Different Methods for Different Types of
Economies
Over years of practice economists and policymakers
tend to differentiate between different types of
economies and agree that different methods and models
should be used with different types. Broadly speaking
there are three types of countries: major industrial coun-
tries, advanced and investment grade emerging small
open economies as well as developing, financially con-
strained countries. For the first type the sustainability is
usually gauged with respect to equilibrium exchange rate
explicitly taking into consideration the interrelation with
other major developed industrial economies. For the sec-
ond type treating "the rest of the world" as exogenous
(constant) variable and proceeding with properly calibrat-
ed intertemporal choice models without borrowing con-
straints gives quite satisfactory results. Finally, for the
third type the limited access to the international capital
market and possible "sudden stops" in external financing
has to be explicitly incorporated into calculation.
Table 1-5. The FDI to current account ratio in East Asian countries before 1997, in %
Country 1994 1995 1996 Country 1994 1995 1996
Korea 21 21 10 Philippines 54 75 39
Indonesia 76 68 80 Thailand 17 15 16
Malaysia 98 90 111
Source: Corsetti et. al. (1998)
( ) )( 1** −−++= ttcad λλφεγλ
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1.3.4. Empirical Evidence
1.3.4.1. Determinants of Current Account and its
Empirical Distribution over Time and Countries
With limited guidance from theory researchers turn to
empirical evidence to discover the determinants of the cur-
rent account balance and its impact on the economy.
Edwards (2001) analyses the distribution of current
account deficits over time and countries. He is interested
how long and to what extent countries were able to run
deficits. 
What is visible from the country experiences that 1973
oil shock brought important changes to industrial countries'
current account balances, which swung into large deficits..
Middle East countries' recorded a surplus; Latin America
and Asia were not significantly affected by the oil crisis. On
the contrary the 1979 oil shock hit every region. We can
also see a strong and successful effort of world's economies
to adjust to high oil prices during 1980s. These develop-
ments seem to support both consumption smoothing and
trade elasticity approaches. It can be also noticed that
recently current account deficits are rather modest from
historical perspective.
How long were countries able to sustain high external
deficits? [18] Table 1-6 presents this summary – there were
relatively few cases in which the deficit was sustained for
more than five years. For ten years there were only eleven
such episodes, out of which five in Africa, three in Asia, and
two in Latin America. Australia and New Zealand are given
as an example that a stable, open and market oriented coun-
try with reliable macroeconomic policies and investment
opportunities can indeed persistently sustain relatively high
current account deficits.
Various researchers tried to establish empirical determi-
nants of the current account. Reisen (1998) tested the
intertemporal approach by including theory-predicted
determinants into an empirical regression. Out of invest-
ment, domestic productivity, world productivity, lagged cur-
rent account, terms of trade and world interest rate only
world productivity (and, of course, lagged current account)
proved to be significant. When he controlled for a budget
reaction function (a government response to a difference
between savings and investment) the world productivity and
interest rate gained some significance, but only at about
20% confidence level [19].  On the other hand, all variables
had the predicted sign (as in Table 1-3). Reisen also noticed
that, as a result of capital inflows in the 1990s, only in
Argentina and Peru the productivity of investment rose (as
indicated by the incremental capital output ratio), and exact-
ly not in these countries but, most notably, in Asia the cur-
rent account deficit widened rapidly. So, summing up, there
is some, but very limited support for the intertemporal
choice model. 
Chinn and Prasad (2000) concentrate on the fundamen-
tal determinants of savings and investment. In simple regres-
sion framework they tried to establish empirical evidence of
current account determinants. One of their findings is
exceptionally robust; namely, the budget deficit is signifi-
cantly and positively linked to the current account deficit
with a (Ricardian offset) coefficient of 0.6. To some extent
financial deepening positively influence an external balance
(because it makes savings intermediation more efficient)
[20]. Other variables predicted by models or included bas-
ing on common knowledge perform inconsistently and
rather poorly.
1.3.4.2. The Links Between Current Account
and Crises
The phenomenon of sudden and large current account
reversals and its link with output decline and currency
crises deserve special attention. The question is how
often and with what magnitude and effects do such rever-
sals occur and, finally, how costly they are. Milesi-Ferretti
and Razin [MFR, 1998] as well as Edwards (2001) under-
take a similar study of indicators and consequences of cur-
rent account reversals on large sample low- and middle-
income countries between 1970 and mid-1990s. They dis-
tinguish and compare the events of reversals and crises.
Their definition of a reversal differs somehow, but the
main point is that the external balance should improve at
least 3–5% of GDP (in MFR this improvement should last
at least for some time). They find that reversals are not an
uncommon event – they account for 17% of all analyzed
cases. MFR report, that the distribution of the reversals is
relatively uniform among regions (they exclude Middle
East), while Edwards finds that they are the most com-
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Table 1-6. Number of countries with sustained high (at least 5 years) current account deficits 1975–1997, by region
Industrialized
Latin
America
Asia Africa Middle East CEEC Total
6 4 5 12 1 0 28
Source: Edwards (2001)
[18] Defined as a deficit exceeding third quartile of the region's average.
[19] As a by-product he obtained a Ricardian offset coefficient of 0.4, which is a common finding.
[20] However the interrelation between financial deepening and savings are not so obvious and more complicated.
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mon in Middle East (26%), and the least common in
industrial countries (6%). Short-term reversals (not sus-
tained after three years), that point to consumption
smoothing explanation, constitute 55% of all episodes,
while long-term reversals that can be attributed to policy
issues and structural changes account for remaining 45%.
Among the determinants of reversals the most important
are: current account deficit itself (of course, the bigger
the deficit the more probable reversal), (low) foreign
reserves level, GDP per capita (the bigger the more
probable reversal – this suggest that low income coun-
tries experience difficulties in achieving external balance)
and (deterioration in) the terms of trade. Among financial
variables: higher share of concessional debt, official inter-
national transfers and lower international interest rate
reduced the probability of a sudden reversal. Most impor-
tant finding of MFR is, however, that current account
reversals and currency crashes are distinct events: cur-
rency crashes are associated with output decline while for
reversals such relationship couldn't be established – only
around one third of reversals are associated with crises
(excluding small economies the ratio becomes 1/2). This
result is to some extent dubious because the impact of
current account reversal on output decline can be indirect
and work through investment channel [21]. Since current
account reversal means a reduction in foreign savings and
there is evidence that foreign savings only partially crowd
out domestic savings – a decline in foreign savings reduces
national savings and thus investment. Since the impact of
investment on output is well established it means that
current account reversals indeed suppress output. Freund
(2000) finds that for industrial countries reversals are
associated with declining output – she concludes that per-
haps for advanced countries they are driven more by
cyclical consideration (like business cycles or domestic
growth). Moreover, of 21 identified crises in the sample
17 happened within two years from a reversal.
Researchers are generally unable to find strong and sig-
nificant correlation between (high) current account deficit
and currency crises in a proper econometric treatment.
Table 1-7 presents the results of some studies on this topic.
The t-statistics for the hypothesis that current account
deficit does not help explain crises are given in the second
column.
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Table 1-7. The evidence on the significance of the current account deficit in predicting currency crises
Study Results (t-statistics) Notice
Edwards (2001) 1) 1.64     2) 1.64
3) 1.44     4) 0.31
four definitions of crisis and different specifications
Milesi-Ferretti and Razin
(1998)
1) 1.25      2) 2
3) 1.65      4) 0.36
5) 1.3        6) 2,25
7) 0.6        8) 0.77
9) 1.71     10) 2.05
different samples
1-4) during current account reversals
5-10) prediction of overall crash
Abhuvalia (2000) 1) 1.94      2) 1.44
3) 1.52      4) 1.43
two samples
two different set of contagion controls
Caramazza et.al. (2000) 1) 2.17    2) 2.5
3) 1.84    4) 0.51
different specification of crisis index
Bussiere and Mulder
(1999)
1) 2.03 early Warning System with 5 regressors
Eichengreen, Rose and
Wyplosz (1996)
1) 0.8       2) 1.9
3) 1.2
different specification of variables
Frankel and Rose (1996) 1) 1.03     2) 0.22 1)default and 2)predictive power
Berg Pattillo (1999) 1) 5.6       2) 9.5
3) 5.5
1)'indicator model'            2)linear model
3)"piecewise linear model"
Kaminsky, Lizondo and
Reinhart (1998)
-not t-statistics, but
“noise to signal ratio” -
export change: 0.42
(the third best result)
univariate "signal" analysis, "noise to signal ratio"; 0-perfect
prediction, 0.5-no information, >0,5 worse than unconditional
guess
Sasin (2001) 1) 1.1         2) 3.1
3) -0.1(wrong sign)
4) 1.2
5) -0.4 (wrong sign)
6) 2.8
- 1,3,5) fixed effect linear model; 2,4,6) probit; 1,2) full
sample;3,4) emerging markets;5,6) developed economies
[21] MFR control for investment in their regression what (probably) causes the endogeneity bias.
24
Marek D¹browski (ed.)
As can be seen, these studies produce mixed results.
The most interesting thing I have established in my com-
putations is the fact that in general (in the full sample with
the simplest probit methodology) the current account is an
important variable – has both the predicted sign and suffi-
cient significance. We should however admit that different
countries have different levels of current account sustain-
ability. The fixed effect method controls for it so, conse-
quently, if we allow for country-specific level of sustainabili-
ty the implications of the current account for currency crisis
prediction shrink to nil.
I also found that, similarly to the real exchange rate
overvaluation, the current account deficit is much less
important for emerging economies (implied t-statistics are
less than 1.6 that is less than 10% significant). This result
confirms that the deficit is actually sustainable in develop-
ing countries
I also dealt with the problem why different studies pro-
duce different and mixed results. By checking around
almost 10,000 specifications I formally confirmed the pop-
ular explanation that much depends on the sample selec-
tion and the specification of the variables included. An
average significance for current account was 0.5 – there-
fore I have to conclude that the current account has no sig-
nificant impact on currency crises. This is even less so in
the case of emerging markets – the average t-statistic was
0.1. Only for developed economies the current account
deficit really means economic problems and is a sign of
increased vulnerability to a crisis (average significance is
96%, i.e. t-statistic is little over 2). 
In Figure 1-2 I present these results – sample distribu-
tions of t-statistics for null hypothesis of no effect of the cur-
rent account (trade balance) obtained from regressions.
Densities for developing and developed subsamples have
been scaled down by the factor of two, not to obscure fig-
ures. Averages are indicated with a dashed line. 
As proper econometric methodology is unable to pro-
vide strong proofs of the impact of external deficits on
crises the narrative approach is taken and case studies ana-
lyzed to shed some light on the issue. For example Milesi-
Ferretti and Razin (1996) attempt to answer when and
why current account problems may end in currency crisis.
The cases of Australia (persistent current account deficit,
no drastic policy actions, no crisis), South Korea (beginning
of 1980s), Ireland, Israel (high deficit, preventive policy
reversal, no crisis), Chile, Mexico (deficit, crisis) are dis-
cussed. Basing on the improved portfolio approach (with
financial constraints included) the main determinants of
current account deficit sustainability are ex ante estab-
lished – they include the size of the export sector, the level
of international competitiveness, the level of domestic sav-
ings, the composition of external liabilities, strength of
financial system, degree of political stability and fiscal con-
solidation.
The analysis shows that among countries with a current
account deficit those who did experience currency crises
differ from those who hadn't with: overvaluation of the
real exchange rate (with rapid growth of import), relative-
ly small export sector, high external debt burden, low and
declining saving ration (especially Chile and Mexico [22]),
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Figure 1-2. Sample distribution of t-statistics on current account deficit (trade balance)
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Trade balance (deficit)
Developed
Emarging
Source: Sasin (2001).
[22] Ireland and Israel also experienced a decline in saving rates but it was an effect of public sector imbalances that were much improved upon.
Australia's saving rate is low as well but it is seemingly justified by the efficiency of its banking system.
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political instability (elections in Mexico) and the composi-
tion of capital inflows [23]. All countries arranged devalu-
ation, but some were preventive and successful (Australia,
Israel), while some countries were forced to do it by the
crises (Chile, Mexico).
1.4. Conclusions
We tried to establish the links between real exchange rate
overvaluation, current account deficit and currency crises.
The evidence is that real exchange rate helps explain and pre-
dict crisis. To some extent this result is intuitive or even tau-
tological. On the other hand, the results on the current
account deficit are mixed – proper econometric methodolo-
gy fails to find strong support that the current account deficit
actually is and underlying cause of a crisis. But qualitative
analysis and common knowledge views large current account
deficits as dangerous. The notion of "new crisis" gives the
deficit secondary, but important role. Although financial vari-
ables, such as the level of short term debt, the state of the
banking sector, moral hazard, balance sheet problems are
main causes of sudden capital outflow, which in turn ignites
crisis and damages economy – the current account is the sig-
nal that the domestic policies can be unsustainable and for-
eign reserves (a must for foreign debt repayment) could be
soon depleted. Recently, it is also not so important if the
external deficit is driven by public or private imbalances –
rather source of the deficit and its financing matters.
Because of the above-mentioned reasons current
account is still and important variable, on which investors
base their decisions. We have, however established that the
actual size of the current account cannot be the only basis
of current account sustainability judgement. What is today
sustainable can other time become unsustainable, when
international capital markets sentiment changes.
It all can be well summarized using the words of Ostry
(1997), who yet before the Asian crisis warned that
although Asian current account deficits safely match the
consumption smoothing pattern other factors may affect
external sustainability. He highlighted the role of the level
and composition of external liabilities, the flexibility of
macroeconomic policies, the efficiency of investment, the
state of the financial system. He concluded that even if the
external position seems sustainable in views of all major
models and determinants there is a case to reduce current
accounts deficits in order to minimize the risk that arise
from running these deficits in the presence of the above-
mentioned weaknesses.
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[23] Australia relied more on equity (significant part of the debt were also denominated in domestic currency, it had a developed bond market). In
such case risk shared by foreigner investor. Ireland, in turn, had a large and sustainable inflow of FDI's.
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2.1. Introduction
The paper addresses a set of issues regarding the
choice of an exchange rate regime in financially fragile
emerging markets. It provides an insight of how different
regime choices were connected with currency crashes
during 1990s. Fourteen cases of financial crises are exam-
ined, and the decisions about the regime choice are dis-
cussed in the light of costs associated with ending an
arrangement weighted against the costs of further support
of a peg. 
The analysis starts from the general discussion of what
regime choice is better for a "small open and emerging "
economy. Specific issues related to the policy choice when
domestic currency comes under pressure are discussed
next. The issue of empirical measurement of the costs and
benefits associated with the regime change is discussed
using case studies. The countries under consideration are
grouped into these that followed a hard peg regime before
the crises, these that followed more relaxed types of pegs,
and these that allowed their currencies to fluctuate. The
relative flexibility of an exchange rate regime is assessed
with the use of an "effective exchange rate flexibility
index". Last section tries to quantify the influence of dif-
ferent factors on the duration of exchange rate peg using
logit analysis.
In the light of the following discussion, it seems that in
the majority of cases, where authorities decided to abandon
a peg, the problem was not really associated with the choice
whether to abandon the fixed rate or to stay on. Further
support of the exchange rate was in most cases prohibitive-
ly expensive, so there was no choice in this respect. Rather,
the problems experienced by these economies and magni-
fied by the currency crashes showed inconsistency of pur-
sued policies within the chosen exchange rate regime. 
2.2. Old Dilemma: Fixed or Flexible?
The classic principle of the fixed versus flexible rates
debate is that of Robert Mundell (1960). Under a high
degree of capital mobility, fixed exchange rate may dominate
flexible exchange rate, in the sense of better stabilising prop-
erties in the face of exogenous shock. Mundell proposed a
first explicit analysis of macroeconomic dynamics under
fixed and flexible exchange rates. The main logic was that
under a fixed exchange rate the interest rate has a direct
effect on the external market to which it responds [1],
therefore helping to quickly restore equilibrium. While
under flexible exchange rate regime the rate of interest has
a more direct effect on the external market than on the
goods and services market, to which it responds, leading to
a cyclical adjustment. However, Mundell also wrote about
some limitations of fixed rates. Specifically, he noted that it is
important for the fixed exchange rate system to be backed
by the sufficient amount of international reserves. Mundell
also pointed on the fact that speculative attacks may pose
smaller threat for the flexible exchange rate systems.
Part II.
Choice of Exchange Rate Regime and Currency Crashes –
Evidence of Some Emerging Economies
Ma³gorzata Jakubiak
[1] The actual rate of interest remains near its equilibrium level, and the disequilibrium at the goods and services market is eliminated by the price
level changes that affect the balance of payments.
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Recent waves of currency crises brought about new lit-
erature, which tries to assess what regime choice is better
when a currency comes under pressure. And in this light
fixed exchange rate arrangements are not automatically
superior to flexible ones, especially when we consider the
costs of ending a peg.
There are important consequences of a sudden devalua-
tion, when a currency comes under pressure in an emerging
market country following a peg. Mishkin (1999) underlines
that it is typically for an emerging market country following
a peg to have a large amount of debt denominated in foreign
currency, because of uncertainty towards domestic money.
In this case, devaluation produces high increase of the debt
burden. This, in turn, leads to a decrease of net worth, low-
ers investment and slows down economic activity.
Mishkin (1999) explains that the debt often has low
maturity, and when a monetary authority rises interest rates
when trying to defend domestic currency, economic agents
see their interest payments increasing, which further deteri-
orates their balance sheets, and brings a fall in lending. Nev-
ertheless, the larger the debt stock, the more valuable the
peg becomes for the authorities, and the authorities are
more committed to defend it, unless it becomes prohibi-
tively expensive. 
Chang and Velasco (1999) explore the topic of an opti-
mal level of international reserves under a fixed exchange
rate system. They write that under a fixed exchange rate
regime, the possibility of a crisis when a currency comes
under pressure depends only on the underlying liquidity of
the economy. This is to say, that if a country does not hold
a sufficient amount of foreign currency – and it should be
remembered that keeping large reserves is costly – and is
following a peg, then a currency crisis occurs if only public
realise that the central bank cannot meet its liabilities.
Contrary to this, flexible exchange rates can be superior
to the fixed rates, but under certain conditions. Floating
rates, in the view of the authors, lead to the point, where it
is not optimal for the investors to withdraw early domestic
currency deposits. Even if a run on domestic currency
denominated securities starts it is not optimal to move early,
since there is a perception that all the obligations will be
honoured, and depreciation punishes early withdrawals.
This result holds when the proportion of domestic curren-
cy deposits is large in relation to the foreign currency
deposits. The flexible exchange rate regime should be
accompanied by the appropriate monetary policy, namely
the central bank acting as a lender of last resort. Authors
stress that the result holds for the floating exchange rate
regimes and not in the case of a sudden regime change.
It is also argued that greater integration with the world
capital markets reduces benefits form exchange rate stabili-
ty, increasing the optimal flexibility of exchange rate regime
[Aizenman, Hausmann, 2000]. However, emerging market
countries are usually not the ones that are characterised by
the large access to the world financial markets. This issue
will not be explored later in details, but high degree of inte-
gration with the world financial market was certainly not the
case of Latin American or the CIS countries considered in
this paper. If we take an example of Argentina, it turns out
that overall capital flows constituted only 5% of its GDP
before the Tequila crisis.
2.3. Costs of a Sudden Shift to a More
Flexible Arrangement
If we summarise some of the insights pointed out in the
previous section, we can specify certain important costs of
a sudden change in the exchange rate regime that are of par-
ticular significance for an emerging economy. Here, the
emphasis is put on the costs of quitting fixed exchange rate
arrangement, which are especially relevant in the light of the
case studies described later. Particularly, the costs related to
the initial defence and then the abandonment of a peg are
underlined. It is irrelevant here whether a fixed commit-
ment is a declared one, or an implicit, but a perfectly known
to the public.
First of all, the sudden regime change produces fluctua-
tions of output and investment. These fluctuations are trans-
mitted to the real sector through the changing magnitude of
real interest rates. But the determination of the long-term
costs of quitting a peg is beyond the scope of this paper,
since they depend also on the evolution of a number of
macroeconomic fundamentals, specific for a given economy.
It is almost impossible to look at these costs only from the
perspective of the different behaviour of nominal exchange
rate. The more detailed discussion on modelling these
dynamics can be found in Cespedes, Chang, and Velasco
(2000), Chang and Velasco (1999) – model with banks as
intermediates, or Pitt (2001). 
Nevertheless, there are several issues that are immedi-
ately valid while taking the decision whether to defend a
fixed rate or let the currency to adjust, especially within the
context of emerging or "transitional" countries described
later. These issues are listed below. 
Loss of international reserves. Starting from the
period when the currency comes under the pressure and
the authorities decide to support its value, they use their
international reserves in order to ease the pressure. As it
will be later shown in the discussion of case studies, when
the perception of the currency overvaluation and the
attack are strong enough, the loss of international
reserves is immediate and substantial. It creates the liq-
uidity cost for the authority, which may undermine credi-
bility of the central bank, and hence add to the expecta-
tion spiral. Sufficient reserves are necessary in order to
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sustain a peg. And if they are used up, then there is a need
to rebuild them later, which may require time and exter-
nal borrowing.
The importance of keeping high enough level of foreign
reserves is emphasised in the model of balance-of-payments
crises of Mendoza and Uribe (1999). The currency crashes
there occur as the result of prevailing large real appreciation
and trade deficits, eventually triggered by the stance of fiscal
policy. But the core issue is that the probability of a collapse
of an exchange peg depends on the sensitivity of speculative
capital outflows to changes in foreign reserves. The proba-
bility of a crisis and a currency risk premium are thus a
decreasing function of the existing stock of reserves.
Authors write that the changes in foreign exchange reserves
are formulated endogenously, by the rational choices of pri-
vate agents. While the peg is in place, they are the result of
a government budget constraint regarding fiscal policy vari-
ables and the decisions of private sector agents. 
Higher price of debt servicing. A rise in debt servic-
ing in terms of domestic currency is an important threat of
large depreciation for heavily indebted countries. And, as
will be shown later on, emerging economies are usually
highly indebted. This higher debt burden substantially weak-
ens fiscal positions. The level of indebtedness and the per-
centage of foreign currency denominated debt are thus a
good indicator of how valuable is stable domestic currency
– or a declared peg – for a given country. 
Pitt (2001) provides a model, in which the link
between institutions and costs and benefits of the fixed
exchange rate runs through foreign indebtedness and pro-
ductivity of investment. When the speculations on the
exchange rate start, government trades off the costs of
devaluation in terms of higher debt service for the slow-
down of economic growth through interest rate increases
when defending a peg.
Collapse in the demand for money. Especially visi-
ble as a rise in domestic currency substitution. This causes
problems in banking sector (or difficulties in the recovery
of the banking sector, as, for example, it happened in the
Kyrgyz Republic after the Russian crisis). The banking sec-
tor in emerging or transforming markets is usually charac-
terised by the high volume of non-performing loans.
Adding to this a decline in confidence to domestic curren-
cy, which demonstrates itself in the form of decreasing
holdings of the treasury bonds and withdrawals of
deposits, we have a serious threat to the stability of finan-
cial intermediation. This also limits the effectiveness of a
monetary policy, and may hamper the necessary develop-
ment of domestic financial market.
Rise in a country risk premium. This factor weakens
access to the international creditors and lowers probability
of attracting long-term capital inflows. Even setting aside all
the externality-related benefits of long-term foreign capital
coming to the growing emerging market, continuous inflows
of foreign funds allow to build exchange reserves and to ser-
vice external debt, even in a presence of large CA deficits.
And as it is described later on, the lack of capital inflows may
quickly lead to unstable macroeconomic situation for an
emerging economy. 
High interest rates. Elevated nominal interest rates
tend to limit investment. They result from the previously
discussed time-varying country risk-premiums, and induce
distortionary effects also on saving. However, if a country is
dependent on foreign financing, and its perceived risk is
higher, there seem to be no other choice than rise interest
rates in order to acquire new external credit.
Lost credibility. Following a sudden change in the
exchange rate regime, and the turbulence lasting for some
time after, policy of the monetary authority may be per-
ceived as less credible. Economic agents may behave in line
with their own expectations, which do not need to fully
reflect the authorities' commitment. This affects negatively
the process of disinflation, and creates an obstacle for quick
recovery. A country may find itself in a situation where the
domestic currency cannot be used for a long-term borrow-
ing, even domestic. Domestic investments face either a cur-
rency mismatch (projects that generate domestic currency
revenues are financed with dollars) or a maturity mismatch
(long-term projects must be financed with short-term bor-
rowing). Then a country is permanently in a fragile state,
almost independently of a chosen exchange rate regime. If a
country follows a float, and a shock occurs, the currency
mismatch may cause bankruptcies. But if the authorities are
trying to defend a peg thus rising interest rates, this will pre-
cipitate defaults on the short-term debts. Eichengreen and
Hausmann (1999) propose that in such situation it is advis-
able to allow for a full dollarisation. 
This credibility loss can be measured by the decrease in
the maturity of the debt, both foreign and domestic. And, it
is often the case, as in some transition countries examined
by Ganev et al. (2001), that the dynamics of credibility of the
exchange rate policy are mirrored by the dynamics of dol-
larisation ratios. 
2.4. Why Emerging Markets Peg their
Currencies
If we know that pegging a currency may become cost-
ly for an emerging country, why do these countries peg?
First of all, fixed regimes are often introduced in order to
"borrow stability". Under the condition that governments'
commitments are credible, pegged regimes promote pre-
dictability, tend to reduce inflationary expectations by pro-
viding a nominal anchor, and – by eliminating exchange rate
risk – ease trade and investment relations. If the commit-
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ment to keep the rate fixed is perceived as credible, coun-
try risk premium falls, facilitating access to world financial
markets. Another argument in favour of a fixed rate may
be this of lower domestic interest rates. Moreover, the
economies that opt for fixing the exchange rate often
experience a currency substitution. If such "dollarised"
economies are prone to shocks of financial nature, then
opting for a fixed rate automatically reduces monetary
volatility. 
2.5. Choices Faced after a Currency Col-
lapse
It is clear that the decision to continue support for the
peg by a monetary authority when high devaluation pres-
sures are mounting depends on the underlying costs. The
first choice of whether to keep the commitment to a fixed
rate and continue losing reserves (lowering own credibility,
and maybe hurting weak domestic banking sector) is
weighted against the choice of letting the currency to depre-
ciate with all described consequences. Assuming that stick-
ing to the peg becomes prohibitively expensive at some
point and the central bank flows the currency, there comes
the next choice – what to do after. This issue is explored
later with the use of the case studies, but some general con-
siderations are marked here.
The monetary authority may opt for repegging. The
choice may seem questionable at first, but it may be an
option in the medium-term, after the exchange rate will
reach its equilibrium level after an initial overshooting. The
transition period must be long enough for two reasons. If a
new peg is set too quickly, the exchange rate may be too
depreciated and not consistent with the medium-term fun-
damentals. Secondly, after running out of reserves during
the currency crisis the monetary authority may have prob-
lems with gaining enough credibility. From the countries dis-
cussed below, it was Malaysia who repeg its currency
approximately one year after the crisis.
Repegging may not be an option also for the reason that
in many transition countries stabilisation policies have a bad
record. And it is difficult for the conventional fixed regime
to be credible. Then there may be two ways out: adopting
a currency board or even allowing for a full dollarisation, or
let the exchange rate to float. The main argument in favour
of the first choice is that in some cases it may not be too bad
to give up an independent monetary policy. The fully float-
ing exchange rate may also have some advantages, especial-
ly when the level of international reserves is low, provided
that there is enough transparency and the anchor for the
monetary policy is set in an explicit way. 
2.6. Empirical Evidence – Case Studies
This section describes further the issues of costs and
advantages of sudden devaluation under a fixed rate
regime by the use of several case studies. The majority of
reviewed countries are the ones that followed a peg prior
to the crisis, and then devalued. There are also three
examples of economies that were allowing their curren-
cies to fluctuate before the crises. These are contrasted
with one example of an economy that followed the
extreme version of a peg – a currency board – and with-
stood currency pressures.
Since it happens that the declared exchange rate
regimes may differ from the "effective" ones, the countries
under consideration are grouped according to the so-
called "effective exchange rate flexibility index" (FLT). The
idea of this measure is taken from Poirson (2001). The
index is calculated as a ratio of monthly nominal exchange
rate depreciation to the monthly relative change in
reserves. It is based on the idea that if a country follows a
float, the volatility of its exchange rate is relatively large,
while the monetary interventions are small. Conversely, if
a country is following a peg, the movements in the
exchange rate are close to zero.
The indices are calculated using monthly data and then
averaged for the 12 months prior to the crisis, in order to
get a better picture of what was the pre-crisis situation.
Thus, they were calculated for each country using the fol-
lowing formula:
FLT = ME / MR = (∑(|Et-k - Et-k-1|/Et-k-1) / (∑(|Rt-k - 
- Rt-k-1|/Ht-k-1)
where: ME – absolute value of the monthly nominal depre-
ciation;
MR – absolute value of the monthly change in 
reserves normalised by the monetary base in the 
previous month;
Et,k – end-period exchange rate in month t;
Rt,k – net international reserves [2] , minus gold, 
in month t;
Ht,k – monetary base in month t.
[2] Net international reserves are calculated as the difference between the gross international reserves excluding gold expressed in domestic cur-
rency and foreign liabilities of the monetary authority. This is only an approximation for the net international reserves in some countries, but is never-
theless used here, given the data constraints.
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The index may take the values between zero (no
exchange rate movements) and infinity (completely inter-
vention-free policy). The small values of the index mean
that the authorities are intervening heavily on the foreign
exchange to offset market forces and a country follows a
relatively hard peg.
Since the measurement and dating of currency crises
may pose some difficulties, episodes of significant currency
pressures were identified ex ante, based on existing infor-
mation in the economic literature on the subject. [3]. Only
then statistical tools were applied to describe their charac-
teristics. The analysis covers 14 emerging economies that
experienced episodes of currency crises during the last
decade. The countries are clustered into three groups: hard
pegs, moderate pegs, and floats. Characteristics of the
Argentinean 1995 crisis are described after. The detailed
timing of each crisis is specified in the Appendix. 
2.6.1. Group First – Hard Pegs: Brazil, Thailand,
Mexico 
Very stable nominal exchange rates during the 12
months preceding the crisis resulted in the low scores on
the FLT index for the three economies, indicating rather
rigid forms of the fixed exchange rate arrangements. In the
case of Mexico additional role was played by the large mon-
etary interventions in November 1994. 
Since November 1991, Mexico was following a crawl-
ing band exchange policy, and there was a belief that its
macroeconomic fundamentals have been steadily improv-
ing. The country had managed to bring down inflation to
single digit levels, have been achieving moderate rates of
growth, and was controlling fiscal balance. However, the
significant increases in capital inflows added to the continu-
ous (since 1991) real appreciation of the peso, and thus to
the widening of the trade and the current account deficits.
It is claimed that this widening of trade deficits was driven
mainly by consumption. Nevertheless, the CA deficit
accounted for 8% of GDP in 1994. In spite of this, Mexico
had a weak banking system (which underwent a series of
reprivatisations in early 1990s). The commercial credit
expanded and non-performing loans jumped in 1994 to 8%
of the total loans. The rise in the U.S. interest rates ini-
tialised a sudden capital outflow, and the government was
left with the few degrees of freedom. On the top of this,
there have been domestic political tensions, which original-
ly triggered reserve losses. Continued selling pressures on
the peso forced the government to stop its interventions on
the foreign exchange market, after the Central Bank of
Mexico lost 11.4 billion USD of its reserves in two months.
The reserves fall by 64.5% from October to December
1994. On the 20th of December, the peso band's ceiling was
devalued by 15%, and on the 22nd the authorities aban-
doned the crawling band exchange rate mechanism and
moved to free float. Peso depreciated by 71% for the
whole 1994. The balance-of-payments type currency crisis
developed hand in hand with the banking crisis.
Pressures on the Thai baht have been in place since late
1996. Similarly, to the case of Mexico, the country's
exchange rate has been appreciating in real terms, and the
economy was dealing with high and unsustainable current
account deficits. Public sector balance has been deteriorat-
ing, and there were difficulties in the financial sector. There
was a rise of the foreign indebtedness, especially of the
short-term maturity. When the Bank of Thailand started to
provide liquidity for the weak financial institutions, base
money growth jumped. During the first half of 1997, the
authorities responded to the pressures by exchange market
interventions, by restrictions on some capital account trans-
actions, and by efforts to limit the worsening of the fiscal sit-
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Country
name
Declared exchange
rate regime prior to
the crisis
Exchange regime into which
the country switched after
the crisis
FLT index over 12
months prior to
the crisis
FLT index over 12
months after the
crisis
Brazil adjustable band with dual
exchange rate structure
independently floating 0.080 0.505*
Thailand basket peg independently floating 0.081 0.437
Mexico crawling band independently floating 0.081 0.360
Note: * over 11 months
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, various numbers, and author's calculations
[3] This classification of the episodes of currency crises poses some problems. For example, the date of the currency crisis in Bulgaria was set a
year after the banking crisis erupted, during which national currency has been already depreciating in nominal terms. This is why Bulgaria recorded rel-
atively high score of the FLT index, in accordance with the declared exchange rate regime. However, when we look at the FLT index prior to the bank-
ing crisis, it describes a perfectly pegged arrangement, even though the country was declaring an independently floating exchange rate.
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uation. However, the speculative pressures continued and
the baht was floated on the 2nd of July 1997. The Bank of
Thailand lost 23% of its international reserves – that is 8.8
billion U.S. dollars – from the beginning of the year. The
baht continued to depreciate in the subsequent months, as
the Asian crisis was spreading out in other countries, and the
market waited for better policy packages. It reached its all-
time low value against the U.S. dollar in January 1998, but
since then it began to strengthen [Lane et. al, 1999].
The Brazilian real has been under pressure since the col-
lapse of the Russian ruble in August 1998. From the beginning
of 1998, the country followed an adjustable band regime.  The
ceilings have been set periodically (on January 22, 1998 of 1.12-
1.22 real per USD, on March 31, 1998 of 1.137-1.142 real per
USD, on April 30, 1998 of 1.1435-1.1495 real per USD; this
time the spread of the band was widened), and the authorities
managed to maintain a continuing crawling peg within them.
There were two exchange rate market; one called "official",
where both the imports and exports proceeds were transact-
ed plus some of the portfolio capital transactions. The other
market – "floating" – was intended for capital account transac-
tions. As foreign institutional investors were losing confidence
in the real, and there was a massive outflow of capital (around
8 billion U.S. dollars on average per month during August-
December 1998), the Central Bank of Brazil has been defend-
ing the currency. The monetary policy was tightened, and
interest rates went up and reached the levels comparable with
the ones during the Asian crisis. International reserves were
falling since April 1998, and until January 1999, Brazil lost over
39 billion USD of its liquidity. This meant that the reserves fell
by 53.3%. The central bank widened the band of the exchange
rate fluctuation of the real to 1.20–1.32 real per USD on Janu-
ary 13, 1999. It allowed for the gradual depreciation of the cur-
rency. The new band allowed for a 10% variation within the
band. Nevertheless, the real was floated five days later, on Jan-
uary 18, 1999 (Baig and Goldfajn, 2000; IMF, 2001). It depreci-
ated by over 64% in January only. From early January to June
1999, the real lost over 30% of its value. 
The countries that followed one of the most tight
exchange rate arrangements among all considered here,
were also characterised by the high amount of external debt
denominated in foreign currency. Total external debt of
Thailand was at the level of 63% of its GDP, and nearly 95%
of this was denominated in foreign currencies. This number
indicates a high value of a fixed exchange rate arrangement
for Thai authorities, suggesting a strong commitment to this
regime. Mexico's total external debt was almost half this size
in relative terms. In 1994, it amounted to 33% of GDP, and
the majority of it was of a long-term nature. Weak access to
the world capital markets (private capital inflows amounted
to 8.0 and 3.1 percent of GDP in 1993 and in 1994, respec-
tively [Chang, Velasco, 1998] may prove justification for this
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Table 2-2. Reserve coverage, hard pegs 
Reserves/Monetary Base
6 months
before
3 months
before
At the crisis
date
3 months
after
6 months
after
Loss of reserves (in
percent)
Brazil 1.10 0.92 1.11 1.25 1.19 53.5%
Thailand 2.14 2.06 2.00 2.41 2.71 23.0%
Mexico 1.23 1.18 0.55 0.78 1.17 64.5%
Note: * Monetary authorities' reserve loss is calculated from the month the stock of these reserves peaks until the crisis date.
Source: author's calculations based on IFS data.
Table 2-1. Foreign indebtedness, hard pegs
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Brazil
Total external debt, in % of GDP 30.7% 45.6% 40.0% 38.2% 37.6%
Short-term debt as % of total external debt 20.8% 19.2% 19.8% 18.6%
Thailand
Total external debt, in % of GDP 45.4% 49.3% 49.0% 62.7%
Short-term debt as % of total external debt 44.5% 49.5% 41.5% 37.3%
Foreign currency denominated debt, in % of
total external debt
94.1%* 94.4%*
Mexico
Total external debt, in % of GDP 33.3% 58.3% 47.9% 37.3%
Short-term debt as % of total external debt 28.1% 22.4% 19.1% 19.0%
Note: * as of end June.
Source: author's calculations on the basis of IFS and WDI data, Chang and Velasco (1998), IMF (2001).
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regime choice. Total external debt of Brazil amounted to
38% of GDP in 1998–1999, while outstanding external debt
rose from 23% in 1996 to 45% of GDP in 1999.
While these economies were defending values of their
currencies, they lost large amounts of international
reserves. When we compare the percentage reserve loss at
the crisis dates of all of the countries described here, it is
clear that Mexico and Brazil lost the most.
If we were to asses costs and advantages associated with
the decision of quitting the peg of these countries, there
seems to be a reason in abandoning the fixed arrangement
in Thailand and Mexico, in the sense that continuation
would have became too expensive. Mexico's international
reserves were not even covering half of its short-term
external debt. Thailand had a level of reserves roughly equal
the amount of its short-term debt 3 months before the
devaluation, but was losing its reserves quickly, so that in
June 1997 the reserves to its short-term external debt ratio
was 0.85. Relevant ratio for Brazil was not that bad, but
when we look at the more precise indicator of gross
reserves to the residual maturity at the end of 1998, it is
clear that reserves were covering only 53% of the debt.
Both Brazil and Thailand allowed its currencies to float,
and tightened monetary policies, avoiding inflation-depreci-
ation spirals. These moves were costly for the real econo-
my, but it seems that the alternatives would have been
much more expensive. However, this was not the case of
Mexico, where there was a passthrough of depreciation on
prices, but nevertheless, the economy returned to its
growth path about a year after the crisis. 
2.6.2. Group Second – Moderate Pegs: Russia,
Georgia, Ukraine, Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia,
Moldova
This classification groups seven countries that declared
different types of their exchange rate regimes before the
crisis. Even if they officially did not change their declared
arrangements after the crises, they certainly allowed for a
greater flexibility of their exchange rates over at least one
year after. 
From all Asian economies hit by the crisis, Korea
appeared initially to be less affected. From 1993 the coun-
try followed an exchange rate band, with the currency
fixed to the U.S. dollar, and won managed to oscillate with-
in the permitted range of fluctuations of +/- 2%. The
exchange rate remained broadly stable until October 1997.
However, the country had a large stock of debt of short
maturity, and its international reserves were only moder-
ate. The macroeconomic fundamentals remained generally
favourable but the financial institutions and large corpora-
tions began to experience problems earlier this year. As the
crisis was spreading out, external financing conditions
begun to worsen, and the won fell by over 5%. The
authority started to intervene, but the reserves were
depleted very quickly. Monetary policy was tightened, but
soon released because of its impact on the highly leveraged
corporate sector. By December 1997, won depreciated by
over 20% against U.S. dollar, and usable foreign reserves
fell to 6 billion U.S. dollars; from over 22 billions at the end
of October 1997 [Lane et al., 1999]. Balino and Ubida
(1999) write that at the end of 1997 usable foreign reserves
were at the level equal to 0.6 month of imports. One year
earlier, the reserves amounted to 2 months of imports. The
exchange rate was allowed to float freely on December 16,
1997, and reached its lowest value against the dollar on
December 23, 1997 [Balino, Ubida, 1999]. By mid-1998
won remained generally stable after the initial appreciation
in January and the country made progress towards over-
coming financial crisis.
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Country
name
Declared exchange
rate regime prior to
the crisis
Exchange regime into
which the country
switched after the
crisis
FLT index over 12
months prior to the
crisis
FLT index over 12
months after the crisis
Russia exchange rate band managed float 0.124 1.093
Georgia conventional peg independently floating 0.185 0.566
Ukraine horizontal band horizontal band 0.202 0.558
Korea exchange rate band independently floating 0.256* 0.530
Indonesia crawling band independently floating 0.271 0.495
Malaysia managed float managed float** 0.285 1.221
Moldova managed float independently floating 0.358 0.672
Note: * counted back form the beginning of the Thai crisis. It is commonly agreed that the crisis in Korea erupted in December 1997, but won was
under serious pressure form the summer of 1997. For this reason period from July to November 1997 was excluded from the pre-crisis calculations.
** Malaysia switched to the conventional peg arrangement in September 1998, a year after the currency crisis started.
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, various numbers, and author's calculations
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Intensified pressure on the Indonesian rupiah started in
July 1997, soon after the Thai baht was floated. Key macro-
economic indicators were stronger in Indonesia than in
Thailand, but the economy had a very high amount of short-
term private sector external debt. Until 1997 Indonesian
GDP was growing at rates no lower than 6.5% per year, the
current account deficit has been modest, export growth
reasonably well maintained, and there was a budget surplus.
However, the financial sector was small even when com-
pared to other economies in the region, was characterised
by the maturity mismatch of banks portfolios, and experi-
enced several liquidity problems during the 1990s. The Bank
of Indonesia was following a crawling band exchange rate
mechanism, with predetermined, constant rate of deprecia-
tion. The exchange rate band was widened in mid-1995,
then in mid-1996, and to 8% in September 1996. Following
the intensified pressure on the rupiah, the exchange rate
band was first widened (July 11, 1997), and on August 14,
1997 rupiah was floated. The authorities did not use its
reserves on such a scale as Thailand, and later Korea, did to
defend its currencies. International reserves of the Bank of
Indonesia fell during the July-August only by 1.1 billion U.S.
dollars that is by 5.2%. However, as the banking crisis
erupted, and the monetary policy was of the "stop-and-go"
type, changing between support for the exchange rate and
injecting liquidity for the declining financial sector, the cur-
rency have been unstable for several months. The economy
found itself falling into a circle of currency depreciation and
hyperinflation. The banking system nearly collapsed during
the November 1997 – January 1998 period. There was a
severe civil unrest, which led to the resignation of the pres-
ident Soeharto in May 1998. There was also inflation, fall of
overall economic activity, banking sector was paralysed, and
the unemployment was rising. The exchange rate hit its all-
time low value in June 1998 [Lane et. al, 1999; Sasin, 2001a].
Malaysia had generally stronger fundamentals than other
Asian economies. Federal budget recorded surpluses, and its
external debt stayed manageable. Large current account
deficits (10% of GDP in 1996 and 5% of GDP in 1997) were
financed by the huge inflows of capital, both short term and
FDI. International reserves were also growing due to capital
inflows. However, its banking sector suffered from some
weaknesses, such as rapid credit expansion and deterioration
of asset quality of banks. The corporate sector was highly
leveraged. When the crisis in the region spread out, the ring-
git came under significant depreciation pressure, similarly to
other currencies in the region. The currency has been appre-
ciating in real terms for around two years before summer
1997, and it is claimed that it was significantly overvalued
(IMF, 1999b). The crisis in Malaysia was triggered by the sud-
den capital outflow. The government was trying to deal with
this by imposing some capital restrictions and by rising
domestic interest rates. Nevertheless, the pressure persist-
ed, and the authorities lost over 18% (4.9 billion USD) of its
international reserves when trying to defend the currency.
On July 14, Bank Negara Malaysia abandoned its peg to the
dollar. The currency depreciated by 4% this month, and con-
tinued to depreciate as investors were further losing confi-
dence in Malaysian economy. It hit the lowest all-time value
in January 1998, which meant the depreciation of 80% in five
months. After the market calmed down, in September 1998,
the monetary authority announced the introduction of a
new, fixed peg of the ringgit versus the U.S. dollar.
Economic situation in Russia started to weaken in mid
1997, as the gas and oil prices declined and stayed low. GDP
started to contract due to the fall in investment. Fragility of
a Russian banking system was growing, as many large banks
become reliant on GKOs and other securities whose prices
were falling rapidly. Market sentiments towards emerging
economies deteriorated after the eruption of the Asian cri-
sis. Moreover, the country was having persistent fiscal prob-
lems and there was a political uncertainty. From mid-1995,
Russia followed a currency band regime, introduced in
order to stabilise market expectations. The bands were flat
over the course of one year, and later, in 1996, they were
sliding, with a predetermined monthly depreciation. The
new bands were set for the year 1997, and the ruble stayed
inside, depreciating by 6.7 % over the whole year. In
November 1997, the authorities announced a new
exchange band for the period 1998–2000, with permitted
deviations of +/-15% from the central rate. At the same
time, a narrower daily intervention band was introduced,
which was set around the mid-point rate of the day. In sum-
mer 1998, the daily band was +/- 0.7%. The first tensions
in economic fundamentals were visible in 1997, but the
Central Bank of Russia encountered successfully first wave
of instability. However, it happened at the cost of increased
vulnerability of exchange rate regime (by huge sales of its
exchange reserves) and – through higher interest rates – the
weakening of commercial banks, whose ruble portfolios
were composed mostly of federal government securities.
Large scale capital outflows started in May 1998, as the
investors became unwilling to roll-over the maturing GKOs.
The central bank started to defend the ruble (lost over 40%
of its international reserves i.e. 5.6 billion U.S. dollars in one
month), but at the same time provided support for both
banks and the government. When it became clear that the
exchange rate regime was unsustainable, the band was
widened on August 17, 1998. There was also a unilateral
conversion of ruble treasury bills into long-term papers,
which intensified the financial turmoil and the ruble was
allowed to depreciate. In fact, it depreciated by 19%. On
September 2, the exchange rate band was eliminated and
the authorities introduced a managed float with no pre-
announced path [IMF, 1999c].
The eruption of the Russian crisis spread over quickly to
the neighbouring countries. Ukraine, with its fiscal prob-
lems and the lack of progress in reforming its economy,
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experienced a halt in the capital inflows in 1997. With the
lack of foreign and domestic capital and the need to finance
budget deficit and repay maturing external obligations (1.4
billion of USD during the first half of 1998), the National
Bank of Ukraine had to provide financial resources to the
government, at the same time trying to ease pressures on
the exchange market. On January 1998, the exchange rate
band was widened. Interest rates were raising form the
beginning of the year. The government, while trying to keep
hryvnia within the declared limits intervened heavily, and,
from March until September 1998 it lost 1.5 billion USD of
its reserves (over 58%). In early September the exchange
rate band was moved upwards, and the monetary policy
was tighten, but nevertheless hryvnia depreciated by over
50% in one month.
The lack of structural reforms was also visible in Moldo-
va. Privatisation and restructuring were conducted at a slow
pace. At the end of 1997, the country had unsustainable
external and internal positions. Continuous real apprecia-
tion of the leu caused large and rising trade and CA deficits.
There was excessive public borrowing. Budget deficit was
financed by external borrowing, which led to the rapid
accumulation of debt. Similarly to other countries in the
region, Moldova experienced relatively large capital inflows
that reversed after the Asian and the Russian crises. The
country followed a managed float exchange rate regime,
with the leu remaining broadly stable since 1993. When the
capital flight started, the National Bank of Moldova decided
to defend its currency, even after the devaluation of the
Russian ruble and the Ukrainian hryvnia. And in fact, the leu
has been stable until November 1998. However, at a cost of
losing 198 million USD, that is over 50% of its internation-
al reserves from November 1997. From August to October
1998, the National Bank of Moldova was intervening heavi-
ly on a daily basis. The costs of expected large depreciation
were high in the case of Moldova – firstly because of its huge
stock of external debt denominated in hard currency, and
secondly – because the stability of the exchange rate
through the preceding five years was the only visible sign of
economic stabilisation, and the proof of credibility of the
central bank [Lubarova et al., 2000]. Finally, when the
reserves were severely depleted, on November 2, 1998,
the National Bank of Moldova stopped its interventions in
support of the leu, and let the currency to depreciate by
around 50%. At the end of 1998 foreign reserves of the
central bank were at the 1994 levels. The non-intervention
policy proved to be successful, as the exchange rate settled
at its new equilibrium value in March 1999.
The Russian crisis and the fragile fiscal position of Geor-
gia adversely affected financial deepening and monetary
developments, in place since 1997. Georgia has been run-
ning fiscal deficits of no less than 6% of its GDP during
1995–1997. The current account deficits were during this
time in the range of 14–21% of GDP. In spite of this, gross
international reserves were mounting, mainly as the effect
of substantial foreign aid. The country followed a conven-
tional peg regime, with lari/USD rate stable for at least two
years preceding the Russian crisis. When the pressures on
the currency started, the National Bank of Georgia
responded with the net sales of 25 million USD of its inter-
national reserves in September 1998 only. The NBG main-
tained its support for the currency through October and
November. Net sales of reserves amounted to around 10
million USD and 20 million USD in each of these months,
respectively. Nevertheless, the NBG let the lari to depreci-
ate by 10% in November. On December 7, 1998, the cen-
tral bank stopped its interventions, and allowed the lari to
float. There was no intervention during the first two months
of 1999, and later, the NBG focused on rebuilding its
reserves.
Moldova, Russia, and Georgia had a quickly growing
debt burden. Nearly all this debt was public or publicly
guaranteed, and of the long- or medium-term nature. And
in the case of Russian Federation, the significant part of it
was the past Soviet-era obligations. The external debt to
GDP ratio increased by over 50% from 1993 to 1998 for
Georgia and Moldova. Currency crises contributed visibly to
the increase in the domestic value of the external debt. For
example in Moldova, external debt servicing amounted to
nearly 42% of government revenues in 1998, while earlier,
at the end of 1997, it was about half this ratio. Total exter-
nal debt of Russian Federation rose from under 30% of
GDP in 1997 to over 80% of GDP in 1998, and there was
a decrease in its average maturity. Similar trend has been
observed in Ukraine. It is claimed that most of the increase
in the debt burden after the Russian crisis in Moldova and
Georgia is attributable to the adverse exchange rate move-
ments [IMF and WB, 2001]. The same can be probably said
about Ukraine.
High amount of foreign-currency denominated short-
term external debt can justify the need for exchange rate
stability in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Korea. The depreciation
costs have been reflected in the increased debt/GDP ratio,
but not on such a scale as in the described CIS countries.
The most heavily indebted was Indonesia, hence Indonesia
probably valued its peg the most. And actually it seems that
it lost the most in terms of the domestic currency value of
its debt, experiencing skyrocketing nominal depreciation at
the beginning of 1998. External debt to GDP ratio grown
further, but it is hard to asses what amount of this magni-
tude can be attributable to the initial depreciation alone, and
how much to the bad management of the crisis, and the
post-crisis turmoil. 
The reserves coverage of the monetary base imply a low
credibility of pegs in Russia (even half a year before the cri-
sis) and Ukraine. In fact, these two countries spend signifi-
cant amount of its liquid reserves on unsuccessful defence
of their currencies. In addition, the reserve coverage of
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Russian external short-term debt has been falling rapidly in
months preceding the crisis, indicating that the support of
the ruble became too expensive.
Reserves to the short-term debt ratio seem to explain
well the decision of quitting the peg in Korea and Indonesia.
A couple of months before depreciation, the reserves were
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Table 2-3. Foreign indebtedness, moderate pegs
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Russia
Total external debt, in % of GDP 35.3% 29.7% 26.2% ~80%
Short-term debt as % of total external debt 8.6% 9.7% 4.9%
Georgia
Total external debt, in % of GDP 40.8% 30.6% 27.5%
Short-term debt as % of total external debt 7.2% 4.7% 1.6%
Ukraine
Total external debt, in % of GDP 17.4% 21.6% 18.5% 28.7%** 34.4%**
Short-term debt as % of total external debt 2.7% 4.7% 10.0%
Korea
Total external debt, in % of GDP 23.5% 25.3% 30.1%
Short-term debt as % of total external debt 51.3% 49.9% 37.5%
Foreign currency denominated debt, in % of
total external debt
94.5%*
Indonesia
Total external debt, in % of GDP 61.5% 56.7% 63.1%
Short-term debt as % of total external debt 20.9% 25.0% 26.4%
Foreign currency denominated debt, in % of
total external debt
97.8%*
Malaysia
Total external debt, in % of GDP 39.3% 39.3% 47.1%
Short-term debt as % of total external debt 21.2% 27.9% 31.6%
Foreign currency denominated debt, in % of
total external debt
74% 89.7%*
Moldova
Total external debt, in % of GDP 58% 63% 66% 82% 129%
Short-term debt as % of total external debt 0.9% 3.2% 2.1%
Note: * as of end June; ** own estimates.
Source: WDI, author's calculations on basis of IFS and WDI data, Jarociñski (2000), Chang and Velasco (1998), Sasin (2001b), Siwiñska (2000).
Table 2-4. Reserves coverage around crisis, moderate pegs
Reserves/monetary base
6 months
before
3 months
before
At the crisis
date
3 months
after
6 months
after
Loss of reserves
(in percent)
Russia 0.33 0.31 0.35 0.61 0.61 40.6%
Georgia 0.69 0.71 0.85 0.87 0.68 24.5%
Ukraine 0.70 0.49 0.47 0.30 0.30 58.1%
Korea 1.46 1.25 1.53 1.86 2.70 32.2%
Indonesia 1.26 1.12 1.50 1.38 2.54 5.2%
Malaysia 0.88 0.89 0.73 0.92 0.98 18.4%
Moldova 1.43 1.32 2.02 1.50 1.77 35.0%
Note: * Monetary authorities' reserve loss is calculated from the month the stock of these reserves peaks until the crisis date.
Source: own calculations based on IFS data.
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covering only about a half of the short-term external oblig-
ations in these countries, and this ratio was increasing
steadily. This pattern does not apply to Malaysia. Although
Malaysia was not covering its base money with its reserves,
it was still able to cover about 1.5 of its short-term debt
with its reserves.
2.6.3. Group Third – Floats: Kyrgyz Republic,
Czech Republic, Bulgaria
High scores on the flexibility index accounted by the
economies in this group emerged by different reasons. First
of all, the relative flexibility of the exchange regime in Bul-
garia resulted from the author's decision about the choice of
the start date of the currency crisis. It was set for February
1997 that is around one year after the banking crisis erupt-
ed. Hence the magnitude of the effective flexibility index
does not correspond with the earlier "tranquil" period low
levels (0.0 FLT during 12 months preceding the banking cri-
sis, irrespective of the same declared floating regime). The
Czech Republic scored so high not because of fluctuations
of the exchange rate (which was, in fact, relatively stable
before the spring of 1997), but because of the relatively
small interventions of the monetary authority, involving use
of its international reserves. Finally, the relative flexibility of
the exchange rate regime of the Kyrgyz Republic seem to
correspond more or less with the declared managed float.
However, when we look at the value of the FLT index for
Kyrgyz Republic during the next 12 months after the crisis,
it is clear that the regime became "better managed" than
before.
Kyrgyz Republic was among the leading reformers in
the region in mid-1990s. Its output started to grow in 1996,
and there were some signs of monetary stabilisation up to
the summer of 1998. The country has been running huge
budget deficits, which during two years preceding the crisis
amounted to 9–10% of GDP. External debt has been also
mounting. It rose from 51% of GDP in 1995 to nearly 80%
of GDP (1.4 billion USD) in 1997 [Brudzyñski and Mamirov,
2000]. Thus, monetary policy was highly constrained by the
fiscal stance, debt accumulation, very low monetization of
the economy, and the scarcity of monetary instruments.
Banking sector was underdeveloped, and remained fragile,
with almost half of its deposits denominated in hard curren-
cy. Since the introduction of the national currency, the som,
the National Bank of Kyrgyz Republic has been conducting a
managed float exchange rate policy. In fact, there were peri-
ods when NBKR intervened heavily. During 1997, the
national currency was fairly stable, fluctuating within the
range of 17 to 17.5 soms per U.S. dollar [IMF, 2000b]. How-
ever, this stability was achieved by over 35% decrease in
international reserves during the first half of 1997. When
the pressures connected with the Russian crisis strength-
ened, the NBKR intervened, but not as much as in 1997.
The reserves were down only by 19%, and the national
currency depreciated by over 19% in November 1998.
Over the 1999, the som was depreciating further despite
significant interventions , as domestic and external events
lowered the confidence in domestic currency. The banking
sector suffered severe setback.
Some signs of worsening of economic performance of
quickly growing Czech Republic started to be visible in
1996. These were mainly the widening current account
deficit, caused partly by the appreciating real exchange rate,
and a considerable slow down of economic growth. It is
argued that the combined effect of a slower growth, very
high current account deficit, a governmental crisis, and pos-
sibly some contagious effects from South-East Asia led to
the currency crisis in May 1997 [Horváth, 1999]. However,
it should be noted that although fiscal balance moved to a
deficit in 1995, the budget deficits accounted in 1995 and
1996 were of magnitude of 0.7% and 1.0% of the Czech
GDP. Monetary policy started to be contractionary more
than 12 months before the crisis, and there was no asset
bubble as in the case of Asian economies. Nevertheless, the
reserves of the central bank that were accumulated during
1994–1995 due to large capital inflows started to decrease
at the end of 1996. Up to early 1997, the economy was fol-
lowing a tight exchange rate regime, with a +/- 0.5% band
of permitted fluctuations. The koruna was pegged to the
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Country name Declared exchange
rate regime prior
to the crisis
Exchange regime
into which the
country switched
after the crisis
FLT index over 12
months prior to the
crisis
FLT index over 12
months after the
crisis
Kyrgyz Republic managed float managed float 0.683 0.414
Czech Republic horizontal band managed float 0.943 0.796
Bulgaria free float currency board* 1.048 0.128
Note: * Bulgaria adopted a currency board arrangement in July 1997 that is 4 months after its currency collapsed.
Source: IMF Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, various numbers, and author's calculations.
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basket consisting of DEM (65%) and USD (35%). The band
was considerably widened in February 1997 to +/-7.5%.
The koruna began to weaken in February, and the market
started to exhibit nervousness, when the government intro-
duced a policy package to deal with slower growth in April
1997. The currency was depreciating, but stayed within the
band. On May 26, 1997, the Czech National Bank
announced a change in the exchange rate regime and moved
to a managed float. The currency then depreciated by over
9%, and the interest rates jumped high. The country lost
23% of its international reserves in 9 months, and 1.5 billion
USD of this in one month between April and May 1997.
During 1996 Bulgaria went through the banking crisis,
which laid grounds for the early 1997 collapse of its curren-
cy. It is also argued that the banking and the currency crises
occurred together, caused by common factors, and that
they lasted from mid-1996 until February 1997. However,
the date for the currency crisis in this paper is set for Feb-
ruary 1997, when the lev depreciated over by 100% against
the U.S. dollar. Fiscal problems were not uncommon for
Bulgaria, either. Only in 1996, state budget deficit amounted
to 10% of GDP. The public debt burden was large, and it
allowed to build inflation and depreciation expectations.
Appreciating – since 1994 – real exchange rate was one of
the reasons behind the trade and the CA deficits. Mounting
macroeconomic imbalances precipitated the emergence of
financial crises. Weak banking system experienced a run on
deposits, and the central bank responded by injecting liquid-
ity into the system. But this resulted in the acceleration of
inflation. Then, the stabilisation program of July 1996 that
followed a money-based approach failed. One of the key
reasons for it was lack of financial discipline. The domestic
currency started to depreciate in April 1996. The attempts
to halt this depreciation with the help of an agreement with
the IMF proved to be unsuccessful, and January and Febru-
ary 1997 witnessed a collapse of the currency. In two first
weeks of February, lev depreciated by nearly 200%. The
country has been at that time following an "independently
floating" exchange rate regime. In fact, lev was kept stable
by the central bank, and sharp depreciations were allowed
only when it was impossible to defend the currency. When
we look at the flexibility index during the mid-1995 to mid-
1996 period, its value equals zero, as in the perfectly fixed
exchange rate arrangement, reflecting successful efforts of
the monetary authority to preserve external value of the
currency, under the declared name of "independently float-
ing" exchange rate regime [Ganev, 2001].
Countries that were not using exchange rate as a nomi-
nal anchor policy had enough reserves to cover monetary
base at the crisis dates, as one might have presumed. What
was specific for two of them, mainly to Bulgaria and the Kyr-
gyz Republic was the heavy burden of external debt. Gross
foreign debt of Bulgaria was well over 100% of GDP during
1991–1996 (with the exception of the year 1995). External
debt of the Kyrgyz Republic jumped for 80% to over 90%
of GDP in 1997–1998. This huge indebtedness was not only
feeding inflation and depreciation expectations but also
enforced domestic currency substitution. Both Bulgaria and
Kyrgyz Republic were, to high extent, dollarised and respec-
tive currency substitution indicators significantly increased
after the financial crises of 1997 and 1998. 
It seems that the stability of exchange rate had been of
great value to the monetary authorities of Bulgaria and Kyr-
gyz Republic, but conventional pegs would have not gained
enough credibility during several months preceding curren-
cy crashes. After the crises happened the confidence to
domestic currencies was even lower, and this was one of the
reasons to adopt a currency board in Bulgaria in 1998. It
should be remembered that these economies could not
have enjoyed additional gains from the flexibility of the
exchange rate regime, because of the lack of strong links
with other capital markets. In fact, their financial links with
external world were poorly developed. In 1996 net capital
inflows to Bulgaria were at the level of 3.1% GDP, and in
Kyrgyz Republic of 2.6% GDP. It is claimed that in order to
gain credibility and to stabilise the economy, the Kyrgyz
Republic should follow Bulgaria and also adopt the "corner
solution" that is the currency board or even allow for a full
dollarisation [Brudzyñski, Mamirov, 2000]. 
The Czech Republic had stronger fundamentals when
the koruna depreciated. Its hard-currency denominated
debt to GDP ratio was about 41% of GDP at the end of
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Table 2-5. Reserve coverage, floats
Reserves/monetary base
6 months
before
3 months
before
At the crisis
date
3 months
after
6 months
after
Loss of reserves
(in percent)
Kyrgyz Republic 0.94 1.08 1.45 1.68 2.51 18.71%
Czech Republic 0.98 0.99 1.08 1.05 0.97 23.0%
Bulgaria 0.64 0.69 1.61 2.36 2.08 16.8%
Note: * Monetary authorities' reserve loss is calculated from the month the stock of these reserves peaks until the crisis date
Source: author's calculations based on IFS data
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1997, and as the depreciation was not that high, it increased
form the previous year by 4 percentage points only. But the
recovery of the real economy has been rather slow.
2.6.4. Currency Board: Argentina in 1995
The advantages of withstanding a currency pressure and
maintaining a fixed arrangement can be shown with the
example of Argentina in 1995. Argentina, which suffered a
form of Tequila crisis, did not devalue its currency at the cost
of a significant loss of international reserves, one year long
recession, rising unemployment and a crisis in the banking
sector. The importance of maintaining the commitment was
crucial for this country, since on the basis of it the authori-
ties reformed the economy and managed to reduce inflation
and gain credibility after a long period of instability and finan-
cial turbulence. Clearly, potential costs of leaving the regime
(if one knows how) outweighed possible gains from devalu-
ation. But it should be noted that the currency pressure was
not directly related to the economic fundamentals, and had
roots mainly in the low credibility in the currency board
regime. The authorities' move toward strong commitment
in support of the peso was interpreted correctly, and the
pressure started to ease just when the reserve coverage of
the monetary base was at the lowest allowed level (2/3 of
the base money). If Argentina had decided to devalue its
currency in 1995, the credibility of an anti-inflationary poli-
cy would have been destroyed and the country risk would
have been much higher indicating higher vulnerability to
subsequent economic shocks. Besides, there were positive
changes in the banking system towards more transparency,
and more effectiveness, brought about by the crisis. 
The discussion on advantages and disadvantages of keep-
ing exchange rate fixed when financial turbulence occurs
with the use of the case studies can be summarised in the
following way:
– Declared regime is not always the pursued one. As an
example may serve Bulgaria in 1995 with the "perfectly
managed" regime.
– The most spectacular regime change happened in
Malaysia, Russia and Bulgaria, as measured by the effective
exchange rate flexibility indices over a year prior and fol-
lowing a crisis. Malaysia and Russia floated the currencies.
Bulgaria did this in 1996, and one year later it again opted for
a rigid arrangement.
– Three countries that followed hard pegs valued high
their fixed arrangements in terms of the alternative cost of
a rise in the domestically valued debt in the case of a sudden
depreciation. However, finally they abandoned their anchors
because of the very high liquidity costs of keeping the peg. 
– Two Asian countries classified as "moderate peggers",
namely Korea and Indonesia, had large amount of short-
term foreign currency denominated debt, and this was mak-
ing the fixed arrangements of a special value for them. The
most heavily indebted was Indonesia, and it also suffered the
most after the crisis. The debt of Malaysia was smaller, but
still substantial. In addition, it seems that this peg was not
very credible, and that it was not so costly for Malaysia to
stay on. Nevertheless, the country decided to let the cur-
rency to depreciate and did not suffer as much as other
economies in the region.  
– Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia were harmed
by the rise of the domestically valued external debt, yet
decided to devalue. It seems that credibility of pegs in Rus-
sia and Ukraine was particularly low since the Asian crisis,
but there was no alternative than to stay on due to the high
costs of quitting, which led them to the point when a peg
ended when it was already too late.
– Two of the economies – Bulgaria and the Kyrgyz
Republic – that allowed for a flexibility of the exchange rate
probably were doing this not because they did not value the
stabilisation of their currencies, but because the conven-
tional peg arrangement would not have been credible
enough to sustain. Also, because of high degree of currency
substitution and weak international financial links they could
not enjoy advantages of the flexible regime. The crisis fur-
ther undermined the confidence to their domestic curren-
cies, and "managed float" do not seem to be an option for
them either. Bulgaria gave up its monetary policy and intro-
duced a currency board a year after its currency heavily
depreciated. 
2.7. Probability of Ending a Peg. Logit
Estimation
Monthly data on 13 countries over 9 years were used to
estimate a model describing the probability of quitting a peg.
The approach is taken after Klein and Marion (1997). They
identified factors that influence the duration of currency pegs in
a panel of monthly data for 17 Latin American countries and
Jamaica over the 1957–1991 period. Potential determinants
included both variables that vary across the course of a spell like
real exchange rate and international liquidity, and also variables
that change slowly like openness and geographical trade con-
centration. Authors performed logit analysis on the pooled data
controlling for peg durations, existence of multiple exchange
regimes, regular executive transfers and coups. They found
that sharp real appreciations and looses of foreign currency
reserves predate devaluations. Probabilities of a system col-
lapse one month before devaluation were as high as 0.89.  In
this paper, the probability of ending a peg was initially set to
depend on the underlying liquidity, bilateral real exchange rate,
trade openness, and a number of months spent on a peg. 
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The degree of misalignment of a real exchange rate from
its equilibrium value is an important cost of maintaining a
peg to a policy maker, and hence should influence its dura-
tion. However, as the equilibrium value is difficult to
observe, it is assumed that quickly changing real exchange
rates of emerging or transforming markets vs. U.S. dollar
are the good approximation of a misalignment itself, and a
good predictor of when a peg ends. The real exchange rate
index used here is calculated on the basis of CPIs, and in
such a way that an increase denotes appreciation. The
importance of enough levels of international reserves is cap-
tured by the inclusion of the relative reserve measure,
namely international reserves excluding gold expressed as a
percent of monetary base. The role of structural factors in
determining the peg duration is brought about by the inclu-
sion of the measure of trade openness, expressed as a ratio
of the sum of trade flows to GDP. Additionally, the probabil-
ity of ending a spell was presupposed to depend on time
spent on a peg. 
The dependent variable equals one when a period of at
least three months of relative stability of an exchange rate
ends. This stability is defined with the use of the relative effec-
tive flexibility index. The exchange rate is defined as fixed, or
stable, if the FLT index for a given month is below 0.3.
The countries used in the estimation are the ones that
were described in the previous section, with the exception
of Georgia. These are, namely: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Indonesia, Korea, Kyrgyz Republic,
Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Russian Federation, Thailand,
and Ukraine. After adjusting for the missing data, this gives
a sample of 970 monthly observations during the
1992–1999 period. The model included 67 peg spells, with
the average duration of 15 months. Average monthly appre-
ciation of the bilateral exchange rate versus the U.S. dollar
was 0.4%. Average openness: 18% of GDP.
After the initial estimation, trade openness was dropped
from the model, because it inclusion was highly insignificant,
and the more parsimonious model yielded better results. In
fact, this structural variable allowed for the differences
among economies, and it proved to have no influence over
the dependent variable. Finally, the probability of ending a
peg was tested against three explanatory variables: liquidity
measure, real exchange rate, and a number of months spent
on a peg. The results of the estimation are given in the table
below. 
The results indicate increasing probability of ending a
peg when real exchange rate appreciates and with more
time spent on a peg. The coefficient of the liquidity indica-
tor is of correct sign, but nevertheless, it is not significant at
90% level. The reserve coverage of base money does not
seem to play a role in increasing probability of quitting a
fixed exchange rate arrangement.
2.8. Conclusions
When comparing between fixed and flexible exchange
regimes, there is a need to examine the degree of the
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Table  2-6. Logit estimates of the probability of ending a peg
Dependent Variable: EPEG
Method: ML - Binary Logit
Sample(adjusted): 3 1330
Included observations: 970
Excluded observations: 358 after adjusting endpoints
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
C -8.757621 2.350957 -3.725131 0.0002
LOG(RES) -0.253666 0.192520 -1.317608 0.1876
LOG(RER) 0.997642 0.491258 2.030792 0.0423
Time on peg 0.724268 0.104344 6.941180 0.0000
time on peg2 -0.037390 0.007095 -5.270219 0.0000
Mean dependent var 0.065979     S.D. dependent var 0.248374
S.E. of regression 0.237099     Akaike info criterion 0.399483
Sum squared resid 54.24819     Schwarz criterion 0.424623
Log likelihood -188.7490     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.409052
Restr. log likelihood -235.8191     Avg. log likelihood -0.194587
LR statistic (4 df) 94.14009     McFadden R-squared 0.199602
Probability(LR stat) 0.000000
Obs with Dep=0 906      Total obs 970
Obs with Dep=1 64
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exchange rate flexibility empirically. The flexibility index
used here allowed to difference between the declared and
pursued exchange rate regimes and set ground for deeper
analysis.
Case study approach allowed for a detailed analysis of
the exchange rate regime changes in some emerging mar-
kets. It is clear that the eruptions of the currency crises
were not caused by the fixed regime choices themselves,
but rather by the inconsistent macroeconomic policies
within this financial framework. If a fixed arrangement is to
be sustainable, not only monetary policy must be directed
towards supporting its parity, but also trade, regulatory and
fiscal policies must be geared towards maintaining the
exchange rate stability.  
The results of the econometric estimation further sup-
port this argument. They point on the importance of the
real exchange rate misalignment magnified by longer peg
duration in explaining the probability that a fixed regime
ends. However, smaller reserve coverage of the base
money does not seem to influence the probability of ending
a peg spell. This fact probably reflects the inter-country dif-
ferences in levels of monetization, irrespective where cur-
rency crises were happening.
It is difficult to recommend one particular regime for all
described economies. However, it seems that with increas-
ing capital mobility, countries nowadays face the choice of
two corner solutions of possible exchange rate regime. If an
economy decides for a floating arrangement, its exchange
rate should be really free to move in response to market
forces. The additional requirement for the floating exchange
regime to be effective is that the monetary policy must
establish a credible alternative nominal anchor. Then if a
country opts for a rigid form of an exchange rate arrange-
ment, this is for a currency board or a full dollarisation
(euroisation), it should create sound and transparent insti-
tutions, and rules guaranteeing that the commitment is
credible. Giving up monetary policy may be even a good
solution for countries that need to stabilise their economies
and have very bad record of their economic policies.
Still, it should be remembered that a conventional peg
arrangement is difficult to sustain for a longer term in high
inflation countries, where the credibility of the monetary
authority is not high, and where the financial system is
underdeveloped. The exchange rate anchor adopted when
economic conditions are favourable, but not supported by
the appropriate set of other policies, cannot last for long.
And it is important that realignments of the pegs should be
considered when it is not already too late, and that expan-
sionary monetary policy is not in line with a currency peg for
a longer period of time. In addition, this type of exchange
rate regime may promote short-term foreign currency bor-
rowing on a large scale, as happened in Asia.
CASE Reports No. 41
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Appendix: Crisis Dates
CASE Reports No. 41
Country Crisis date Nominal monthly depreciation
against USD at a crisis date
Mexico Dec 1994 54.6%
Argentina Mar 1995 0%
Bulgaria Feb 1997 100.98%
Czech Republic May 1997 5.44%
Thailand Jul 1997 24.34%
Malaysia Jul 1997 4.19%
Indonesia Aug 1997 16.78%
Korea Dec 1997 45.64%
Russian Fed. Aug 1998 26.72%
Ukraine Sep 1998 51.11%
Moldova Nov 1998 55.41%
Kyrgyz Republic Nov 1998 19.40%
Georgia Dec 1998 16.8%
Brazil Jan 1999 64.08%
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3.1. Introduction
Calls for higher foreign liquidity holding [Feldstein,
1999; Mishkin, 1999; Radelet and Sachs, 1998] require a
serious theoretical and empirical analysis of benefits and
costs of maintaining high liquidity. The paper aims at eval-
uating the optimal level of foreign exchange reserves with
respect to currency crises in emerging markets. Simple
policy optimisation model is presented, which is then eval-
uated empirically.
The crises (including big crises) are nothing new [see
excellent survey in Bordo and Schwartz, 1999, which
describes currency crises since 1830], but they appear to
elude the attempts to model them. Many crises of the
1930s, speculative attacks of the late Bretton-Woods era
and the ones troubling Latin American economies in 70s
and 80s could well be explained by early, "first-generation"
models [1] in which crisis erupts as a result of a macro-
economic policy incompatible with fixed exchange rates.
The catastrophes of the 1990s often require a different
apparatus. Thus appeared "second-generation" models in
which rational government chooses (or not) to devalue, in
an utility optimising process and in which rational agents
try to predict government choices [2]. Other models (gen-
eration not yet given) started also to appear: liquidity
models [e.g. Chang and Velasco, 1999], moral hazard
[Dooley, 1997; Krugman, 1998; Corsetti, Pesenti and
Roubini, 1999] and others. Second generation, as well as
later models often allow for analysing new features, crucial
for understanding the currency crises of the 1990s. They
include contagion, multiple equilibria, self-fulfilling attacks,
and crisis propagation.
As always, along formal models aiming at explanation of
what happened, post mortem accounts of the crises,
together with policy advice were being published [3]. The
policy recommendations stated in these papers are surpris-
ingly similar. They can be summarised in the following
points:
– Fixed exchange rates are dangerous (country can have
only two out of capital mobility, freedom of monetary poli-
cy and fixed exchange rate),
– Banks should be very closely supervised, foreign par-
ticipation in the sector would help,
– In the absence of international lender of the last
resort, and with a possibility of self-fulfilling attacks, interna-
tional liquidity is the key to self protection.
The last point indeed seems to make perfect sense:
even with less-than perfect macro policy, the government
could survive any speculative attack, provided it has enough
"foreign exchange ammunition". What is more, if the
reserves are high enough, the attack (bound to fail) will
never happen. The simple argument for higher reserves is
not obvious, however. 
First, in monetary terms sterilised intervention (and for-
eign exchange interventions are very often sterilised) should
not matter that much for the exchange rate. The main
problem here is that sterilisation increases the potential for
hot money outflow – "multiplies the enemy with the same
amount of ammunition" to stick with the military parable. If
the foreign exchange intervention is not sterilised, the econ-
omy (and the banking sector in particular) must be able to
survive a serious liquidity squeeze (which could have worse
effects than devaluation itself).
Second, in fixed exchange regime "sufficient liquidity" may
mean foreign exchange reserves close to money supply. Any
level of reserves smaller than this does not fully eliminate the
"attack" equilibrium, as not only foreign investors, but also res-
idents could choose to exchange domestic for foreign curren-
cy. It may well be that relationship between foreign exchange
reserves and probability of a crisis is not linear at all – it would
be plausible that a country with very high reserves would enjoy
almost zero probability of a speculative attack. Reserves even
marginally smaller than that could warrant much higher risk.
Part III.
International Liquidity, and the Cost of Currency Crises
Mateusz Szczurek
[1] Including Krugman (1979), Flood and Garber (1984).
[2] See e.g. Obstfeld (1994, 1996), Velasco (1996) Ozkan and Sutherland (1998), Drazen (1999).
[3] Feldstein (1999), Mishkin (1999), Obstfeld (1998), Edwards (1999), Kamin (1999), Radelet and Sachs (1998) are just a few.
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Finally, liquidity is costly. Even if the government issues
international debt solely for the purpose of building up the
war chest of international reserves (with the annual cost of
the spread over the US Treasuries) the gain in terms of liq-
uidity will be limited because of the additional build-up of
obligations. If the proper measure of liquidity includes the
level of short-term debt, borrowing short to build up
reserves will make little sense. Still, provided the interna-
tional reserves are built up with the long-term bonds, an
increase of international liquidity is feasible.
The problems indicated above should not lead to a con-
clusion that reserves do not matter. Empirical studies sug-
gest that there is significant evidence that international liq-
uidity was a good predictor of the recent crises [4]. So far,
however, there has been little research done to link theo-
retical models with econometric research.
Thus, the following chapter tries to establish the theo-
retical relationship between foreign exchange reserves and
currency crises. Existing currency crisis models are
reviewed, starting from Krugman (1979) "first generation"
crisis model through several "second generation" optimising
government models. New models dealing explicitly with
international liquidity [like Chang and Velasco, 1999] are
then evaluated.
The paper will then include a short survey of empirical
study in which international liquidity plays a role.
After the review of the theoretical, as well as the empir-
ical literature, a simple model of optimising government will
be presented. In the model, international reserves are the
only variable under the direct control of the policy-maker,
which tries to minimise the probability of a currency crisis,
having in mind the costs of foreign exchange reserves. Using
the structure presented it is possible to estimate the implic-
it reputation cost of the prospective currency crash to the
policy-maker.
The final step was empirical testing of the model. Pooled
logit regression study was performed to check if different
measures of international liquidity help in surviving emerging
market crises [5], and an attempt was made to approximate
a reasonable amount of foreign exchange reserves in such
countries. Developed markets currency crises rarely seem
to be resulting from poor liquidity nowadays. Not only the
level of international reserves they hold is usually higher
than in the emerging economies, but more importantly, the
solvency of industrialised countries' governments is never in
question, therefore such countries enjoy easy access to
international credit even in times of distress. Other equa-
tions of the model were also estimated, which allowed for a
numerical estimation of reputation costs of the crisis to
emerging economies' authorities. 
The results confirm the appropriateness of the model's
foundations. Almost all the parameters of the model (esti-
mated over the sample of emerging market countries)
behave as predicted by the theory. It allowed for estimation
of the curve of reasonable holdings of the foreign exchange
reserves. Assuming that a currency crisis costs only 1% of
the GDP, the FX reserves should be 1.64 times higher than
the foreign short-term debt (as reported by BIS). Given the
conservative estimation of the crisis cost, this recommenda-
tion clearly exceeds the IMF's prescription of reserve/short
term debt ratio equal to one. Another result was the evalu-
ation of the weight the governments/central banks of the
countries give to the risk of a currency crisis. The results
show that the policy makers of the emerging economies
"value" a currency crisis at between 5 and 0.3% of the GDP.
Surprisingly, the actual number does not seem to be corre-
lated with the exchange rate arrangements.
3.2. Foreign Exchange Reserves in Crisis
Models
3.2.1. A Survey of Literature
Beginning of the currency crisis literature is attributed to
Krugman (1979) classic, later simplified and extended by
Flood and Garber (1984) and surveyed in Agenor et al.
(1992) [6]. So called first generation crisis models base on
exhaustible resource literature originating in Hotelling
(1931). The first generation crisis occurs as a result of an
unreformable macroeconomic policy incompatible with
fixed exchange rate. In Krugman's example the policy is the
one of excessive fiscal deficits, monetised away. The inter-
national reserves are quite central to the analysis: they take
the role of exhaustible resource in the equivalent model of
Salant and Henderson (1978). Incompatible macroeconom-
ic policy causes gradual depletion of reserves. Fixed
exchange regime can last only until foreign exchange
reserves reach certain critical level. The model predicts,
however, that the end comes earlier than that. Rationally
thinking speculators attack and buy all remaining stock of
reserves as soon as the shadow price – the price which
[4] Radelet and Sachs (1998), Tornell (1999), Bussiere and Mulder (1999), IMF Early Warning System.
[5] The literature on the subject is vast. Excellent survey of pre-1997 results is provided in Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhard (1997). New research
include: Tornell (1999), Rodric and Velasco (1999), Bussiere and Mulder (1999), Glick, Reuven and Rose (1999), Radelet and Sachs (1998), Chinn, Doo-
ley and Shrestha (1999), and Tanner (1999). Still, each new crisis (and each new theory) provide some more scope for further research.
[6] Balance of payments models are older than that though. Mundell (1960) shows an example of a general equilibrium model in which abandon-
ment of a peg depends on the level of international reserves.
49
Currency Crises in Emerging Markets – Selected Comparative ...
CASE Reports No. 41
would prevail without central bank fixing the exchange rate
reaches the official rate. The regime turns smoothly to a
float (exchange rate does not jump, only the level of
reserves).
Second generation models (a good example is shown in
Obstfeld 1994) addressed serious drawbacks of the first
generation models [7]. First, the governments and central
banks of the models building on Krugman (1979) were like
lemmings: once engaged in a policy incompatible with fixed
exchange rates, they were heading for the disaster of
reserve depletion. In reality, the governments have more
options: for example, they can change their policy when
balance of payments gets worse, or devalue without
depleting the reserves first. The second-generation mod-
els allow the governments to optimise. The loss function
usually includes the exchange rate and some variable
dependent on both actual depreciation and the prior pub-
lic expectations of depreciation. In two models presented
in Obstfeld (1994), the variable is a level of taxation
(dependent on nominal interest rates, and thus on public
expectations of nominal depreciation), or unemployment
(dependent on agents' wage setting decisions, and thus
nominal depreciation).
The circular causality indicated above gives rise to fas-
cinating properties of second-generation models.
Exchange rate regimes that at first glance may seem to be
perfectly viable may suddenly collapse simply because they
are expected to. The possibility of multiple equilibria and
self-fulfilling attacks fits very well with crises like 1992 ERM
collapse. Important feature of most of the second-genera-
tion models (which is often overlooked) is that self-fulfill-
ing attacks cannot occur for any value of fundamentals.
Usually, there is a range of fundamentals for which an
attack is impossible, a range for which the attack is certain,
and a range in which both "attack" and "calm" equilibria are
possible.
What is the role of international reserves, so central to
first generation models, in the second-generation alterna-
tives? Many models of the second kind, and indeed the ERM
crisis itself seem to suggest that reserves do not matter at
all. The British problem of 1992 was not about being able to
defend the currency, but about Britain not wanting to do it.
Britain had plenty of reserves, could borrow more from
other European central banks, or could decrease the money
supply and defend the pound a long time (as it had been
doing before the 1st World War). ERM crisis erupted
because the speculators believed Britain would have found
defending the pound unprofitable if attacked.
A simple explanation of the possible role of the interna-
tional reserves is shown in Obstfeld (1996), and reproduced
in Figure 3-1.
In a simplified model, Obstfeld envisages three agents:
the government (selling foreign reserves to fix the curren-
cy's exchange rate), and two investors who either hold to
their local currency assets, or sell them draining reserves.
When the reserves (which serve as a measure of the gov-
ernment's commitment to the peg) are high enough to sell
absorb both investor's selling-out of the domestic assets, the
only Nash equilibrium in the one-shot non-cooperative
game is the "no crisis" equilibrium. When the reserves are
insufficient to satisfy even one of the traders, than it is opti-
mal for each one of the investors to force devalue the cur-
rency and get some profits. The most exciting situation is
when the currency is devalued only when both traders sell.
Then two equilibria exist – it is optimal for trader 2 to attack
the currency only when trader 1 does so. Without the
attack, the peg may last forever, when attack occurs, the
peg fails.
The simple model above served only as an example of
multiple equilibria in foreign exchange markets. But other,
full-fledged, second generation models exist, which stress
the importance of international liquidity. Sachs et al. (1996)
Figure 3-1. Reserves determine the range of possible equilibria
Source: Obstfeld (1996)
[7] For other models of this kind see e.g. Obstfeld (1996), Velasco (1996) Ozkan, Gulcin, and Sutherland (1998), Drazen (1999). A survey is pro-
vided in Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz (1996).
Trader 2
Hold Sell
Hold 0,0 0,-1Trader
1 Sell -1,0 -1,-1
(a) High Reserve game
Trader 2
Hold Sell
Hold 0,0 0,2Trader
1 Sell 2,0 ½,½
(b) Low Reserve game
Trader 2
Hold Sell
Hold 0,0 0,-1Trader
1 Sell -1,0 3/2,3/2
(c) Intermediate Res. game
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provides one example, in which the fundamental, which
governs the possibility of a successful attack, is the net level
of debt the government holds. Thus, sufficiently high level of
reserves (net of government debt) makes an attack impos-
sible to succeed. Such a model seems to explain the stylised
fact of relative crisis immunity of highly liquid developing
countries.
Asymmetric information was quite early identified as an
important factor behind financial crises. Asian crisis provid-
ed another example of how moral hazard (resulting from
implicit government guarantees) can cause over-investment,
excessive risk taking and a currency crisis. One of the advo-
cates of the asymmetric information roots of many financial
crises was Mishkin (1998).
Right after the eruption of the Asian crisis, Paul Krugman
(1998) suggested a moral hazard explanation to the crisis.
His idea, in principle, was that implicit public guarantees for
the private enterprises generated excess demand for risky
investments. The firms (and their foreign creditors) were
confident that if their project fails the government would
bail them out. Of course, such logic cannot work in the
economy-wide scale. When things went badly for East Asia
(depreciation of the yen against the dollar, fall in semicon-
ductor prices, etc.) too many projects started to fail. The
government was not able to bail out everyone, short term
foreign financing dried out and the currency plunged. Pesen-
ti and Roubini (1999) present a formalised version of this
model.
Dooley (1997) shows a similar story in his "insurance
model." The latter model is especially interesting as it sug-
gests that high international liquidity can actually cause a
deterministic cycle resulting in a violent crisis. The mecha-
nism suggested by Dooley works as follows.
Once (1) the government of a country has incentives to
bail out domestic borrowers, (2) the government has a pos-
itive net worth, and (3) capital account is sufficiently liber-
alised, the crisis cycle starts. Domestic residents compete to
borrow foreign money (knowing that the government will
provide free insurance, and will bail them out anyway if they
fail to pay – see 1 above), driving the domestic yield
upwards. Foreign creditors seeing that the government is
(1) willing and (2) able to pay the insurance premium if their
borrowers fail to pay use (3) the liberalised capital account
to pump in the funds. As soon as the overall liabilities
(including the implicit liabilities) of the government exceed
available assets (these are not growing in line with liabilities
because of moral-hazard induced excessive yield), the for-
eign creditors rush to claim their insurance premium.
Regardless of the exchange rate regime, resulting sudden
outflow of capital causes severe fiscal costs.
Recent years brought to the light several models dealing
explicitly with (lack of) international liquidity as a factor
behind foreign exchange crises. Typical model of this kind is
presented in Chang, Velasco (1999). The model is based on
the work on bank runs of Diamond and Dybvig (1983). In
the models, the banking sector works as a term-structure
transformer, and as such has a structural asset-liability term
mismatch. Because banks deal with many clients, they can
use law of large numbers to optimise their term structure,
amount of reserves held, and long-term investments under-
taken. The optimised (in terms of expected profit) amount
of reserves, however, usually gives rise to a multiple equilib-
rium solution. Either an outcome superior to the private
competitive (without bank inter-mediation) equilibrium pre-
vails, or run on banks happens. Because the small liquidation
value of the non-liquid assets, this outcome is usually worse
than the private competitive solution.
The translation of such a model of a bank run to the
world of foreign exchange crises is then quite straightfor-
ward. If foreign depositors decide to run on the (insuffi-
ciently liquid) banking sector, either banks fail (if the central
bank does nothing), or fixed exchange system collapses (if
the central bank provides liquidity to the sector by printing
money after using up insufficient foreign exchange reserves).
The level of international liquidity is crucial, the more inter-
national reserves the central bank has, the less severe bank-
ing/currency crisis is. Floating exchange rate regime does
seem to ease some problems of insufficient liquidity, but
only if majority of debt in the economy is in local currency.
The problem faced by most of the emerging markets, how-
ever, is foreign debt denominated in foreign currency (also,
foreign exchange crisis influences the quality of domestic-
currency debt, as it can hit the value of collateral, see e.g.
Mishkin, 1998).
The class of models does not only explain how runs on
insufficiently liquid banking sectors can translate into cur-
rency crises. It also shows that the overall liquidity level held
by the sector may be optimal from expected return point of
view, but it may still give rise to a switch to a crisis equilibri-
um. While it is quite easy to remain liquid, it is rational (cer-
tainly for individual banks, but also often for the economy as
a whole after taken into account the social cost of the sys-
temic crisis) to have some maturity mismatch. Similar argu-
ment applies to the term structure – high short-term
indebtedness may be individually rational (although it can be
socially inferior to long-term debt) – see Rodric and Velasco
(1999).
Other models explicitly dealing with liquidity include:
Goldfajn and Valdez (1997), Chang, Velasco (1998ab), and
Krugman (1999). 
3.2.2. A Survey of Empirical Results
The importance of the international liquidity in prevent-
ing or easing the currency crises shown in the theoretical
models was also confirmed in many empirical studies. In an
extensive research of 117 currency crashes Frankel and
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Rose (1996) concluded that variables important for predict-
ing currency crises (defined as 25% depreciation of the
local currency) include FDI/debt ratio, level of international
reserves, high domestic credit growth, increase in world
interest rates, real exchange rate overvaluation, and reces-
sions. Current account and fiscal deficit were found to be
insignificant.
A study in a similar, univariate spirit was conducted
recently by Aziz, Caramazza and Salgado (2000). In the
study based on 50 countries in a sample spanning from 1975
to 1997 they found that out of the most of the 157 crises
recorded were preceded by a fall in international liquidity
(M2/international reserves).
Sachs, Tornell, and Velasco (1995) also show that
M2/international reserves coupled with weak fundamentals
rendered the countries vulnerable to contagion effects fol-
lowing the Mexican crisis. 
In another study, Tornell (1999) presents three determi-
nants of the vulnerability of economies to the currency
crises: weakness of the banking sector, real appreciation of
the local currency and international liquidity. Tornell found
that some non-linear dependencies between the variables.
For example, if international liquidity is high enough, than
even significant real appreciation or banking sector fragility
do not matter.
Bussiére and Mulder (1999) point to the importance of
international liquidity (defined as short term foreign debt to
reserves ratio) in predicting the depth of a currency crisis.
This variable, together with real appreciation of the local
currency over the preceding four years, current account
deficit and lack of an IMF support programme was able to
explain much of the depreciation of the emerging markets'
currencies during the recent contagious crises. What is
more, multiplicative specification of the model (where
international liquidity dominates the overall vulnerability
index when it is very low or very high) seemed to perform
even better.
Rodric and Velasco (1999) present yet another proof
that low international liquidity actually welcomes a curren-
cy crisis (defined as a sharp reversal of capital flow) [8].
Their probit analysis shows that short term debt/reserves
ratio (especially short term debt to foreign banks) signifi-
cantly increases the probability of a crisis. Interestingly, the
level of long-term and medium-term debt is significantly
negatively correlated with the probability of a crisis. The
explanation for this could be that long-term debt is associ-
ated with other, positive, country attributes (omitted from
the analysis). Rodric and Velasco also find out that short-
term debt to international reserves ratio helps in explaining
the severity of the foreign exchange crises (measured as a
GDP cost or depreciation).
The above survey of the literature touched upon an
important problem in measuring the crisis vulnerability –
definitions of the crucial variables. The problem starts very
early: how do we define a currency crisis? Table 3-1 sum-
marises how different authors defined a currency crisis.
Similar "definitional" problem relates to the interna-
tional liquidity. In a sense, the problem is deeper here, as
it involves not only subjective view of what we call a crisis
(as in the previous case), but also the economic theory.
We can broadly define international liquidity as the ability
of a central bank / economy to survive a temporary capital
flow reversal without serious macroeconomic (e.g.
exchange rate or GDP growth) consequences. Translating
such a definition into the world of available indicators is
difficult. One side of the equation (international assets
available on short notice) is quite easy to determine – in a
vast majority of cases it is defined as the stock of interna-
tional reserves [9].  
The problem starts with the definition of "hot" liabili-
ties. How many obligations the central bank may be forced
to honour depend on many factors. For example, under a
fixed exchange rate regime the central bank should theo-
retically be able to buy all the money stock for dollars (or
other reserve currency) from the public. How much the
central bank should actually be ready to buy out depends
on e.g. the level of dollarisation of the economy. In coun-
tries like Bosnia and Herzegovina, DM can easily be used
for transactional purposes, thus in times of foreign
exchange distress, the transactional demand for local cur-
rency will be close to zero. Therefore in such country the
central bank must be prepared to buy out the entire
money stock from the public. 
Weak banking sector enlarges the potential liability of
the central bank (banking sector panic requires a boost in
money supply, which may lead to depreciation). Similarly,
the implicit guarantees towards the private corporate
sector increase requirements for the overall liquidity of
the government/central bank. Asian difficulties, modelled
in Krugman (1999), and Dooley (1997) are a good exam-
ple of this. Thus, while it seems plausible that sovereign
short-term debt should carry slightly bigger weight than
private sector liabilities, the latter should be far bigger
than zero. The private sector debt is likely to drain the
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[8] Radelet and Sachs (1998) reach similar conclusions in their study, which employs similar methodology.
[9] Sometimes an international support may effectively increase the international liquidity (see the regression results in Bussiére and Mulder who
show that IMF support programmes reduce the vulnerability). On the other hand, the official foreign exchange reserves are sometimes more then the
actual available assets. For example, central banks do not report their off-balance sheet obligations. Simple forward transactions (an obligation to e.g.
sell foreign exchange in the future) are not represented in official reserves statistics. Central banks may also invest their foreign exchange in illiquid, or
excessively risky assets. Blejer and Schumacher (1998) advocate the use of Value-at-Risk approach to assess the central bank vulnerability. For some
statistics on discrepancy between official reserves and actually available assets see Aizenman and Marion (1999).
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reserves in any case, especially if the exchange rate
regime is rigid.
Probably, the most often used measure of hot liabilities
is Bank for International Settlements' (BIS) statistic of
short-term debt in the foreign banking sector. This mea-
sure is available for most of the emerging market counties
in semi-annual frequency, which makes it the statistic of
choice for most of the cross-country estimations of inter-
national liquidity [Bussiére and Mulder, 1999; Tornell,
1999; Radelet and Sachs, 1998; Rodric and Velasco, 1999].
Even disregarding the domestic liabilities of the central
bank, this short-term debt measure is obviously biased
downwards. For example, a five year treasury bond held
by a foreign fund is not included (the liability is more than
one year, and moreover it is not versus the foreign bank-
ing sector). Similarly, portfolio equity investments can
flow out of the country in minutes, but they are not
included in the BIS statistic as a short-term liability.
Money stock is clearly the upper limit for the short-term
liabilities of the central bank, provided the M2 does not
grow during the crisis as a result of sterilised foreign
exchange interventions [10].
3.3. International Liquidity: Simple Model
3.3.1. Crisis and its Costs
The model stands on somewhat "empirical" assumption,
which, on one hand, may be questionable from the strictly
theoretical point of view, but on the other, are the most
widely used formulation in the literature on the leading indi-
cators of the currency crises. The assumption is that the
probability of a currency crisis happening in time t (yt=1) is
equal to:
(3.1)
where l is international reserves, REER is real effective
exchange rate overvaluation, and G is the budget deficit. α,
γ, δ>0, β<0.
While no foreign exchange crisis model yield the exact
probability function, the formulation above can be justified
on two grounds. First, it is not incompatible with neither of
the two generation of currency crises, and it has much in
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Table 3-1. Definitions and measures of a currency crisis in empirical literature 
Article Discrete/
Continuous
Definition
Rodric and Velasco (1999) Discrete/
Continuous
1 if net private capital flow/GDP changes from positive to negative by at
least 5 percentage points. Also, fall in GDP in the year of the crisis, and
depreciation (both conditional on the crisis).
Bussiére and Mulder
(1999)
Continuous Weighted average of nominal depreciation and reserve outflow
Frankel and Rose (1996) Discrete 25% depreciation vs. US$ + 10% higher depreciation rate than a year
before
Meese and Rose (1996) Discrete As above
Tanner (1999) Continuous Depreciation + reserve loss/money supply
Eichengreen, Rose and
Wyplosz (1996)
Discrete Crisis when an index of weighted average of exchange rate, interest rate
differential and reserve/M1 differential change (weights to equalise
variance of the three components), reaches mean+1.5 std. Deviation
Aziz, Caramazza and
Salgado (2000)
Discrete crisis when an index of weighted average of detrended fx and reserve
change (weights to equalise variance of two components), reaches
mean+1.5 std. Deviation
Glick and Rose (1999) Discrete Financial Times, journalistic and academic histories suggesting if the
country was, or was not a victim of a particular crisis episode.
Ötker and Pazarbasioglu,
(1997)
Discrete Crisis if there is a regime change (devaluation, widening of the band, a
switch to flexible rates)
Goldfajn and Valdés
(1997)
Discrete Three measures: 25% depreciation (as in Frankel and Rose, 1996), 2
std.dev from the mean jump in real effective exchange rate, exchange
rate market pressure index, as in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996)
Van Rijckeghem and
Weder (1999)
Discrete/
Continuous
binary variable (as in Glick and Rose, 1999), or market pressure
(weighted average of depreciation, % decline in reserves, and normalised
change in interest rates)
Source: author
[10] Sarno and Taylor (1999) try to measure the degree of capital flows persistence, or "hotness" of different types of capital flows. Not surpris-
ingly they find portfolio flows (bond and equity) the least persistent, and FDI flows the most long-term.
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common with the liquidity models based on bank-run liter-
ature [see e.g. Chang and Velasco, 1999]. Secondly, because
the function is so widely used in the empirical study, it can
be claimed that it is believed by both policy-makers and the
creditors to be true representation of the currency crisis
risk. It suffices for the analysis of the policy-maker's optimi-
sation that follows.
The functional form of the crisis probability function has
powerful implications for the policy options faced by the
government/central bank. In particular, regardless on how
bad the fundamentals are, the central bank could come up
with liquidity in t-1 sufficiently high to prevent the crisis in
time t, as shown in Figure 3-2.
A crisis in period t results in real depreciation in the
same period. This is the only effect of the crisis on the fun-
damental variables. The scale of the crisis-triggered depre-
ciation is a function of the liquidity and the other country-
specific variables in t-1.
(3.2)
where µ, θ > 0; λ < 0
A crisis and devaluation/depreciation is possible even
with undervalued real exchange rate, provided internation-
al liquidity, or other fundamentals are bad enough. Formu-
lation above ensures that the two consecutive crises in a
country are possible, yet unlikely – the worse the funda-
mentals leading to the first crisis, the bigger the deprecia-
tion, and bigger the improvement in the external stability
outlook in the following period.
A crisis in time t results in certain costs χt to the econo-
my and the policy makers. One could argue that the cost
should be some function of the severity of the crisis (or mis-
alignment of the fundamental variables and insufficient liq-
uidity), reflecting the adjustment costs (presumably higher
with high current account deficit, high public debt growing
in line with real exchange depreciation), distress to the
banking system, etc. This type of cost can be observed
empirically as, e.g., the deviation of the post-crisis GDP
growth from its long-term trend.
The overall crisis cost to the policy-maker, however,
includes a second type of cost: reputation loss. It is much
more difficult to assess empirically in an explicit way, no
explicit form of the total crisis cost function will therefore
be considered here. Presumably, the reputation cost is the
function of the degree of the rigidness of the foreign
exchange regime, and the length for which the regime was
maintained, past inflation experience, but also personality of
the central banker, etc.
The actual expected gain from the additional unit of
reserves in t-1 is therefore:
where χt<0, (3.3)
which is the decrease in expected value of the policy
maker's crisis cost in t as a result of the higher international
liquidity in t-1. Apart from the liquidity's influence on the
financing costs (considered in the following section), this is
the only benefit from international reserves in the model.
The marginal gain reflects the shape of the probability
surface, and looks as in Figure 3-3 (assuming cost indepen-
dent of REER).
The peak of the marginal return to reserves is reached
for higher levels of liquidity as the fundamentals get worse.
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Figure 3-2. Probability of a crisis vs. international liquidity and a budget deficit
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The reason is that when fundamentals are really bad, a mar-
ginal increase in liquidity from zero will not markedly reduce
the probability of the crisis. Alternatively, if the fundamentals
are really good, an increase in already high liquidity will not
reduce the probability of a crisis, because it is very close to
nil anyway.
3.3.2. International Liquidity and its Cost
At each non-crisis point of time, the policy maker faces
the following choice: he can either keep his foreign
exchange reserves (receiving international yield i* and ben-
efiting from the increased security it brings), or he can get
rid of them using the cash to pay off its foreign debt, avoid-
ing paying interest i. We assume that when there is no run
on the currency, the policy maker can both easily borrow on
the international bond markets and get down with its inter-
national debt up to the size of foreign exchange reserves (to
allow a possibility to vary international liquidity between
zero to infinity). 
The real alternative cost of the foreign exchange
reserves is thus the difference between the country's inter-
national bond and US treasury yield, equal to i-i*, which is
the country risk premium over the international borrowing
rate. This is the only cost of holding foreign exchange
reserves. The way the reserves are acquired does not mat-
ter, to the policy maker's choice – it can always run down or
increase his reserves holding afterwards [11].
The risk premium faced by the policy makers depends
on the credit assessment by the foreign investors, which is
directly related to the probability of the crisis:
(3.4)
Because an improvement of the credit assessment
makes servicing the existing foreign debt cheaper, the mar-
ginal, immediate cost of reserves πt is:
(3.5)
where Dt is the amount of foreign debt to be rolled over in
t. Because β is less than zero, it is possible that πt falls below
zero, given the existing debt is high enough.
We assume the level of taxation constant, so an increase
in international liquidity in t-1 increases Gt by πt.
The immediate cost of reserves is not the only cost
faced by the policy maker. Second round effects also play a
role. There are two dynamic problems to worry about.
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[11] Somewhat more subtle point is how international liquidity is defined. If it is just foreign exchange reserves, or foreign exchange reserves scaled
by M2, the annual cost of "a unit of liquidity" is i-i* (possibly scaled up by a constant). If it is the ratio of foreign exchange reserves to the foreign short-
term debt (as in most of the recent empirical work), the cost is higher, because the bonds become a short term obligation one year ahead of the matu-
rity. The average annual cost then becomes larger by               , where m is the maturity of the benchmark international bond of the country. The effect
becomes insignificant when the bonds are sufficiently long maturity, and does not change the overall results qualitatively.
Figure 3-3. Marginal return to international liquidity vs. liquidity and REER
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First, is the obvious negative impact of debt servicing costs
on budget deficit in the subsequent period [12]. This nega-
tive effect can be counterbalanced by reserve borrowing 
higher by            , at a cost of             , where r is the poli-
cy maker's discount rate.
Second cost is much less straightforward, and is related
to the fact, that crises in t and t+1 are not independent
events. A crisis in t makes the subsequent crisis less likely,
because of the real depreciation assumed in (3.3) [13].
Therefore, by borrowing reserves in order to protect the
country from a crisis in t, we make the crisis in t+1 more
likely, because the probability of the "cleansing" effect of the
crisis in t decreases. The amount of the reserves needed to
counterbalance the effect is equal to:
To complete the analysis one should take into account
higher debt service cost in subsequent periods caused by
the above-mentioned additional borrowing. The marginal
total cost MTC of reserves, therefore, is equal to:
Quite clearly, the discount rate r matters. Large r means
that the effects of future budgetary costs, and the lack of
cleansing effect of the quick crisis do not bother the policy
maker much. One could argue that the optimal r, which
should be close to the inter-temporary consumption dis-
count rate (probably related to the average real interest
rate), may be completely different to the policy makers' r.
For example, if the government is on its way to loose the
elections, it could risk postponing the (almost) inevitable
currency crash, by borrowing foreign exchange reserves at
a large cost, and making the crisis virtually certain, but only
after the elections. In such case (3.6) collapses to (3.5).
3.3.3. Optimisation Problem
Combining (3.3) and (3.6) we are able to complete the
analysis. Optimising policy maker tries to minimise the fol-
lowing loss function by targeting the liquidity level:
(3.7)
First term of (3.7) is the total cost of reserves (the area
below the cost curve in Figure 3-4), while the second is
(minus) total benefit from reserves.
Unfortunately, the problem is not solvable analitically. 
There are two possible equilibria. One is at internation-
al liquidity equal to zero. Increasing liquidity costs more
than it brings (fundamentals are too bad for a slight
improvement of liquidity to change the probability of a cri-
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[12] Clearly this cost can be negative in a special case, when marginal costs are also negative, i.e, when the benefits of cheaper financing outweigh
the cost of the additional unit of reserves.
[13] Here, we explicitly assume lack of two effects which make a crisis in subsequent period more likely after a crisis in t. First is the feedback effect
on the reserves (crisis in t results in the outflow of reserves and higher probability of the crisis in t+1). Second effect is the loss of reputation, which is
more common than major reforms after the crisis.
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sis much). The second equilibrium is in the point where
downward sloping marginal benefit and marginal cost curves
cross. The second equilibrium is a global minimum only if
L(lt-1)<0. In the example above, it is clearly the optimal level
of liquidity: the total gain (which is the surface below the
marginal benefit curve) exceeds the total cost.
The model has several advantages:
1. It takes into account not only the obvious costs of liq-
uidity, but also the dynamic effects – the costs of postponing
the crisis.
2. It is relatively straightforward to estimate. The bene-
fit function (logit analysis of the reserves' impact on the
probability of the crisis) is deeply rooted in the existing lit-
erature on leading crisis indicators. Similarly, data for the
depth-of-crisis function, and interest rate premium relation-
ship is widely available for a wide range of countries.
3. The model allows for an estimation of the reputation
cost of the foreign exchange crisis (which is the only missing
data in the whole structure).
3.4. Empirical Application
The above model was used for two applications. First,
we tried to estimate what is the optimal (safe, and reason-
ably cheap – "best value for money") holding of internation-
al liquidity. This requires certain assumption regarding the
perceived cost of the currency crisis.
Second application involve finding out what is the per-
ceived cost of the currency crisis to the policy-maker. By
assuming the countries analysed hold optimal (from the
point of view of the policy maker) international liquidity, we
are able to estimate "how much the crisis is feared", or the
total cost the currency crisis (including the reputation cost),
as viewed by the policymaker.
3.4.1. Data
The macro data for the empirical section comes mostly
from the IMF IFS CD-ROM. The variables used were:
Y, crisis dummy, calculated as in Eichengreen and Rose
(1997). Y equals to one when weighted average of nominal
depreciation versus US$ and foreign exchange reserve loss
exceeds 1.5 times standard deviation of the pooled
exchange market pressure index. 
REER, a measure of exchange rate overvaluation. It is
calculated as a percentage deviation from the long-term
(1980–2000, or shorter when early real exchange rate data
not available) quarterly trend. Positive number means
appreciated real exchange rate.
LLBIS, a measure of international liquidity, calculated as a
ratio of foreign exchange reserves to foreign bank debt
maturing within one year (taken from BIS/OECD/WB/IMF
database).
G, budget balance as a percentage of GDP.
SPREAD, benchmark bond spread over US treasury of
the same maturity. This variable was taken from ING Bar-
ings' Emerging Markets Weekly Report tables. 
The participation of a particular country in the global finan-
cial markets was the main factor in the sample selection
process. Developed countries were skipped from the sample,
and only emerging market countries dollar-denominated
bonds of which were quoted at some stage in the 1990s were
considered. The list of the countries in the sample is in the
Appendix.
Two assumptions should be made for the estimation:
first, the policy maker's discount rate r was set to 10% (the
results were not very responsive to the changes in this vari-
able), and the "reasonable" cost of the currency crisis. The
latter was much more difficult to choose, as indicated in the
Crisis and its cost section above. We avoided the problem by
presenting the whole curve of optimal liquidity holding,
dependent on the estimation of the prospective crisis cost.
3.4.2. The Results
The results of Equation (3.1) estimation are shown in
Table 3-2.
All the parameters have right signs, but the significance
of the budget balance in influencing the probability of the
crisis is dubious. This allows us to drop the budget balance
from the crisis probability equation, but also, we can ignore
the first of the dynamic effects from the total cost equation
(the impact of the debt servicing costs on the subsequent
budget deficits). 
International liquidity is the most significant variable in
the model. The model suggests that a country with foreign
exchange reserves at 30% of the short term debt, and 30%
overvalued real exchange rate has over 42% chance of
experiencing a currency crisis.
Next step is estimating the scope of depreciation in case
of the crisis, conditional on the fundamental variables. The
results of the OLS estimation are given in Table 3-3.
Again, all the parameters have correct signs, apart from
the budget surplus variable, which is also not significant.
The final step is evaluating how sovereign spreads depend
on the fundamentals and international liquidity. For this pur-
pose MODEL variable was created from the fitted values of
the crisis probability equation. The results are again consistent
with the theoretical model; higher fitted probability of the cri-
sis leads to higher spreads over US Treasuries well ahead (one
year) of the prospective crisis (Table 3-4).
The overall results are satisfying, i.e. consistent with the
model priors. They prove that international liquidity does
matter very much in averting currency crises. The higher
CASE Reports No. 41
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probability of a crisis is also (implicitly) reflected in higher
yield spreads of the countries involved.
What is the right level of international liquidity to hold? The
answer depends very much on the cost of the crisis – on how
much the policymakers risk. While the GDP cost of the crisis
may be similar in all exchange rate regimes – capital outflow,
real depreciation costs, etc. are also dangerous in a float (yet
one could argue that some sort of FX risk illusion keeps the
real economy's exposure to the foreign exchange risk larger in
fixed exchange rate countries), the reputation cost should be
CASE Reports No. 41
Table 3-2. Probability of currency crisis function
Logit Maximum Likelihood Estimation. The estimation method converged after 6 iterations
Dependent variable is Y
80 observations used for estimation from 1 to 80
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
CONST -1.1402 .57917 -1.9687[.053]
LLBIS -.80637 .38436 -2.0979[.039]
REER 3.3720 1.8849 1.7889[.078]
G 8.6119 6.4455 -1.3361[.185]
 Factor for the calculation of marginal effects =   .10755
 Maximized value of the log-likelihood function = -31.3216
 Akaike Information Criterion = -35.3216
 Schwarz Bayesian Criterion = -40.0857
 Hannan-Quinn Criterion = -37.2317
 Mean of Y =   .17500
 Mean of fitted Y =  .025000
 Goodness of fit =   .85000
 Pesaran-Timmermann test statistic = -59.4574[.000]
 Pseudo-R-Squared =   .15571
Table 3-3. Depth of the crisis function
Dependent variable is DEPR
 13 observations used for estimation from 1 to 13
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
CONST -.20678 .064084 -3.2267[.010]
LLBIS .14495 .051945 2.7904[.021]
REER -.66769 .13472 -4.9560[.001]
G -.14869 .28864 -.51513[.619]
 R-Squared                                    .77827                                R-Bar-Squared                           .70436
 S.E. of Regression                        .10170                                F-stat.    F(  3,   9)                      10.5297[.003]
 Mean of Dependent Variable       -.14778                              S.D. of Dependent Variable       .18704
 Residual Sum of Squares              .093085                              Equation Log-likelihood             13.6585
 Akaike Info. Criterion                  9.6585                                Schwarz Bayesian Criterion       8.5286
 DW-statistic                                 1.4847
Table 3-4. Domestic-foreign interest rate spread as a function of crisis probability
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Dependent variable is SPREADS
 60 observations used for estimation from 1 to 60
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
CONST 166.4071 227.7070 .73079[.468]
MODEL 2840.6 947.1194 2.9992[.004]
 R-Squared                                       .13427                             R-Bar-Squared                             .11934
 S.E. of Regression                           1124.7                             F-stat.    F(  1,  58)                       8.9954[.004]
 Mean of Dependent Variable          692.5000                        S.D. of Dependent Variable         1198.5
 Residual Sum of Squares                 7.34E+07                       Equation Log-likelihood               -505.6353
 Akaike Info. Criterion                     -507.6353                        Schwarz Bayesian Criterion        -509.7296
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different. In the extreme float case, the central bank ignores
the foreign exchange fluctuations, however rapid and large
they are, the reputation cost should thus be set to zero.
Another complication arises due to the fact that the govern-
ment's loss function is something completely different to the
"economy's loss function". One could argue that what really
matters in influencing the policymakers' liquidity preferences
are expected fiscal and quasi-fiscal costs of a currency crisis.
Surprisingly, the results of the next section do not sup-
port expectations of the strong influence of currency regime
on the policymakers' aversion to the currency crises.
The results for the average (from the pool) country are
shown in Figure 6. Vertical scale represents optimal liquidi-
ty (as a reserves/short-term debt ratio) corresponding to
the assumed cost of the currency crisis (as a percentage of
GDP).
The results indicate that the IMF's recommendation of
keeping foreign exchange reserves stock equal to the short-
term foreign debt is insufficient. Assuming the cost of the
crisis at just 1% of GDP, optimal international liquidity is 1.6
times the short term foreign debt. If we believe the crises
are more costly than 1% of GDP, the reserves held be a
multiple of the short-term foreign debt. It is important to
stress that this prescription is applicable to the average
country from the sample, and may be sub-optimal for some
of the analysed economies (which, for example, suffer from
excessively high budget deficit, or exchange rate overvalua-
tion).
3.4.3. How Much the Policy Makers Fear the Crisis?
The final empirical application of the model involves find-
ing the cost of the crisis as seen (or expected) by the poli-
cymaker. Assuming that the amount of international liquidi-
ty held by the central banks is rational (in the model sense),
we can find out how much the policymakers fear the cur-
rency crisis. The process involves finding out the value of χ
(implicit estimation of crisis cost by the policymaker) for
which marginal cost curve of the liquidity crosses marginal
benefit curve of the liquidity at the level of actually held
international reserves.
In the following analysis it sometimes happens that the
cost curve has such a shape that it is impossible to find a χ,
which would minimise the loss function at the desired level
of the international liquidity. In such cases to gain some
insight of the possible range of reputation cost χ, we
assumed the largest χ for which the total benefit exceeds
total cost (both integrated between 0 and the actual inter-
national liquidity held). 
Table 3-5 shows the summary of the results, cost of the
currency crises expected by the governments and central
banks of the countries listed, as of end-99. Figure 3-6 shows
graphs of the 4Q99 liquidity's marginal cost and benefits
curves of the countries in the sample, as well as implicit
expected crisis cost – χ (in US$m).
The results show quite a wide disparity of implicit cur-
rency crisis cost to the policy makers. Discarding the
Moldova's outlier (which, most probably results from
extremely low amount of short term BIS reported debt),
the implicit cost estimation by the policymakers varies from
5% of GDP (Malaysia) down to 0.3% (Dominican Republic).
The results seem to have little to do with the exchange rate
arrangements, which is somewhat disturbing: apart from
Malaysia, the first nine countries on the list have a floating or
managed floating exchange rate.
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Figure 3-5. Optimal liquidity holding versus cost of the crisis
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Table 3-5. Crisis cost to the policy maker, as of end-99
Country % of GDP US$m
MOLDOVA 43.1% 500
MALAYSIA 12.1% 9500
CZECH REPUBLIC 5.0% 2650
POLAND 3.3% 5220
CHILE 2.7% 1800
SLOVAK REPUBLIC 2.1% 420
KOREA 2.0% 7950
PHILIPPINES 1.8% 1370
SOUTH AFRICA 1.5% 2000
RUSSIA 1.4% 2650
ARGENTINA 1.3% 3730
COSTA RICA 1.2% 175
ECUADOR 0.9% 180
CHINA,P.R.: MAINLAND 0.9% 8600
COLOMBIA 0.8% 710
BRAZIL 0.8% 4150
ROMANIA 0.4% 150
PAKISTAN 0.4% 250
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 0.3% 50
Figure 3.6. Marginal liquidity cost and benefit curves in emerging markets
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3.5. Conclusions
The paper presents review of the literature on the influ-
ence of international liquidity on the incidence of currency
crises. It then presents a model of optimal liquidity holding
by the policy maker, in which optimal liquidity held depends
on the fundamentals, international borrowing costs, and the
potential cost of the crisis to the policy maker. 
The model presented in the paper appears to be a
promising way to deal with costs and benefits of interna-
tional liquidity. Almost all the parameters of the model (esti-
mated over the sample of emerging market countries)
behave as predicted by the theory. It allowed for estimation
of the curve reasonable holdings of the foreign exchange
reserves. Assuming that a currency crisis costs only 1% of
the GDP, the FX reserves should be 1.64 times higher than
the foreign short-term debt (as reported by BIS). Given the
conservative estimation of the crisis cost, this recommenda-
tion clearly exceeds the IMF's prescription of reserve/short
term debt ratio equal to one.
Another set of results received thanks to the model was
the weight the governments/central banks attach to the risk
of a currency crisis. We found out that the policymakers of
the countries analysed, behave, as if they predicted the
prospective crisis would cost the budget between 5 and
0.3% of the GDP. This result includes not only explicit bud-
getary costs of the currency crisis, but also the reputation
loss of the central bank, political losses of the government
etc. To our knowledge it is the first estimation of this kind.
Surprisingly, the actual number does not seem to be corre-
lated with the exchange rate arrangements.
In case of some policy-makers the assumption of ratio-
nality (in the model sense) does not seem to hold. Given the
model's specifications, some international liquidity holdings
are too small to find any crisis cost value, which would make
them optimal.
The paper leaves some scope for further research. Main
issues worth addressing are:
– The simplicity of the foreign financing cost function;
– Enlarging the data sample. It was limited to the IMF IFS
data in the paper, which reduced the sample to 24 in some
equations.
– Dealing with continuous, instead of binary, definitions
of a currency crisis.
Appendix
Countries in the data sample:
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ARGENTINA
BRAZIL
CHILE
CHINA,P.R.: MAINLAND
CHINA,P.R.:HONG KONG
COLOMBIA
COSTA RICA
CROATIA
CZECH REPUBLIC
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
ECUADOR
HUNGARY
INDIA
INDONESIA
KAZAKHSTAN
KOREA
LEBANON
MALAYSIA
MEXICO
MOLDOVA
PAKISTAN
PANAMA
PHILIPPINES
POLAND
ROMANIA
RUSSIA
SLOVAK REPUBLIC
SLOVENIA
SOUTH AFRICA
THAILAND
TURKEY
URUGUAY
VENEZUELA
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4.1. Introduction
Many economists, among them, for example, Dorn-
busch (2001), stress the distinction between old-style and
new-style crises. The country's external position used to be
in the center of the old-style crises. The limited access to
the world financial market, the cycle of overspending and
excessive budgetary deficits together with the government
policy to control the exchange rate quickly led to real over-
valuation and unsustainable current account deficit. The for-
eign reserves depleted gradually. At one point the country
had to undergo the external adjustment – devaluation – just
because there were no more financial resources to carry on
with the policy. Such crises were slow-motion events; the
build-up of unsustainable situation was gradual and more or
less obvious – to this extent they were highly predictable.
There are also some doubts if they can be called real crises
– because they usually happened in the situation of financial
repression the devaluation had little consequences for the
economy and the crisis was banned from spreading.
The new-style crises are characteristic to an environ-
ment of capital mobility and financially liberalized markets
and are fundamentally different – their central issue is a bal-
ance sheet problem. They also involve the private sector
rather than the public one. Typically, due to a mismanage-
ment on behalf of the corporate and financial sectors the
quality of the national balance sheet deteriorates – this
include the imbalanced nature of asset and liabilities with
respect to maturity and denomination as well as increased
exposure to market and national credit risk. The country
becomes vulnerable to a crisis – temporarily the balance
sheets are solvent; problems are offset by high internation-
al liquidity. But when the conditions change, triggered by
some minor event or market sentiment shift external, funds
are suddenly withdrawn and banks and corporations not
only become unable to service their obligation but the value
of their liabilities may exceed the value of their assets indi-
cating insolvency and eligibility for bankruptcy. Such crises
spread quickly and have severe impact on the entire econ-
omy – sharp growth slowdown, a currency collapse (cur-
rency crisis), the financial system breakdown are examples
of possible consequences.
Financial institutions are pivotal to the problem [1].
Their unsound and irresponsible behavior makes the coun-
try vulnerable to the crisis. Therefore, the analysis of the
condition of the banking system and its relationship to the
rest of the economy and, in particular, the issue of the bank-
ing crisis should contribute much to the explanation of a cri-
sis phenomenon in general.
4.2. Theoretical Aspects of Banking and
Financial Crises
4.2.1. Definitions 
Formally a distinction can be made among various types
of crises:
– Currency crises – they are said to occur when a spec-
ulative attack on the exchange rate forces authorities to use
up large amounts of foreign reserves or/and sharply rise
interest rates in defense of the currency – the attack may,
but not necessarily, result in a devaluation.
– Banking crisis (or a financial crisis) – indicates the situ-
ation where a number of banks (or a financial system) fails
to respect (or experiences difficulties in respecting) their lia-
bilities. The disruption of the financial system impairs mar-
kets' ability to function effectively – balance sheets of these
institutions collapse and many fall into insolvency. Usually
the government intervenes with a bailout.
– Foreign debt crisis – regarded sometimes as a variety
of the financial crisis, happens when country stops (or there
is a threat that it may stop) servicing its foreign debt. Usual-
Part IV.
Financial Systems, Financial Crises, Currency Crises
Marcin Sasin
[1] Corporate sector problems are, to large extent, a by-product of financial institutions' behavior - no bank should lend money to the corpora-
tion known to be over-leveraged and overexposed to various kinds of risk.
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ly international financial institutions intervene with liquidity
help and assure prompt recovery from international default.
Elements of financial and currency crises may be present
simultaneously [2]; actually some researchers do not distin-
guish between them and treat them as a manifestation of
similar economic weaknesses. Even if actually there are no
direct links or causalities between them they share common
causes, such as economic recession, worsening of the terms
of trade, overvalued exchange rate and, in general, unsus-
tainable course of macroeconomic policy as well as micro-
economic deficiencies of the economy. Banking and curren-
cy crises tend to cluster and have come to be called "twin
crises". In fact, the causality goes both ways.
4.2.2. The Relationship between Banking and
Currency Crises 
There is a sound theoretical basis why both crises should
be interrelated.
4.2.2.1. From a Banking Crisis to a Currency Crisis
First, economic agents have good reason to expect that
authorities will prevent the financial system from collapse
and bail it out by monetary expansion – this means choosing
inflation over exchange rate stability and leads to a classic
currency crash due to excessive money creation. Second,
domestic agents can run on domestic banks, withdraw
deposits and then convert this money into the hard curren-
cy. This puts a pressure on the exchange rate and usually
leads to devaluation. Third, and most important, the bank-
ing crisis is going to impair credit relations, worsen the state
of domestic corporations, bring about an economic slow-
down. The number of profitable investment opportunities is
going to decrease, so foreign investors would want to with-
draw their assets. They don't want to leave their money left
in hand of presumably insolvent bank neither. They know,
however, that other investors want to withdraw as well,
hence they expect massive capital outflow and currency col-
lapse – as a result they withdraw as quickly as possible to
avoid losses and sharp devaluation indeed occurs.
4.2.2.2. From a Currency Crisis to a Banking Crisis
First, foreign exchange liabilities constitute a part of
banks' balance sheets. If deposit money is used to speculate
in the foreign exchange market and there are large
unhedged foreign open positions, a currency crisis (devalua-
tion) directly and usually very significantly increases the
value of (foreign exchange) liabilities and, thus, worsens the
balance sheet. If the denomination mismatch is common to
financial institutions, the devaluation can cause systemic
banking system distress. The second and probably less
important channel is the impact of devaluation on the short-
term interest rate through higher import prices and higher
expected inflation. Because the banking system is funded on
short-term money the increase in the respective interest
rate poses an increased burden on their balance sheets. The
balance sheets of shortly indebted corporations also deteri-
orate and negatively affect the banking system through an
increase in non-performing loans.
4.2.2.3. Join Causality 
There are common factors to both crises – they mani-
fest themselves through financial market reactions. If the
state of the economy is bad, prospects for future profitable
investment are weak, politicians or economic agents act
irresponsibly, foreign creditors are not secure whether
exchange reserves are sufficient to cover potential short
term obligations – in such case there can be a shift in the
market sentiment and a sudden capital outflow. Investors
can stop rolling over the debt and demand immediate
repayment. The are only two alternatives at the authorities'
disposal to counteract the situation, i.e. a rise in the interest
rate or a devaluation. Both actions have a very harmful
impact on the unhedged and imbalanced financial and cor-
porate sectors. Usually both take place, so a currency and
banking crises – the twin crises – coincide.
4.2.3. The Theory and Practice of a Banking Sys-
tem Crisis
Banks are financial intermediaries whose primary func-
tion is maturity transformation – their liabilities are mainly
short-term deposits while assets are usually long-term loans.
It must be stressed that banks are highly leveraged institu-
tions – a small change in the balance sheet performance
translates into very large changes in banks' capital. When the
value of their assets less liabilities falls below some point
banks are believed to be undercapitalized; when it turns to
be negative, banks are insolvent (negative net worth).
Given the nature of the bank it faces the following risks:
– credit risk – a possibility that a borrower wouldn't be
able to repay principal and interest, nor the eventual collat-
eral would cover the claims in full. This can happen because
of the poor financial status of the borrower (due to unex-
pected shocks to its business) or because of its (un)willing-
ness to pay. The risk can be reduced by screening, loan
monitoring, diversifying the loan portfolio and proper collat-
eralization – among other methods.
[2] As happened in Mexico 1994–95 and Asia 1997–98. The 1992–93 ERM crisis was a currency crisis, although some Nordic countries that time
were experiencing a banking crisis as well.
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– interest rate risk – usually the short-term interest rate
is lower than the long-term one, so because bank's liabilities
are short-term, while its assets are long this situation is to
the bank's advantage. Nevertheless, the opposite can hap-
pen (the so-called inverted yield curve) and the bank has to
pay higher interest on its liabilities than on its assets and
incurs losses. Such situation cannot last indefinitely – soon
the bank will become insolvent.
– exchange rate risk – emerges when foreign liabilities
and assets are not balanced – any move in the exchange rate
translates into a direct change in the balance sheet. If the
change is in undesirable direction (net foreign exchange lia-
bilities and devaluation or net foreign assets and an appreci-
ation) the bank incurs losses.
– market risk – affects the non-financial part of the
bank's balance sheets. When a bank invests in the real estate
sector or in equity, the change in asset prices (a collapse in
the stock or real property market, for example) directly
affects the bank's capital.
Banking problems can be classified according to various
criteria. For example, we can distinguish between a distress
caused by adverse developments in the liabilities and in the
asset side of the balance sheet. The liabilities-side distress is
usually associated with large deposit withdrawals, or bank
runs. The asset side is relevant, for example, in so-called
boom-bust cycle. Other authors [e.g. Honohan, 1997] dif-
ferentiate between crises caused by "epidemic" macro- and
microeconomic factors as opposed to endemic system fail-
ures usually associated with government involvement.
In any case, given the complicated structure of the bank-
ing process, a game-theoretical approach is the relevant
framework in analyzing banking system crises.
4.2.3.1. Liabilities-Side Crises – a Bank Run
There are two players; in the first period each of them
has a deposit D in the bank. The bank has invested total
deposits (2D) in a project, which matures the second period
with an outcome 2R. Assuming that there are no deposit
withdrawals the "bank-game" ends with each player receiv-
ing R (R>D). If any of the players decides to withdraw in the
first period the project has to be liquidated; it yields 2r, the
bank goes bankrupt (D>r) and the game ends. If only one
player withdraws he gets his deposit back (r>D/2), if both
withdraw they both get r. The players move simultaneously.
The game looks as follows:
Because D>r and R>D it is obvious that the game has
two (Nash) equilibria, notably "hold"-"hold" and "withdraw"-
"withdraw": no player would want to hold his money in the
bank if he expected his opponent to withdraw.
This simple reasoning is a serious challenge to the bank-
ing business – it proves that due to coordination failure, i.e.
the bank run ("withdraw"-"withdraw" equilibrium) and
despite the otherwise project's success, the bank some-
times would have to collapse and liquidate the project.
A run on an individual bank shouldn't threaten the whole
banking system. However, one run is often taken as a signal
that the condition of a banking system is bad in general, so
another runs may follow and the system is likely to collapse
(contagion effect – the run on one bank coordinates the
expectation in other "bank-games"). Alternatively, individual
bank problems can spill over through interbank market to
other banks. To remove the possibility of the bad equilibri-
um there is a need for a perfect public confidence in the sys-
tem. Some methods for reassuring this confidence are dis-
cussed in the section 4.2.3.6 dedicated to deposit insurance
schemes.
It is worth noticing that recent crises do not have liabili-
ty-side (bank run) character. Neither the Nordic banking
crisis in end-1980s-early-1990s, nor earlier banking prob-
lems in industrialized countries, nor the recent crisis in Japan
were associated with a bank run. Among emerging
economies large withdrawal of deposits (mainly by large
creditors) are more frequent [3], however, they are not
accidental manifestations of a bad equilibrium in a banking
game – they usually follow the disclosure of some bad news
concerning the asset side of the financial system. This was a
case in recent crises in Bulgaria in 1996, Indonesia (Asia in
general) in 1997–1998, Russia in 1998 and Turkey in
2000–2001. Accordingly, they are not run against otherwise
solvent financial institutions but typically against presumably
insolvent banks suffering from the asset deterioration – or at
least a combination of both.
4.2.3.2."Boom-bust"-Type Endogenous Banking Crises
The asset-side crisis emerges from the poor quality of
bank assets, such as high non-performing loans ratio, dan-
gerous maturity and denomination mismatches, etc., and can
bring the expected value of the bank below the safe line or
even below zero. The asset-side crisis usually takes a form of
and endogenous boom-bust cycle with over-lending.
Typically in the beginning of a cycle banks, on the wave
of optimism, over-lend to projects of poor long-term
prospects. The short term success of these projects – high
interest and fast economic growth in general – are, to large
player two's strategy
payoff of:   player 1 / player 2
withdraw hold
Withdraw r / r D / 2r-Dplayer one's
strategy Hold 2r-D / D R / R
[3] The 1980s and 1990s crises in Argentina, Philippines Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay and Venezuela, to name a few.
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extent, results of the very process of lending. There is an
abundance of capital and, therefore, investment projects as
well. Also the asset prices go up fuelled by real estate and
equity investment. The wealth effect increases consump-
tion; demand and the profitability of most economic activi-
ties temporarily rise in general. Gradually the asset price
increase transforms into a bubble reinforced by the endoge-
nouity of credit limits [4]. Banks either excessively invest in
equity itself (market risk) or lend to such investment (cred-
it risk). Then the bubble burst, the economy comes into a
downturn, bad loans portfolio increases, and the financial
system's condition worsens.
Of course, no bank is able to generate an asset price
boom only by itself – the situation has something to do
with the behavior of bank management in general and the
herding behavior phenomenon [5]. For example managers
adapt their behavior to what other bankers do. This can
be individually rational – they might want to avoid criti-
cism or take advantage of the economic boom, no matter
how sustainable it is. The rational assessment of econom-
ic perspectives is blurred by the tradition of success
(especially when success' origins are misunderstood) and,
to some extent, by a "disaster myopia" [6]. The results are
poor lending decisions based on misjudgment of borrow-
ers' creditworthiness, their ability and willingness to pay,
recoverability of loans and a loan concentration in partic-
ular sectors. Lack of coordination and informational prob-
lems create a situation where the externalities of individ-
ual lending decisions are not adequately taken into con-
sideration and where a shift in expectations about some
sector of the economy (particularly property sector)
become self-fulfilling. 
A credit expansion involved in the boom stage of such
cycles requires adequate base money – this is achieved by
significant capital inflows. Such inflows are usually induced
by the capital account liberalization and are attracted by high
yields (large interest rate differential) and seemingly stable
nominal exchange rates (effectively overlooked by the
authorities). The appropriate policy response to sterilize
these inflows may not be easy. Tightening of monetary pol-
icy usually raises the interest rate, thus attracting the inflows
even more. On the other hand, it is sometimes politically
hard to resist widespread optimism and tighten the policy in
the midst of an economic boom.
The reversal of such a boom, if not amortized by the
appropriate policy, is usually sudden and brings dare conse-
quences. Asset bubble bursts, foreign capital withdraws and
banks are placed under severe liquidity pressure, the
exchange rate tumbles – the financial system experiences
significant balance sheet deterioration. 
This endogenous boom-bust over-lending cycle is very
common and is sometimes thought of as an archetypal bank-
ing crisis.
However, here we have a theoretical puzzle. Banks are
institutions prone to asymmetric information problems (the
borrower is better informed about the investment project
than the banker is). According to a classic Stiglitz-Weiss
(1981) model and its extensions in the environment of sig-
nificant asymmetric information, there shouldn't be the so-
called over-borrowing (over-lending) syndrome with a rapid
credit expansion. On the contrary, the theory-predicted
equilibrium on such a market is the low one – the lending is
sub-optimal and so-called credit rationing take place.
Because banks know that raising interest rate will induce
adverse selection, i.e. only low quality and risky projects will
apply, they choose not to raise the interest rate and to ration
its credit. As a result not all enterprises willing to pay the
prevailing interest rate can obtain funds. Why then, given
such asymmetric information problems, credit expansion
and over-lending are common features of recent crises in
emerging economies? One plausible answer points to the
microstructure of the financial market, in particular the
emergence of a moral hazard problem [7].
4.2.3.3. Moral Hazard and Other Microeconomic Defi-
ciencies
The above-described classic model of boom-bust bank-
ing troubles involves rather minor imperfection on behalf of
agents' behavior. Without other adverse components the
distress it generates is quite manageable – there is usually a
need for some restructuring, intensified asset recovery and
moderate re-capitalization. Now we proceed to explain
particular types of behavior of economic agents – most
notably financial institutions' executive officers – which can
be described at least as irresponsibility if not as serious mis-
management.
It is important to realize that the amount of risk that a
bank manager chooses to take is likely to exceed what is
[4] Real assets are used as collateral, while borrowed money speculatively invested in the asset sector. The resulting increase in asset prices (asset
bubble) increases in the value of the collateral as well – the borrower obtains higher credit limit, accordingly, and again invests it in the asset sector.
[5] There is a saying that "bankers hunt in herds".
[6] The situat  Real assets are used as collateral, while borrowed money speculatively invested in the asset sector. The resulting increase in asset
prices (asset bubble) increases in the value of the collateral as well – the borrower obtains higher credit limit, accordingly, and again invests it in the
asset sector.ion where economic agents neglect events with large negative payoffs because of their extremely small probability. Nevertheless, this neg-
ative payoff multiplied by the probability can significantly reduce the expected total outcome. For example, if the investment gives a payoff of 1 with
a probability of 99.9999% but the payoff of minus 1,000,000 with a probability 0.0001% the economic agent is likely to engage in it despite the neg-
ative expected outcome (0.999999*1 – 1.000.000*0.000001<0) – justifying it by a common "this would never happen to me".
[7] Accordingly, the distinction of so-called "third-generation" models of currency and financial crises is the emphasis on microeconomic factors. 
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socially optimal because of limited liability. The manager
usually receives bonuses proportional to profits he secured
to the bank, while he is not financially responsible, to the
same extent, for the losses he incurs for a bank – the only
consequence he can face is an outplacement [8]. Since his
incentives are based on a skewed distribution (negative pay-
offs are cut off) he prefers to take high-risk and high-return
investments, and under-price the risk. Such behavior is
called a moral hazard and is the very reason for bank regu-
lation, imposition of capital adequacy, loan provisioning,
bank supervision and a proper design of incentive schemes
and institutional environment. The very roots of the mis-
management and irresponsible behavior that cause the real
banking collapses are precisely in the inadequate prudential
rules, supervision and institution design. 
The term moral hazard refers to a reckless behavior by
the party of the contract that is granted a limited liability –
the behavior takes place after the contract giving the limit-
ed liability is signed. Originally, it was used to describe the
behavior of an insurant in the theory of insurance. For
example, an insured car owner looses incentives to respect
the contract and drive carefully because the insurance com-
pany is going to cover the eventual losses. In the context of
banking business, it refers to the behavior of a borrower
after having received a loan – he gains incentives to misuse
the loan or demand a change in the contract. 
But there are efficient tools in bank's disposal to coun-
teract the borrowers' moral hazard; screening, monitoring
and proper collateralization minimize borrower's miscon-
duct. The real threat is a moral hazard on behalf of bank
executives. They also have signed a contract with bank
owners and (more or less implicitly) with depositors to pru-
dently invest the money and care about long-term prof-
itability. But to maximize their own benefit and bonuses
(proportionate to bank's short-term profits) they may
engage in increasingly risky (and thus profitable) activities.
Such activities usually include:
– assumption of excessive net foreign open position in
order to exploit the interest rate differential (denomination
mismatch). Even if the fund borrowed abroad by the bank
are on-lent in hard currency to domestic agents the man-
agement doesn't seem to realize that it only transforms
exchange risk into credit risk. When an unexpected devalu-
ation takes place, apart from an increase in the value of the
liabilities bank is going to experience a decline in the value
of assets in the form of bad loans. This happens because
bank's borrowers experience a rise in their debt and some
of them might not be able to service it any more. 
– assumption of excessively short-term liabilities (matu-
rity mismatch). Since short-term capital is cheaper bank
might want to finance itself by it excessively but then it
becomes vulnerable to the interest rate risk. To avoid the
risk the bank might want to lend in floating rate but, again,
the protection is illusory. The interest rate risk is trans-
formed into credit risk.
– excessive asset sector investment. Asset market rises
disproportionally fast during the economic boom and makes
a good investment but only to the point of its collapse.
– over-lending – because lending is primary bank's activ-
ity – and is of course profitable – banks have incentives to
expand it as far as possible. Over-lending syndrome often
arises when profit margins decline – for example, in the
highly competitive, liberalized and poorly regulated banking
sector. New entrants into the banking system in order to
make profit may prefer to expand lending at prevailing
interest rate than compete by attracting deposits at lower
rates. Similarly, the success in inflation stabilization also
decreases profit margins and induce higher lending.
– "looting" where the management receives direct benefits
from the otherwise ineligible borrower in exchange for a loan.
Although looting is usually an isolated incident it can some-
times become a serious problem leading to a banking crisis
(e.g. presumably in Venezuela in the 1994 banking crisis).
The problem of moral hazard becomes serious in a
weak legal environment where property rights are unclear,
contracts, in particular bankruptcy procedures, are not
enforced, etc. The irrelevance of "bankruptcy threat" is
especially evident in countries where political connections
of the bank management and their notion of being "too big
to fail " decrease their concern with possible failure. High
ownership concentration, the oligopolistic structure and
especially the situation where firms directly control banks
("connected lending") contribute to poor or irresponsible
lending decisions. If the bank is a part of an industrial group
it can be treated as a source of cheap capital to finance risky
enterprises. Although it is not in an interest of the conglom-
erate to drive the bank to bankruptcy, the management's
assessment of their own projects may be too optimistic.
Usually neither the proper risk calculation, nor the loan
monitoring takes place.
The above-described behavior makes a bank very vul-
nerable to common sources of risk. The dubious and risky
loans are usually not adequately provisioned and under-
priced – consequently the banks capital base erodes, some-
times to the point of insolvency.
The problem of moral hazard is made even worse by the
existence of explicit or implicit government deposit guaran-
tees – not only the bank management but all agents involved
in the banking process can engage in moral hazard. Deposi-
tors, who know that their deposits are guaranteed, have little
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incentive to discriminate between sound and unsound banks.
On contrary, they would prefer to deposit their money in
banks engaged in high-return, high-risk activities. On the
other hand, foreign creditors can exercise moral hazard with
twice as much confidence. Even if they are not covered by the
borrower country deposit insurance they can count on such
guarantees in their home countries. Even if not – on the quite
certain IMF bailout ("global moral hazard"). Accordingly, due
to the existence of implicit or explicit, domestic or interna-
tional guarantees all parties of the banking contract are, in a
sense, responsible for a banking system collapse.
The following simple illustration of how the moral haz-
ard works is a variation on Krugman (1998). Lets assume
that the world interest rate is 4%. There are two financial
intermediaries (banks) who are known to have government
guarantees. If a bank goes bankrupt the government repays
the principal (i.e. 0% interest). The minimal cost of inter-
mediation (minimal bonus for the banker) is 1%. The
bankers have access to two domestic investment opportu-
nities: a safe asset that brings 5% real interest and a risky
asset (say, real estate) yielding 20% ("success") or minus
20% ("disaster") with equal probabilities (0.5). If foreign
creditors (or domestic depositor) know in what asset the
bank invests (transparency rules) they would demand at
least 4% if it were in the safe asset or at least 8% if it were
in the real estate: 
8%*0.5(success)+0%*0.5(disaster)=
=4% (i.e. the world interest rate).
Bank manager knows that he has to give depositors at least
4% to attract funds provided it is known that he invest in the
safe asset. His profit is then 5%-4%=1%. Therefore, the risky
asset is a perfect investment for the bank manager. When things
go well he gets 20%, gives 8% to depositors and cashes in
12%. When things go wrong he proclaims bankruptcy and
walks away with his 1%. His expected profit is
12%*0.5+1%*0.5=6.5%, a great deal above 1%. So both
banks invest in the risky asset – it happens at a heavy social loss:
the investment yielding 5% is abandoned while the investment
giving expected 0% (for the society) is undertaken.
Since there are two banks and they compete. The bank
offering higher interest rate gets all the deposits and makes
huge profits (even 1% times all deposits is a big amount of
money). So the interest rate both banks offer is driven to
the maximum, i.e. 19%:
(20%-19%)*0.5(success)+1%*0.5(disaster)=
1% (minimal cost of intermediation)
The high interest rate differential 19%-4%=15%
attract large capital inflows and deposits – the economy is
over-invested. The demand for real estate increases, so
does the price: the "success" scenario is validated ex post.
But a large amount of deposit means high contingent cost of
the guarantee and reduces its credibility.
The end to the game is brought either when the "disas-
ter" happens or when depositors start to worry about their
deposits. When suddenly they realize that the guarantee is
only 40% credible their deposit become worth:
0.5*19%(success)+0.2*0%(disaster, guarantees)+
+ 0.3*(-21%)(disaster, no guarantees)=3.3% ,
which is less than 4%, so they immediately withdraw their
funds and the system collapses.
This simple example depicts the dangers of moral haz-
ard. All relevant components are present: asset price boom,
over-investment, capital inflows and their sudden reversal
and the irresponsibility on behalf of all market participants.
In the words of Krugman, this game can be shortened to
"heads I win, tails the taxpayer loses". 
4.2.3.4. The Government Intervention in Banks
In many countries the authorities are involved in the
banking sector – they just try to take advantage of their
power over the financial sector to finance their short-term
needs. The involvement generally includes: the government
ownership, interventions in the management, programs of
various distorting tax and subsidy policies, encouraging or
forcing lending and investment in designed sectors, directing
and subsidized credit, etc.
In the early stages of economic development, government
intervention in the investment decision-making may actually
be desirable, given the severe asymmetric information struc-
ture of the market and the size of required infrastructure pro-
jects. But as the country develops the government should
relinquish its power over the banking sector, since in more
sophisticated economies the decentralized private sector is
much more efficient in processing information and discovering
the desirable and profitable investment opportunities. Never-
theless, it is hard to remove the government from its large
direct or indirect intermediation role [9]. In this case the sys-
tem functions not as profit-oriented efficient intermediation
mechanism but rather as a quasi-fiscal device, in which private,
leveraged funds are used to finance government projects.
There are many dangers of such a situation. First, the
public sector deficits become hidden in banks' balance
sheets [10]. Second, the capital allocation is impaired. The
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[10] The huge magnitude of restructuring costs of a banking system may be partly explained by the fact that the balance sheets of the banking sys-
tem have been a place to hide a budget deficit. When a bank collapses the cumulated deficit has to be actually paid by the government.
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private entrepreneurs' access to bank funding becomes lim-
ited (higher interest rates). The government involvement
discourages the development of market based credit risk
analysis, appropriate screening and monitoring culture, and
weakens a financial discipline and the quality of law enforce-
ment in general. For example, a government support
extended to an insolvent bank is a precedent on which
expectations of future bailouts are built. Bank managers
might act as having an implicit government guarantee with
all the consequences. The government also often encour-
ages banks to borrow abroad in foreign currency (by which
they assume an exchange rate risk) because it eases the
pressure on official foreign reserves and postpones the need
of policy adjustment. Also it is to the authorities' advantage
(although not to the banking system's advantage) not to
encourage the transparency and prudent disclosure prac-
tices – the less the public knows about the distortionary
government involvement, the more funds it is willing to pro-
vide for the system. In the same manner, supervisors are
often discouraged by the government from intervening as it
would bring problems out and cause expenditure (to fix the
system and recapitalize it). As a result, due to lack of trans-
parency and improper supervision, it is difficult to assess the
true condition of corporations and banks. Profits are over-
stated while the scale of bad loans underestimated.
The government involvement significantly increases the
vulnerability of the system, although the magnitude of this
vulnerability is not usually known until it is too late. In good
times, such a system can function without any obvious
problems: economic growth induce steady inflow of new
deposits but when the downturn comes the condition of
the banking system deteriorates rapidly due to a rise in non-
performing loans and a general deterioration of the asset
quality.
4.2.3.5. Financial System and Financial Liberalization
Financial system failures are often the effect of an
increased vulnerability that is connected to some regime
change, induced by a policy change or by external condi-
tions. One type of such regime change is privatization but
the most important one is financial system liberalization and
deregulation. This is usually associated with simultaneous
capital account liberalization.
In regime of financial repression, the authorities force
financial institutions to maintain low or even negative real
interest rate. There are limits on deposit and lending rates.
It is impossible for the bank to charge large risk premia and
the opportunities for optimal but more risky investment are
foregone. Constraints on the financial sector reduce (pri-
vate) savings, distort investment and decrease the availabil-
ity of resources to finance capital accumulation and growth.
On the other hand, well developed and liberal financial mar-
kets help diversify risk (making high-risk and high-return
investment attractive to investors), pool liquidity risk, prop-
erly screen and monitor loan applications and bring about
general improvement of resources allocation. There is
ample evidence that financial development is positively cor-
related with contemporaneous and future growth rates.
The bank life is actually very easy in the state of financial
repression. Because interest rates are artificially low there
are more possible borrowers than credit available – credit
rationing takes place and banks comfortably cash in their
profits. When the liberalization comes, the whole situation
changes. Bank management lacks experience necessary to
run the business in the new environment. The nature of the
regime change is the fact that it alters the incentives facing
banks and increases the risk of traditional behavior. First, by
removing interest limits and allowing new entrants, the lib-
eralization drastically increases sector's competitiveness:
traditional monopolistic profit disappears and banks have to
struggle for market share. Deregulation is often accompa-
nied by a rapid growth of little regulated, aggressive non-
bank financial institutions. Because they are allowed to con-
duct activities, which banks are restrained from engaging in,
they quickly outperform domestic banks both in attracting
deposits and lending expansion. As profit margins narrow,
managers start to favor risky lending practices. Indeed,
financial liberalization increases the risk-taking opportunities
significantly – not only there are new banking products and
derivatives available but the system is open to yet unknown
and unfamiliar types of opportunistic behavior facilitated by
temporary relaxed law enforcement.
The overall level of interest rates can become very
volatile after liberalization (the removal of the interest
rate ceilings) – often the rate remains high in the period
after liberalization [11] and thus banks become more vul-
nerable. As a result, they might prefer to borrow abroad
and on-lend the hard currency to its customers (changing
the exchange rate risk into a credit risk, as it was men-
tioned above). The problem is aggravated by a significant
capital inflow induced by the parallel process of capital
account liberalization. In the environment of capital abun-
dance, inexperienced banks expand risky activities
beyond their ability to manage them properly. Both regu-
lators and banks usually have limited knowledge concern-
ing the complex instruments of the financial market what
causes hardships with evaluation of the asset quality and
poses a threat to balance sheets.
The popular term "sequential liberalization" is given as an
answer to the problem. In this view, the liberalization should
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come in an orderly, gradual and well-sequenced manner.
When liberalization comes, the constraint on excessive risk
taking must be already present – prudential regulation, prop-
er supervision, adequate incentive scheme, enforceable law
are the basic prerequisites. On the other hand, keeping tight
restrictions on the capital account until banks are fully devel-
oped is not a good alternative – external and domestic liber-
alization reinforce each other and benefit by developing par-
allelly. Advises given usually include:
– allowing foreign ownership – FDI's are less prone to
reversals and usually foreign-owned banks can, in times of
distress, count on help of the mother (foreign) institution,
– dealing first with weak institutions (with a mixture of
closures, recapitalization and mergers), before new entrants
are allowed in,
– assuring adequate law enforcement, transparency
rules, accounting and audit standards, private ownership,
well-designed deposit insurance scheme, and relevant insti-
tutional framework.
4.2.3.6 .Deposit Insurance Schemes
The banking game presented in section 4.2.3.1. has two
equilibria – the good one in which agents hold their money
to the second period and receive their bonus and a bad one
– a bank run where both agents withdraw their funds and
everyone looses. But there is a method to counteract the
problem. A perfectly credible government can introduce a
deposit insurance scheme (DIS) – if the bank goes bankrupt
every depositor would be repaid in full. The game becomes:
Although the game still has two Nash equilibria we can
use weaker (i.e. better) solution concept, namely iterated
elimination of weakly dominated strategies, to obtain only
one solution: "hold"-"hold". Each player can see that he can-
not play any better than "hold" regardless of what the oppo-
nent does. Thanks to a deposit guarantee not only the good
equilibrium is achieved but also the bank would never go
bankrupt and the guarantee would never be called.
In general the deposit guarantee can be explicit or
implicit. The implicit guarantee is present when econom-
ic agents have good grounds to believe that in the case of
distress (a bank run) their deposits would be repaid by
the government. Agents can bet that the authorities
would not let the financial system collapse, especially
when in past the government has actually engaged in an
emergency bailout or other kind of support to the bank-
ing sector.
There is one fundamental problem with deposit insur-
ance: it offers a limited liability to economic agents – to
depositors, creditors, bank management and to borrowers
altogether. This situation results in moral hazard behavior
with all the previously discussed consequences. The guar-
antee is more valuable to bad banks – there is a possibility
that they would dominate the sector. Explicit or implicit
guarantees are also often used by the authorities to com-
pensate for the inadequacy in the financial sector's trans-
parency. Unclear disclosures on behalf of the financial insti-
tutions make them vulnerable to runs – to avoid such a
case the government prefers to (implicitly or explicitly)
back deposits.
The benefits and costs of a DIS should be, therefore,
cautiously calculated. Various studies discover that (for most
DIS) the extent of moral hazard is greater than the benefit
from bank run protection. This result does not necessarily
mean that the DIS institution itself is deficient – it may as
well point to its improper design.
Garcia (2000) notices that countries have roughly six
options concerning deposit insurance:
– an explicit denial of any guarantee and reliance on
transparency and market discipline (as for example in New
Zealand),
– legal preferences of depositors over other claimants in
the liquidation process after a bank's failure (as for example
in Australia and Mongolia),
– ambiguity concerning insurance,
– implicit guarantee (present in 55 countries as counted
by Kyei, 1995),
– explicit limited coverage (74 countries),
– explicit full guarantee (existing usually in post crisis
countries).
First and second options are "legitimate" but rare, often
infeasible, politically undesirable and, especially if confi-
dence is weak, they leave the system open to runs. Third
option also doesn't protect from bank runs. Option four
and six assure continuous functioning of the banking and
payment systems but they induce excessive moral hazard –
the incentive disruption can be more costly than a possible
bank run. The fifth option, i.e. explicit limited deposit cov-
erage, seems to hold an optimal balance between the bank
run and moral hazard components and is chosen by most
countries and preferred by some international institutions
(e.g. the IMF). According to this option only a fraction of
deposits (usually those of small depositors) are insured –
the system seems to work well. It contributes to stability
and reduces government contingent liabilities but, on the
other hand, usually large depositors run first. Therefore, as
a rule, the DIS should be implemented in a sound environ-
ment and be complemented by a strong legal system, well-
operated lender-of-last-resort facility (which provides liq-
uidity only to solvent banks), strong prudential regulation
CASE Reports No. 41
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and supervision [12]. Most importantly the DIS has to have
public confidence.
The situation changes somehow during crises. Limited
coverage cannot be expected to support the stability of the
system in the presence of a large shock. In this case author-
ities should offer a full but explicitly temporary guarantees
to assure the continued functioning of the financial system.
4.2.3.7. The Basle Capital Accord
The so-called Basle Capital Accord was initiated in 1988.
Originally regarding the G10 countries' banks (only those
operating internationally) has since became a widely accept-
ed standard for the evaluation of banks' financial soundness
and is applied to all banks. Accord has been designed to
counteract the decline of banks' capital observed for much
of the 20th century. It is based on the risk-weighted assets.
The simple risk measurement includes four risk-categories
with assigned weights ranging from 0 to 100%, depending
on the credit risk of the borrower. For example, loans to
commercial companies are weighted 100%, interbank lend-
ing 20% while loans to central government in local curren-
cy (virtually riskless) – 0%. The Accord requires banks to
maintain its capital equivalent to at least 8% of such risk-
weighted assets. This framework has the advantage of being
a simple and comparable measure of bank soundness but,
on the other hand, it neither makes any adjustment for risk
diversification, nor is sophisticated enough to adequately
price the new complex banking instruments. Since the
Accord was designed for stable industrialized countries with
developed and well-established financial systems, countries
with volatile and risky macroeconomic environment should
accordingly implement higher capital adequacy ratios –
indeed, most of them do.
The Accord has been, in general, successful in reversing
the trend of banks' decapitalization in most of G10 countries
and assuring the (relative) bank soundness elsewhere.
4.3. Assessing the Condition of a Banking
System
The theory offers guidance as what are the determi-
nants of banking crisis and allows building the framework to
assess the quality of a banking sector and its vulnerability to
a crisis.
The "bottom-up" approach analyzes each individual bank
and then sum up the scores to obtain the result for the
whole banking system while the "aggregate" approach mea-
sures the probability of systemic insolvency using the aggre-
gate banking sector data with similar methodology as in the
case of individual bank. As a complementary method, the
"macroeconomic" approach can be applied – it relies on the
fact that bank's solvency depends on the state of their cus-
tomers what in turn depends on the condition of the econ-
omy – it therefore tries to establish links between macro-
economic indicators and bank soundness.
Typically the bank's condition would be assessed by
identifying the relevant indicators that are correlated with
variables responsible for bank's solvency. These indicators,
generally, fall into five categories:
The first is exposure to risk – among this group a useful
indicators include:
– Loan to deposit ratio, as a measure of bank's leverage
and the extent to which bank relies on other, nontradition-
al sources of funding. When times are good banks would
seek to increase its leverage to maximize profits, but a
reversal of economic trend is much more dangerous for
highly leveraged companies.
– The ratio of non-performing loans is a (somehow ex-
post) measure of en exposure to credit risk – increase in
NPL means that a bank would have to provision for expect-
ed losses – its capital base erodes. High ratios points to
inadequate lending practices and bad risk pricing – Sheng
(1996) notices that a collapse is rather inevitable when this
ratio exceeds (provisioning by) 15%.
– Exposure to real estate and equity market measures
the extent of market risk a bank is taking. In the event of a
sharp decline in asset prices the bank can easily go insolvent.
The difference between current and trend values of asset
prices multiplied by the exposure provides a good measure.
High ratios also indicate that the bank's core business is less
profitable.
– Net open foreign exchange position measures the
exposure to exchange rate risk. In an event of unexpected
devaluation the bank is going to incur heavy losses.
The second includes solvency conditions – they explicit-
ly take into account the adequacy of banks capital – the (risk
weighted) capital adequacy ratio (actual and projected)
should be sufficient (minimum 8% according to the Basle
Committee) to assure that the bank has enough capacity to
absorb possible losses [13].
The third consist of liquidity criteria:
– Lender of last resort indicator – the more often a bank
has to resort to the central bank's credit the more probable
is its insolvency. Sound banks shouldn't have systemic prob-
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lems with liquidity and should be able to fund themselves on
the interbank market. If the bank is cut from the interbank
funding or faces above average interest rates it is a clear sign
that something is wrong with the bank (the manager, for
example, may be known to the market to be an excessive
risk taker). Also compliance to statutory reserve require-
ments or liquid asset requirements is a good indicator of the
same kind. 
The fourth is profitability – usually measured by return
on assets. The likelihood of remaining solvent depends, of
course, on bank's profitability. A decline in that indicator
should be an important warning signal. Low interest margins
also indicate problems. Similarly a significant share of non-
interest income in total income may point to the weakness
in the core banking business. The performance of bank's
shares can reveal much about the future prospects of the
bank as well.
Finally, there is a "supervisory assessment" criterion – the
official assessment of banks' condition should be taken into
account. The evaluation can be in a form of a standard
CAMEL rating (based on Capital adequacy, Asset quality,
adequacy of Management, Earnings, Liquidity); alternatively,
some supervisory bodies construct a so-called watch list
incorporating banks that should take corrective measure to
improve their standing.
Judging from the macroeconomic and aggregate
approach, a rapid growth of aggregate bank lending to real
estate and equity sectors is a classic leading indicator of a
crisis. Similarly, the aggregate inflow of portfolio capital
exceeding, say, 10% of GDP over a couple of years also
indicates increased vulnerability. The dim prospects for
the economy and the expected growth slowdown con-
tribute to the worsening of the banking system through its
impact on banks' clients. The microeconomic structure
should also be taken into account: the design of the DIS,
the quality of supervision, and the degree of ownership
concentration are relevant variables. The involvement of
the government in the banking system, political and con-
nected lending, management's reckless or fraudulent
behavior are almost always accompanied by market gos-
sips and rumors and through this can be incorporated into
the analysis.
High liquidity can offset financial system problems – as
long as there is a capital to intermediate the system can func-
tion. The possible monetary tightening in major developed
countries should be a particularly important indicator [14].
The above-sketched framework is frequently used to
construct the so-called early warning systems [15].
4.4. Empirical Evidence and the Determi-
nants of Banking and Currency Crises 
4.4.1. Banking Crises in the Real World
The endogenous boom-bust cycle banking sector crisis
theory is consistent with the experiences of Argentina,
Chile, Uruguay 1979–1983, Japan in the 1990s, Nordic
countries 1987–94, Mexico 1994 and Asia 1997–1998. In
every country there was a significant economic boom
accompanied with rapid increase in credit.
The so-called "debt crisis" in early 1980s was preceded
by a surge in international lending to emerging markets at a
very low interest rate. The heavy lending caused consump-
tion boom (financed by expansion of bank credit), an asset
price bubble, a real appreciation, a current account deficits,
etc. When industrial countries engaged in tight anti-infla-
tionary policies the debtors could no longer respect their
obligations, defaulted and went into a crisis.
The Asian crisis included similar dynamics, but rather
instead of the consumption boom there was an excessive
investment. Over-lending, over-investment and moral haz-
ard were engraved by the initial success of this policy –
widely shared optimism about future growth based on a
long tradition without a single year of negative growth. Last
year with growth rate of significantly lower than 5% was in
Indonesia in 1985, in Malaysia in 1986, in Korea in 1980 and
in Thailand in 1972. The crisis was, again, triggered by a sud-
den outflow of foreign capital. However, the collapse of the
financial system was far more damaging in Asian economies
due to a deeper financial markets, higher debt-equity and
credit-GDP ratios. Similarly, the degree of overvaluation in
Asia was smaller, but due to relative openness of these
economies the results of the overvaluation were more
severe.
On the other hand, the 1999 Brazilian crisis was not a
financial crisis but rather a classic balance of payment crisis
with unsustainable fiscal policy. The banking system was
sound, adequately hedged and capitalized. The relationship
between the soundness of the banking sector and the sever-
ity of crises is, therefore, evident.
As we mentioned before, the soundness of the financial
system depends on the quality of the supervision and the
enforcement of prudential rules – especially in the period of
financial liberalization.
In Korea the liberalization started in 1991, in 1993 short-
term interest rates and in 1994 lending rates were deregu-
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[14] Although the 1997–98 Asian crisis (as opposite to the 1994–95 Mexican crisis of 1994–95) erupted when the international liquidity was high.
[15] It should be said that not only the state of the banking sector but also the condition of the corporate sector (analogously: the moral hazard,
increased leverage, unhedged borrowing, overinvestment, political connections) should be taken into account in estimating the probability of a cur-
rency or a full-fledged financial crisis in a given country.
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lated. Rapid growth of non-bank financial intermediaries –
investment and finance companies, mutual savings and mer-
chant banking corporations – followed. They enjoyed a
greater autonomy and were able to offer higher interest
rates on deposits. Non-commercial bank share in "deposits"
rose from 37% at end-1980 to 68% by June 1995. They
quickly developed serious maturity and currency mismatch-
es; for example, by 1997 over 70% of their funding were
short-term while 90% of loans were long-term. Despite
this fact, the supervision was weak and fragmented (Bank of
Korea supervised commercial banks while the Ministry of
Finance supervised merchant banks); provisioning was even
relaxed in 1995–95 (from 100 to 75% for doubtful loans).
Korean Deposit Insurance Corporation only was estab-
lished in 1996. 
In Indonesia, between 1978 and 1995, the number of
banks doubled. Regulatory and legal structure was simply
unable to manage banking business in much more compli-
cated environment.
In Thailand, the number of non-bank financial interme-
diaries exploded as well – they conducted activities, which
banks were restrained from engaging in. Supervision was
again fragmented between the Bank of Thailand and the
Ministry of Finance. Rules for loan classification were often
ignored, large portfolios of questionable loans were simply
rolled-over rather than classified as non-performing. There
were no limits of large exposures to corporate groups. 
Deregulation was accompanied by the rapid growth of
little regulated non-bank financial institutions in other coun-
tries as well – in Chile from 1974, Argentina since 1978,
Venezuela before 1989 – to name a few. For example, in
Chile in early 1970s, following privatization, new "groupos"
i.e. large conglomerates emerged. They were aggressive,
highly leveraged and centered around few banks; by 1979
they controlled more than 80% of all private banks and
almost 70% of the equity of firms listed in the stock
exchange. Banks acted as agents for these groups and
engaged in risky, connected lending, despite their weak cap-
ital position. 
The above-described syndrome is not unique to emerg-
ing markets only. For example, in Sweden, since the end of
the WWII the banking system was a very regulated.
Between 1945 and 1983 there were no new private
entrants. The objective was to avoid banking system fail-
ures. In 1986 one prominent Swedish economist said that
the idea of a bank run or collapse was out of the question.
There has also been a long-tradition of close relationship
between industry and banking sector. Swedish banks as well
as regulatory bodies were not prepared for liberalization.
Tranquil and profitable existence in the environment of
credit rationing and monopolistic profit turned into a hard
life of increased competition and rising complexity of finan-
cial instruments. The new "direct finance" sector emerged.
Banks, as previously, had to maintain high capital adequacy
ratios while new non-bank entrants not. These lightly regu-
lated institutions engaged in leveraged real estate lending.
The asset bubble finally burst and between 1988 and 1990
half of finance companies went bankrupt. The impairment
of the Swedish banking system prolonged several years. To
a large extent, the crisis was a result of inadequate supervi-
sion and prudential regulations.
According go the World Bank (1993), inadequate pru-
dential regulations also played a major role in crises in
Hong-Kong, 1982–1983, Japan, 1991, Chile, 1981–1993,
the Philippines, 1981–1987, Turkey, 1982–1985, the US
1979–1989 and many more. 
In the same spirit, after the Asian crisis, Bank of Korea
admitted that moral hazard (caused by government guaran-
tees) had been present in the case of all major players on
the financial markets: borrowers, financial institutions, their
creditors and depositors. For example, the President once
said that Korean financial institutions were immune to fail-
ure because government implicitly guaranteed their solven-
cy and liquidity. And, indeed, the general opinion was that
the government would not allow commercial and merchant
banks go bankrupt.
By arranging a bailout the government proved that eco-
nomic agents were right in their expectations (implicit guar-
antee). This only reinforced these expectations and wors-
ened the moral hazard problem. For example, the Chilean
"groupos" started to experience difficulties in early-1980s.
Nevertheless, there were expectation of government
bailout, and indeed, in 1983, after two largest groupos went
bankrupt the government took over five banks, among
them the two largest – owned by the conglomerates.
Implicit guarantees in the banking system were evident
before the Asian crisis – although only Korea and Thailand
had explicit deposit insurance schemes, up to 1993 only
Hong Kong and Thailand closed any insolvent intermedi-
aries. Major government support has been extended to the
failed banking institutions in Malaysia 1985–1988, Thailand
1983–1987, Philippines 1981–1987 and others – the
investors and depositors had good grounds to believe that it
would happen again in the future, if necessary.
Investors took a specific lesson of global moral hazard in
early 1995. Holders of dollar denominated Mexican bonds
were bailed-out by the IMF and other financial institutions
while holders of other forms of Mexican papers, equity and
most peso denominated papers in particular, did suffer heavy
losses. This event most probably distorted the patterns of
international capital flows – there was a change from equity
to debt and from domestic to hard currency. Interbank lend-
ing grew in importance, in the expense of equity. This means
that debt became very short-term and denominated in for-
eign currency. Interbank lending to five most crisis-affected
countries in Asia ran at around 43$bln a year. Before the
1997–1998 crisis, about 40% were denominated in yen, the
rest in USD; 2/3 had maturity less than a year.
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4.4.2. Some Statistics Concerning Banking, Cur-
rency and Twin Crisis
Banking and currency crises have not been uncommon
in the history. Analyzing the panel of 21 industrial, 37 devel-
oping and 32 emerging market [16] countries over the
1975–1997 sample period Glick and Hutchison (2000) find
that out of 90 countries 72 had banking problems and 79
experienced at least one currency crisis. There were 90
banking crisis episodes and 202 currency crisis episodes.
Out of 90 banking crises 37, i.e. 41% have been twin-crises
[17]. Banking crises have increased over time both in num-
bers and in frequency and are four times as frequent in the
1990s than in the 1970s, while the frequency of currency
crises remained more or less the same. The occurrence of
twin crises rose as well. All types of crises, in particular the
twin crisis phenomenon, are most common in financially lib-
eralized emerging markets. Table 4-1 presents time and
geographical distribution of banking, currency and twin
crises.
The consequences of crises are not negligible. A
decline in output average 4% [18] – this number is higher
for recent crises and for crises having a financial compo-
nent [19]. The average recovery time is around two years
– again, higher for financial crises. The interest rate is high-
er a year after the crisis (but lower thereafter), inflation
peaks a year after a crisis on average 28% above the pre-
crisis level. The (fiscal) costs of restructuring the economy
after a crisis are significant: for industrial countries they are
usually little under 10% of GDP, for emerging market
economies the costs are huge. The reason is that in emerg-
ing economies the overall state of the national balance
sheet is much worse and, secondly, the currency and bank-
ing crises tend to coincide [20].
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[16] As "emerging market" authors define countries with relatively open capital markets while "developing country" sample includes other devel-
oping countries and transition economies.
[17] "Twin" crises are defined as banking crises accompanied by a currency crisis in previous, current, or following year.
[18] Which brings the cumulative (potential) output loss to around 7–8%.
[19] It is interesting to notice that crises with a financial component have greater impact (in terms of the loss of output) on developed economies.
This is most probably because in these countries a much greater share of GDP is intermediated through the banking system – the possible conse-
quences of a credit crunch are proportional to the importance of the credit itself. I thank Marek D¹browski for this remark.  
[20] For example: the US 1984–91 banking distress cost 5–7% of GDP, Sweden 1991–93 – 4–5%, Norway 1988–92 – 4%, Finland 1991–93 –
8–10% of GDP. The Argentinean debt crisis cost 13–55%, Chilean dent crisis 19–41%, the Mexican crisis 1994–95 – 12–15%. Figures for 1997–98
Asian crisis run as high as 55% for Indonesia.
Table 4-1. Time and geographical distribution of banking, currency and twin crises
Time distribution 1975-1997 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1997
number 90 6 16 21 30 17Banking
crises frequency 5.0 1.6 4.2 5.3 7.2 6.8
number 202 39 45 50 48 20Currency
crises frequency 11.3 11.0 12.0 12.6 11.6 8.0
number 37 3 5 8 11 10Twin
crises frequency 2.1 0.8 1.3 2.0 2.6 4.0
DevelopingGeographic
distribution
Industrial Developing Emerging
Africa Asia Latin Am. Other
number 19 71 46 21 15 26 9Banking
crises frequency 4.4 5.2 6.6 5.8 5.0 5.1 4.8
number 42 160 78 59 29 53 19Currency
crises frequency 9.6 11.8 11.2 16.5 9.6 10.4 10.2
number 7 30 23 11 7 8 4Twin
crises frequency 1.6 2.2 3.3 3.1 2.3 1.6 2.2
Source: Glick and Hutchison (2000).
Frequency: with respect to total country-years,
Other: includes CEE, ME etc.
Table 4-2. Average recovery time and output loss (relative to trend)
Currency crisis Currency crash Banking crisis Twin crisis
Average recovery time (in years) 1.6 2.0 3.1 3.2
Cumulative loss of output per crisis (in %) 4.3 7.1 11.6 14.4
Source: World Economic Outlook (1998).
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4.4.3. The Determinants of Banking Crises
Table 4-3 summarizes the results of typical studies
regarding bank crisis determinants and its predictability.
With the exception of Kaminsky (1998) the estimations
were usually carried through by the limited dependent
variables method (binary choice models, such as probit
and logit). The table presents the coefficients obtained
from the regressions. The asterisks indicate the signifi-
cance of the variable (*=10%, **=5%, ***=1%,
n.s.=not significant). Coefficients are usually not compara-
ble between studies, nevertheless, their "within" magni-
tude and significance provide much information about how
banking crisis erupt.
In general, banking crises tend to happen when macro-
economic environment is weak, i.e. growth is low, infla-
tion high and real interest rate is excessive. Institutional
factors seem to matter strongly. Countries with explicit
deposit insurance schemes, weak law enforcement and
just liberalized are particularly vulnerable.
The decline in growth emerges as one of the most
important factors – the undoubtful significance of this vari-
able provides evidence that developments in the real part
of the economy are a major source of banking sectors
problems. When economic conditions deteriorate corpo-
rations experience difficulties with servicing their debt and
the banks' non-performing loans portfolio increases. This
conclusion is consistent with the boom-bust cycle theory
[21]. However, this result does not seem to give evidence
of the reverse causality (i.e. that bank crises induce output
decline). Kaminsky and Reinhart (1996) find that a decline
in output precede a banking crisis by about 8 months.
The sign for the inflation coefficient is somehow
ambiguous. There is some evidence that banking crises
happen in an environment of accelerating inflation. On the
other hand, the rapid slowdown of inflation (a boom-bust
cycle of inflation), as, for example, during disinflation pro-
grams, seriously erodes banks' profitability and can be
responsible for systemic problems [Hardy and Pazarba-
sioglu, 1998].
Other macroeconomic variables as credit expansion,
high real interest rates and overvalued exchange rate also
increase banking sector's problem.
According to theory and the common sense, greater
financial liberalization is highly correlated with the onset of
banking distress. Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997)
analyze 53 countries during 1980–1995 and find that finan-
cial liberalization increases the probability of a banking cri-
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[21] The liabilities-side crisis doesn't get much support from the data. See Kaminsky (1998) - the bank run noise-to-signal ratio is equal to one.
Table 4-3. The empirical evidence of the determinants of banking sector crises
study growth infl. liber RIR TOT DIS M2/res RER Other variables and notice
A
-0.17
***
0.03
***
1.95
***
0.05
***
–
0.54
**
-
0.02
***
-
Quality of institutions:       (explained below)
law and order                95% **
contract enforcement  80% *
bureau quality             125% *
(no)corruption            130% **
B
-2.2
***
-1.42
***
-
0.01
**
n.s.
0.36
***
- -
lag of stock prices              -0.37 **
lag of credit to priv. sector   0.67 ***
interest rate control :           -0.36 ***
C
–14.6
***
-7.9
***
9.2
***
-
0.06
***
n.s. - -
7.2
**
Inflation column:
first coefficient: first lag of inflation
second coefficient: second lag of inflation
D
-0.38
**
n.s.
7.98
***
- -
1.42
**
- -
E
-0.24
***
0.06
**
-
0.12
***
- -
0.016
**
-
law and order  -0.52 ***,  gdp/capita  -0.16 **
budget surplus not significant
F 0.5 - 0.8 - 0.8 - 0.5 0.3
Noise-to-signal ratios  (explained below)
dom. credit/GDP  0.6    foreign debt   0.5
exports                 0.6     stock prices   0.3
deposit withdrawal (bank run)  1.0 ,    etc.
Source: A: Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache (1997), B: Munoz (2000) C: Hardy and Pazarbasioglu (1998), D: Glick and Hutchison (2000), E:15, F:
Kaminsky (1998).
"-"=not included,   n.s.=not significant, *=10%, **=5%, ***=1%
"Quality of institution" coefficient indicates how many percent of the initial negative impact of the financial liberalization is (would be) offset if the
country got the best score instead of the worst, for a given criterion.
Noise-to-signal ratios = 0-perfect predictor, >1 worse than an unconditional guess (see text for more explanation).
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sis significantly. Nevertheless, they also find that in finan-
cially repressed countries the financial situation usually
improves even if they experienced a banking crisis. For
financially restrained this cannot be proven – financial
development remains at similar level [22]. They also notice
that liberalization not immediately increases banking
fragility – it takes usually few years before the country
experience banking problems.
What is important – the initial negative impact of the
liberalization is lower for countries where the institutional
environment is strong. For example, the promotion of the
country from the worst to the best score within the "rule
of law and order" criterion almost in 100% offsets the neg-
ative effect of the liberalization itself. Obtaining the perfect
score (instead the worst) within "contract enforcement"
category can undo the liberalization's bad influence in
80%. For "efficient bureaucracy" and "low corruption" the
offset coefficients are as high as 125% and 130% respec-
tively.
Empirical research seems to support the view that
financial liberalization should be treated with caution and
special attention should be paid to the existence of suffi-
cient institutional framework: respect for law, prudential
regulations and supervision, etc. This is true regardless of
just only macroeconomic stabilization.
The results for deposit insurance scheme are disap-
pointing. Although it may have reduced the system's vul-
nerability to runs, nevertheless, the moral hazard problem
posed by the guarantees overrides possible benefits.
Countries with deposit insurance schemes were not able
to adequately supervise and regulate their banking sectors.
However, as it has been mentioned above, this argument
is rather not against DIS per se but against its poor design
and inadequate implementation.
The overall significance and predictability for the bank-
ing crises is the highest in the emerging market sample,
which is consistent with a similar finding for currency
crises [compare Sasin, 2001]. In addition, it is interesting to
notice that the same factors that increase the probability of
a banking crisis also make this crisis more costly [23]. 
4.4.4. The Empirical Evidence on the Interrela-
tion between Currency and Banking Crises
The general consensus among researchers on this point
is that banking crisis is a good leading indicator of a cur-
rency crisis but the converse is not necessarily true - cur-
rency crises are not good leading indicators of banking
crises.
Table 4-4 presents a summary statistics on the fre-
quency of currency crisis accompanying bank crises and
vice versa, as well as the performance of bank crises as a
signal of currency crises and vice versa. The frequency of
banking crises accompanied by currency crisis is higher
than the frequency of currency crises accompanied by
banking crisis. Currency crises tend to cluster one year
after a banking crisis while banking crises accompany a cur-
rency crisis usually the previous year. Both findings support
the view that banking crises provoke currency crises,
rather than the opposite.
Also the comparison of the predictability index devel-
oped by Glick and Hutchison reveals that currency crises
in period t and t+1 can be well predicted by the occur-
rence of a banking crisis in period t. The predictability is
stronger for emerging markets (values of 2.46 and 1.96
respectively). The occurrence of a currency crisis in peri-
od t doesn't contain any information regarding the next
period probability of a banking crisis (the value of 0.98).
The above analysis was univariate. When we exploit
the cross-correlation among variables in the multivariate
model, the results change somehow (full table not report-
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[22] Financially repressed (restrained) are countries, in which the real interest rate before liberalization was negative (positive). 
[23] The breakdown into subsamples and the cost-of-crises regression not reported.
Table 4-4. Performance of bank crises as a signal of currency crises and vice versa
Freq of accompanying
currency crises (%)
Currency crises as bank
crisis indicator (index)
Freq of accompanying
banking crises (%)
Bank crises as currency
crisis indicator (index)
Number
of
banking
crises
t-1 t t+1
Cumu
-lative
freq.
Number
of curr-
ency
crises
t-1 t t+1
Cumula-
tive freq.
All 90
11
1.38
16
1.40
15
0.98
41 202
7
0.98
7
1.44
5
1.42
18
Developing 71
10
1.32
18
1.59
15
0.82
42 160
7
0.82
8
1.66
5
1.35
19
Emerging 46
9
1.87
24
2.30
20
0.87
50 78
11
0.77
14
2.46
6
1.96
29
Source: Glick and Hutchison (2000)
Predictability index: the higher the value of the index the better predictability, the value of 1 indicates ambiguous informative content
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ed). Currency crises as predictors of banking crisis remain
insignificant (except for contemporaneous events). The
usefulness of banking crises as predictors of currency
crises decreases substantially – they only issue a proper
(and very strong) signal of an approaching currency crisis in
the case of emerging markets. The contemporaneous cor-
relation is significant for both developing and emerging
markets.
Kaminsky (1998) develops a so-called "signal approach"
to assess what are the determinants of both currency and
banking crises. The estimated coefficient are actually
noise-to-signal ratios (ntsr): the coefficient equal to zero
indicates perfect predictability power of the variable, the
coefficient one indicate the power of a simple uncondi-
tional guess (i.e. the variable in question is neutral) while
values greater than one disqualify the variable. She notices
that it is a little harder to predict banking crises (com-
pounded ntsr=0.8) than currency crises (ntsr=0.7). The
best variable to predict both crises is the real exchange
rate overvaluation (ntsr=0.2 for currency crises and 0.3
for banking crises). Consistently with other studies she
finds that a banking crisis is a very good indicator of a cur-
rency crisis (ntsr=0.3) while the opposite is not true
(ntsr=1.2). 
4.5. Conclusions
It has been shown that banking crises and currency
crises are interrelated and that banking crises are good
leading indicators of currency crises, so there is a point in
assessing the condition of the financial system and the
probability of a banking crisis. The recent crises are shown
to follow the pattern of a boom-bust over-lending – over-
investment cycle. Banking crises emerge when macroeco-
nomic situation deteriorates, i.e. growth slows down, infla-
tion and the real interest rates are high, etc.
Institutional factors matter: countries with explicit
deposit insurance scheme or with inadequate contract
enforcement are more vulnerable. The financial liberaliza-
tion increases the possibility of a crisis in improperly regu-
lated banking sector. The problem of moral hazard chiefly
contributes to the emergence of a crisis.
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5.I. Introduction
The recent wave of currency crises in the 1980s and
1990s has led to a resumption of studies into this economic
phenomenon. The series of crises started with the Mexican
debt crisis in 1982, followed by the European Monetary Sys-
tem crisis of 1992–1993, the Mexico crisis of 1994, the
Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian crisis of 1998 and the
Brazilian crisis of 1999. The financial turmoil seen in these
crises triggered a vast bulk of literature on various issues
surrounding the topic. Despite all the advancements in the-
ory and empirical analyses there are still some unclear
aspects. This ambiguity arises even with regard to the defi-
nition of a crisis per se. 
One strand of currency crisis theory deals with the
cross-country propagation of crises – very often referred to
as contagion. An investigation into the nature of this mecha-
nism is of key importance for a proper understanding of
crises. An understanding of contagion has very important
policy implications as it can help in the search for answers as
to whether contagion can be stopped or avoided. 
Despite the proliferation of literature on crisis propaga-
tion in recent years there is no research consensus on issues
surrounding contagion. One of the reasons for this is the
problem of defining contagion in the first place. Notwith-
standing intuitive comprehensions of the term contagion,
numerous misconceptions arise. Since the inception of con-
tagion theory, the term contagion has been used in a variety
of ways, covering both broad and narrow meanings. Thus,
this paper starts with a survey of literature on contagion,
focusing on definitional approaches. The focus is then shift-
ed to the problem of identifying the various means by which
crises propagation, followed by a look at measurement
methods. 
Research to date has tended to take one of three routes:
to investigate individual channel of contagion; to test empir-
ically which channel is most important; to discover simply
whether there was any contagion at all. For instance, Mas-
son (1998) and Masson (1999) explored a transmission
mechanism via multiple equilibria; Rijckeghem and Weder
(1999a) explored the common lender effect; Drazen (1999)
explored political contagion; Glick and Rose (1999) looked
at trade channels, and Eichengreen et al. (1996) tested for
contagion and the importance of the trade channel. Forbes
and Rigobon (1999b) have pointed out deficiencies in
econometric tests for contagion and proposed their own
test, which remains consistent with econometric theory. 
The results of and conclusions drawn from the above-
mentioned papers seem to depend to a great extent on the
definitions of contagion employed and the respective
empirical tests that emanated from them. Rijckeghem and
Weder (1999b), applying a very broad definition of conta-
gion, found that spillovers through common bank lenders
were significant in the propagation of the Mexican, Thai,
and Russian crises. Drazen (1999) put forward a concept of
political contagion and a model of 'membership' contagion
that applies to the ERM crisis. Glick and Rose (1999) illus-
trated the key importance of trade channels in contagion
above and beyond macroeconomic and financial similarities
by sidestepping the problem of defining and testing conta-
gion (they simply assumed that there is contagion). Eichen-
green et al. (1996), conducting a panel analysis of industrial
countries, found evidence of contagion and also stressed the
importance of the trade channel. On the other hand, Forbes
and Rigobon (1999a) and (1999b), using a very precise def-
inition of contagion, analysed stock market co-movements
and claimed that there is no such thing as contagion, only
interdependence. 
This paper tackles the issue of criseis propagation by
investigating the case of the Russian crisis in terms of a sam-
ple of 24 selected countries of Central and Eastern Europe
(CEE) and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). No
formal testing of spillovers and the contagion effect is pur-
sued. The focus is put rather on the propagation in general
terms. The crisis-hit countries are chosen arbitrarily based
on expert knowledge. It is argued that in the global econo-
my there are many co-existing and interdependent mecha-
nisms and channels for shocks to spread across economies.
The mechanisms refer both to real and financial linkages and
are permanently in operation. Due to real world complexi-
ties it is impossible to isolate specific mechanisms. Recog-
nising these limitations and data constraints, the empirical
Part V.
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analysis in this paper goes beyond formal econometric tools
and makes use of a less formal approach based on stylised
facts. For a more comprehensive understanding of the
spread of the Russian crisis, basic developments in crisis-hit
countries are presented with a selective analysis of financial
market characteristics of the CIS countries. Some refer-
ences to the Asian economies are also provided. First, a sim-
ple probit model is estimated. This outlines the probability
of crisis in a country with trade links with crisis-hit countries
with reference to macroeconomic fundamentals. Then,
some back-of-the-envelope calculations within the frame-
work of the balance of payments model developed by Mas-
son (1999) are conducted. The results of these two
approaches form the grounds for a case-by-case analysis of
the issue under investigation based on stylised facts.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Chap-
ter 5.2. discusses definitions of contagion and Chapter 5.3.
identifies the main channels by which currency crises propa-
gate. Different empirical approaches to the measurement of
contagion are presented in Chapter 5.4. Chapter 5.5. intro-
duces the research methodology of this paper and presents
its results. Finally, Chapter 5.6. offers some conclusions.
5.2. Definitions of Contagion
Despite what we may call an intuitive understanding of
the term contagion there are many misconceptions sur-
rounding it. From the very beginnings of contagion literature
researchers adopted varying positions with regards the
term. These range from a very broad usage – encompassing
the propagation of shocks in general, for example via trade,
financial linkages, etc to a very specific usage, i.e. how
shocks spread unrelated to fundamentals. 
In some papers authors have not explicitly defined
contagion at all [e.g., Glick and Rose, 1999] or have pro-
vided a specific definition for particular purposes of their
research, like in Eichengreen et al. (1996), p. 19: 'The
contagion effect with which we are concentrated can be
thought of as an increase in the probability of a speculative
attack on the domestic currency which stems not from
"domestic fundamentals" such as money and output but
from the existence of a (not necessarily successful) spec-
ulative attack elsewhere in the world'.
In other papers more formal and clear-cut distinctions
have been put forward. For instance, Masson (1998) dis-
tinguishes three types of phenomena related to the spread
of crises: monsoonal effects – arising from a common
shock, e.g. an interest rate hike in the US; spillovers – a cri-
sis in one country worsens the macroeconomic fundamen-
tals in other countries, for instance, via trade linkages (see
Chapter 5.4); contagion – crises spread unrelated to funda-
mentals, in, for example, a shift in market sentiment or in
the perception of market conditions. 
Though Masson's definitions have conceptual appeal,
some problems with differentiating between spillovers and
contagion can arise on the empirical side. Contagion can be
triggered by unknown factors that underpin investors' expec-
tations or a simple capital squeeze – see further below.  In the
former case it is virtually impossible to test if fundamentals
have an impact on investors' reaction functions and to define
its parameters. This is because financial markets are extreme-
ly heterogeneous and many reaction functions may exist.
Even if there were a single function, its parameters would
change instantaneously. Thus, as fundamentals matter for
contagion (i.e., investor expectations) the spillover effects
naturally influence contagion effects. The factor that should
differentiate between contagion and spillovers is time. Conta-
gion should take place immediately, whereas spillovers should
take some time to feed through economic mechanisms.
However, setting the time window in the real world is difficult
and no objective rules exist. A lack of high frequency data on
various economic variables makes it impossible to measure
the speed of this process. Moreover, market imperfections or
specific features may additionally extend the period of propa-
gation. In this respect the relation between spillovers and
contagion is similar to the debate over self-fulfilling crises vs.
crises due to poor fundamentals. As Jeanne (1997) argued, it
does not make sense to set these views up in opposition to
each other – they should in fact both be dealt with interac-
tively. Both fundamentals and investor behaviour may con-
tribute to the genesis of a speculative attack. 
A different definition was proposed by Forbes and
Rigobon (1999a) and (1999b). They coined the term shift-
contagion, i.e. "a significant increase in cross-market linkages
after a shock to an individual country (or group of coun-
tries)". Cross-market linkages can be measured by various
statistics, like the correlation in asset returns, the probabili-
ty of a speculative attack or the transmission of shocks or
volatility. This definition is very neat for testing purposes,
however, it focuses mechanically on one specific channel
and therefore ignores developments in other segments of
the economy as well as overall economic background.
In this paper the definitions developed by Masson (1998)
are employed. However, given that the empirical focus of
the paper is how crises spread in general, the very detailed
distinction he makes between contagion and spillovers is of
minor importance to us here.
5.3. The Channels of Crises Propagation
Contrary to the problem with defining contagion, there
is a general agreement among researchers at the theoretical
level on the set of channels by which crises spread. This
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chapter is devoted to a discussion of these channels. It
draws on Forbes and Rigobon (1999b) and the IMF (1999b).
The first channel is called multiple equilibria: [see Mas-
son, 1998]. Masson claims that a crisis in one country affects
investors' expectations which then leads to a shift from a
good to bad equilibrium in other countries. Expectations are
thus the mechanism by which crises spread. This channel
clearly would not work during tranquil periods. Masson
argues that multiple equilibria should be associated with
pure contagion. As market expectations are correlated
across economies due to sunspot variables (provided that
fundamentals lie in the zone of multiplicity), crises can take
place contemporaneously irrespective of these fundamen-
tals. Hence, as Jeanne (1999) notes, self-fulfilling crises fea-
ture an inherent tendency to become systemic.
The second channel – endogenous liquidity shock – occurs
when a crisis in one country causes liquidity strains in other
countries. Investors, to survive, maintain margin calls, etc.
and have to alter their portfolios. Very often this entails sell-
ing assets in other countries which in turn sparks crises. The
drop in liquidity can also induce tighter credit rationing in
other countries which can also lead to the selling of assets.
A similar concept – common bank lender – was investigated
by Rijckeghem and Weder (1999a). They analysed the effect
of significant bank lending to emerging markets (both loans
per se and the holding of assets). In the event of crises,
banks, in order to restore capital asset ratios, meet margin
calls or, to reduce risk exposure, withdraw capital causing
contagious effects. 
The third channel – political contagion – can arise when
there is a political conflict between domestic and exchange
rate objectives. A country may decide to sacrifice its fixed
exchange rate to meet domestic objectives. Such a possibil-
ity is revealed by a successful speculative attack, which, in
turn, impacts on other countries in a similar position who
may also experience pressure on their currencies. This
channel was analysed thoroughly by Drazen (1999) and
applied to the ERM crisis. Apart from this very specific situ-
ation, one should also note the general role of political
developments during crises and how they spread. Political
factors are usually not in themselves responsible for crises,
but add to crisis pressures by aggravating the already poor
economic situation, in turn affecting the sentiments of for-
eign investors.
The fourth channel relates to trade. In the event of a cri-
sis, demand for foreign goods is slashed due to 1) devalua-
tion/depreciation of the domestic currency and 2) lower
economic activity dampened by higher interest rates. In
practice, the exchange rate channel is the most important as
it has a direct and immediate impact as opposed to the activ-
ity channel. Lower demand in the crisis-hit country induces
strains on countries that export significant amounts to this
country. A drop in their exports may lead to current account
problems and trigger a crisis. 
While considering the trade channel, the issue of timing
and expectations should be brought to attention. In the
spillovers paradigm depreciation in the crisis-hit country
worsens export prospect in other countries. This process is
rather long-lasting – depending on the structure of trade
contracts – but probably not shorter than 3 months. Thus,
one should not expect an immediate crisis outbreak due to
this mechanism. This appears to depend to a large extent on
other factors, like the level of foreign reserves, the size of
the depreciation, and whether it is permanent or not. In the
case of a one-off depreciation – a significant change in the
exchange rate followed by the return to the previous level –
we cannot speak about a real spillover mechanism. The
trade channel may also involve the expectation mechanism.
Trade linkages may enter the reaction function of financial
market actors. A crisis in an important export-partner coun-
try may incline investors, recognising the trade-related
spillovers, to pull out of the domestic market.  As a conse-
quence, some of the findings from the literature on the sig-
nificance of the trade channel in spreading crises may in fact
partially point to the financial market channel. 
The other trade channel works through the competi-
tiveness effect. If two countries compete in a third country
market, a crisis driven devaluation in one of them will cause
a relative deterioration in competitiveness in the other
country. Similarly to the first case, the lowering of exports
can lead to current account problems and a crisis.  At this
point, it is should be stressed that two conditions must be
met in order to make this mechanism legitimate. First, the
commodity structure of competing countries must be very
similar, because if they trade in very different goods one can-
not talk in terms of the competitiveness effect. Second, if
the first condition is satisfied, the output capacity of the cri-
sis-hit country must be large enough to allow for an increase
in output and exports large enough to crowd-out the non-
crisis hit country's exports in the third market. As most
studies employ aggregated data these conditions have not
yet been investigated properly. Only Forbes (2000), work-
ing with data at a very disaggregated level, has tested this
issue in any formal way.
Forbes (2000) also investigated the bargaining effect. This
occurs if a crisis-hit country is a significant supplier of a certain
good and the crisis induced devaluation leads to lower world-
wide prices of that good. As a result, the competitiveness of
non-crisis-hit countries is reduced. In this case, the effect does
not necessarily require direct competition in the same mar-
ket. Although this argument is theoretically interesting, in
practice its significance is rather limited. 
The fifth channel deals with common aggregate shocks
such as a change in world interest rates, a slowdown in
world output growth or changes in bilateral exchange rates
among major world economies. These shocks exert con-
temporaneous pressures on the currencies of several coun-
tries and may lead to a crisis. 
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Forbes and Rigobon (1999) distinguished two main
themes out of the aforementioned channels: crisis-contin-
gent (multiple equilibria, endogenous liquidity and political
contagion) and non-crisis-contingent (trade and common
aggregate shocks). This classification seems rather artificial.
It manages to clarify theoretical study but does not facilitate
further empirical modelling. 
What has to be stressed here is that in reality many of
these channels occur simultaneously and the separation of
their effects is virtually impossible. Researchers usually tend
to focus on one channel at the cost of generality and rele-
vance to the real world. However, the advantage of this
approach is the feasibility it allows in conducting economet-
ric modelling, which is the topic of the next chapter. 
5.4. Measuring Crises Propagation
Bearing in mind the problems of defining contagion and
its channels, we can now turn to a discussion of the meth-
ods of measuring the phenomenon. There are two broad
approaches (correlation and limited dependent variable
models) that will be discussed based on examples from the
literature. 
5.4.1. Cross-Market Correlation Coefficients
The cross-market correlation coefficients approach to
measuring contagion boils down to a comparison of corre-
lation coefficients (for instance between stock returns) dur-
ing tranquil and volatile periods. An increase in the correla-
tion is treated as an occurrence of contagion. Forbes and
Rigobon (1999a) and (1999b) contributed largely to this
method. They draw attention to the fact that a simple cor-
relation coefficient is biased if not adjusted for het-
eroscedasticity. Their adjusted coefficient, applied to stock
market indices during periods of the 1987 US stock market
crash, 1994 Mexican crisis and 1997 Asian crisis, does not
indicate any significant increase in correlation during volatile
periods as compared to tranquil periods. Consequently,
they concluded that there is no contagion, rather interde-
pendence. This method was also pursued, among others, by
Baig and Goldfajn (2000). They analysed contagion from
Russia to Brazil focusing on stock indices, sovereign spreads
and exchange rates. Rolling correlations (adjusted for het-
eroscedasticity as in Forbes and Rigobon) and reduced VARs
provided the tools for their analysis. They found a significant
increase in the correlation on the Brady bonds market.
Based on this they claimed that this market was the most
likely channel for the propagation of the Russian crisis to
Brazil. 
5.4.2. Limited Dependent Variable Models
Limited dependent variable models seek to explain how
a crisis in one country influences the odds of a crisis in other
country (the dependent variable equals 1 if there is a crisis,
0 if otherwise). Probit models are usually used as particular
econometric tools. This approach has been widely pursued
in many studies. One prominent example is the work of
Eichengreen et al. (1996). Using panel data for 20 industri-
alised countries over a period of more than three decades
they found that a crisis in one country increases the odds of
a crisis in another. Their study showed that the trade chan-
nel is more important than macroeconomic similarities in
contagion propagation. 
Glick and Rose (1999) arrived at similar conclusions.
They ran a probit model that explains the occurrence of a
crisis with trade linkages and a set of macroeconomic vari-
ables. They assumed arbitrarily which country was affected
by the turmoil. The sample covers 5 waves of currency
crises – 1971, 1973, 1992, 1994–95, and 1997. Their main
conclusion highlights the regional nature of currency crises
and the dominant role of trade linkages.
Another view was presented by Rijckeghem and Weder
(1999b) who ran two types of models that explain contagion
(first defined as a binary variable and later as the continuous
EMP index) with trade linkages, competition for bank funds
and macroeconomic fundamentals. They investigated Mexi-
can, Thai and Russian crises and found that the common
bank lender effect contributed significantly to the spreading
of analysed crises. However, not all results held up against
the inclusion of trade variables. 
A different econometric approach to those presented
above was employed by Edwards (1998). He estimated the
variance-covariance transmission mechanism across coun-
tries with the help of ARCH or GARCH models. He tested
for volatility contagion in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico using
high frequency data on short-term nominal interest rates
during the 90s. The augmented GARCH model proved,
quite strongly, volatility-contagion from Mexico to Argentina
and no volatility-contagion from Mexico to Chile.
This succinct survey of empirical literature presents two
broad approaches of measuring contagion and highlights the
main difficulties that researchers face in their quest to unrav-
el the mystery of contagion. On the one hand, we have cor-
relation coefficient-based models that try to answer the
question of whether contagion exists. Econometric tests
may raise reservations as they suffer from heteroscedastici-
ty, omitted variables and endogeneity problems. Even if the-
ses problems are solved, such studies only provide answers
as to whether or not there was contagion by focusing on
one selected indicator. One can not fully learn about the
underlying determinants of this process. Thus, this approach
is limited in this respect. On the other hand, different forms
of limited dependent variable models predict the probabili-
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ty of crises with the help of trade and financial linkages as
well as macroeconomic fundamentals. The latter approach
tends to be more interesting as it sheds more light on the
issue under investigation and has more profound implica-
tions, though it also poses numerous deficiencies. Limited
dependent variable models are not free from similar econo-
metric shortcomings as those in the case of correlation
models.
Finally, a few words need to be devoted to an explana-
tion of why empirical studies lag behind the development of
the contagion theory. First of all, the problem of crisis defi-
nition in itself blurs the situation. Second, in the real world
there are a number of factors that determine the econom-
ic situation. In empirical studies it is virtually impossible to
single out these factors. Moreover, the discussion about fun-
damentals versus contagion (expectations) usually ignores
the inter-determination of these two categories. As Jeanne
(1999) points out, the world is not completely determinis-
tic. Consequently, the causality between fundamentals and
market expectations runs both ways and econometric mod-
els fail to account for this fact. 
Second, empirical models are incapable of fully incorpo-
rating financial markets. We do not know the reaction func-
tion of financial market participants and will probably never
be able to estimate it properly. Although there have been
some attempts to derive models from microeconomic
behaviour, they are of little help within a macroeconomic
framework. There are two main reasons behind this con-
jecture: financial markets are extremely heterogeneous and
the parameters of their reaction functions can change
instantaneously. This, coupled with problems of informa-
tional asymmetries, makes formal modelling untractable. As
Jeanne (1999) puts it, researchers estimating probit models
that account for multiple equilibria are like meteorologists
trying to predict a storm.
A microeconomic approach to modelling of currency
crises was pursued by G. Kaminsky et al. (1999). They tried
to identify investment funds' strategies via analysis at the
portfolio level and their links with contagion. They discov-
ered that funds used contagion strategies – i.e., they sys-
tematically sell assets from one country when a crisis hits
another.
5.5. Model
The perfect model for crisis propagation would test all
possible channels at the same time – trade linkages, the
common bank lender effect and the role of financial mar-
kets. These concepts are mutually interdependent and
equally important. Such a test would require detailed data
on trade linkages (direct spillovers, the competitiveness
effect and bargaining effect), financial linkages (for instance,
a matrix of liabilities linking creditors and debtors) and the
reaction function of financial market participants. Unfortu-
nately, only an aggregated trade matrix is available – no reli-
able and comparable data on financial linkages exist – and
most importantly we do not know the reaction function.
Therefore, no comprehensive econometric modelling is
feasible, leaving only partial analysis possible. 
Recognising deficiencies in the theoretical and in partic-
ular the empirical aspects of contagion, this paper focuses
on the spread of the Russian crisis among selected CIS and
CEE countries without formal differentiation between con-
tagion and spillovers. A detailed list of analysed countries is
provided in Appendix 1. A simple probit model testing trade
linkages and the balance of payments model, as developed
by Masson (1999), which tests fundamentals (in terms of
external debt) is employed. Following this a case-by-case
analysis, supported by stylised facts, is applied to the com-
bined results of the two models. This method, in the face of
a very complex system of relations (not clearly distinctive
channels which overlap and erratic data) may have conclu-
sive power equal to that of general econometric approach-
es. However, in addition, we can gain more interesting
insights that would be overlooked in general econometric
models. 
The paper aims to categorise the analysed countries into
the following cases:
A crisis in country A caused a crisis in country B:
– country B was prone to a crisis and shock propagation
triggered the crisis,
– country B was 'healthy' and spillovers/contagion
caused it to suffer a crisis.
A crisis in country A did not cause a crisis in country B:
– country B was immune to a crisis and (disregarding if
there was or was not shock propagation),
– country B was susceptible to a crisis but no propaga-
tion mechanism occurred.
5.5.1. Definition of a Crisis
Prior to a formal analysis the issue of defining a crisis will
be tackled. From the very outset of theory dealing with cur-
rency crises, academia faced the problem of defining the
phenomenon. Questions such as when does a crisis start
and end or can a crisis be repelled are crucial in the search
to find an universal and formalised definition of crisis. As
these questions cannot be answered unambiguously no
fully-formed definition has yet been found. It seems that a
crisis should be understood as the collapse of confidence in
a domestic currency. Unfortunately, this idea is hard to mea-
sure in practice. 
Recently, however, an approach deploying the exchange
market pressure (EMP) index has been widely used. It was
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largely developed by Eichengreen et al. (1996). They
claimed that when analysing crises one should look not only
at changes in the exchange rate but also at international
reserves and interest rates. Some countries may choose to
defend their exchange rates at the cost of reserves or/and
higher interest rates. 
The deficiency of this approach lies in its mechanical
nature and dependence on the choice of weights and
thresholds. There is significant scope for the researcher to
set these parameters according to her own theoretical
predilections. This definition also does not allow one to eas-
ily differentiate between 'crisis' and a 'successful defence of
a crisis/speculative attack'. Besides, as Flood and Marion
(1998) noted, if a crisis is not fully anticipated, then interest
rats rise and reserves are depleted prior to the exact timing
of the crisis. Because of this, jumps in interest rates,
reserves and the exchange rate in the event of a crisis may
not be sufficient to be found by the EMP index.
An alternative to the EMP index is the selection of crises
based on expert knowledge. This approach is entirely sub-
jective, but makes it possible to account for those specific
features of countries under investigation that the mechani-
cal EMP approach would never be able to track down.
Given the focus on CIS countries in this research, com-
puting the identical EMP index to the index of Eichengreen
et al. (1996) is virtually impossible due to data constraints. In
particular, there is a problem with proxies of interest rates.
In the face of conceptual and data deficiencies it was decid-
ed to choose crisis-hit countries arbitrarily. Namely:
Ukraine, Moldova, the Kyrgyz Republic, Belarus, Georgia
and Kazakhstan. 
5.5.2. The Russian Crisis – Stylised Facts 
Before turning to the model basic facts on the crisis-hit
countries are provided. In particular, we focus on develop-
ments in financial markets and changes in exchange rate
arrangements. This factual background should facilitate a
better understanding of how crises spread and will serve as
a basis for further discussion. In addition, facts on financial
and trade linkages as well as some characteristics of financial
markets in CIS countries will be presented.
A chronology of the Russian crisis starts with the deval-
uation of the rouble by over 33 per cent on August 17,
1998. This decision was preceded by mounting pressures on
the currency and a change in investors sentiment. The
Moscow stock market plummeted in May and June 1998 –
the market index dropping by 40 and 21 per cent [Antczak,
2001]. The end of June saw a massive outflow of foreign
capital that was reflected in a decline in the official reserves
of the Central Bank of Russia by US$8 billion. At the same
time interest rates on GKO/OFZ securities were increased
to 130 per cent. As the crisis unfolded the exchange rate
band was abandoned on September 2, 1998 and the rouble
depreciated by a further 20 per cent the next day.
An immediate reaction was seen on the Ukrainian mar-
ket. On September 4, 1998 the National Bank of Ukraine
stopped selling foreign exchange to the market and altered
the exchange rate band from 1.8–2.25 to 2.5–3.5 Hryvnas
per US dollar [IMF, 1999d]. However, it should be stressed
that these decisions, accompanied by numerous adminis-
trative measures to control the currency market, were the
last stage of a long process. Clouds over Ukraine had been
gathering since the autumn of 1997. At the time of the
Asian crisis, a swing in investors sentiment triggered a sus-
tained outflow of capital during the remaining part of 1997
and the first 9 months of 1998. Consequently, internation-
al reserves were declining and pressures in the financial
policy mounting.
A similar scenario took place also in Moldova. Strains in
the financial system were caused by the continued high bud-
get deficit and the accumulation of external debt as well as
debt arrears. Consequently, the T-bill market was eroding
for most of 1998. Export proceeds almost immediately
ceased to flow in at the time of the Russian crisis. At the
same time money and banking conditions deteriorated con-
siderably. A drop in demand for domestic financial assets
and money was coupled with an increase in dollarisation.
With international reserves running ever lower, the Nation-
al Bank of Moldova decided to float the leu exchange rate in
early November [IMF, 1999f].
The Russian crisis had an immediate impact also on the
Kyrgyz financial markets. The som came under a heavy
pressure and, despite significant interventions from the
National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic, it had depreciated
by 11 per cent by mid-September. International reserves
consequently declined up to December and the som con-
tinued to depreciate with a considerable drop in Novem-
ber. At the same time foreign investors, in particular Russ-
ian and Kazakh banks, fled the government securities mar-
ket. In order to counteract this process, interest rates
were raised, for instance: 3-month T-bill rates rose from
22 per cent in May 1998 to 116 per cent in November
[IMF, 2000b].
The situation in Belarus was not a clear-cut case. Crisis
identification was blurred due to multiple exchange rates. At
the time of the Russian crisis there were 5 exchange rates.
Moreover, Belarus had already experienced currency tur-
moil in March 1998 and developments in Russia triggered a
second wave of the crisis. International reserves remained
stable with no sharp decline. The official exchange rate
between November and December depreciated enormous-
ly. In the event of the Russian crisis the central bank's inter-
est rates were lowered due to the desperate need of the
public finances to cover mounting deficit. Despite their sub-
sequent rise, they remained negative in real terms as infla-
tion soared. 
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In Georgia, the Russian crisis coincided with a weak fis-
cal stance. As market sentiment shifted, a sharp decline in
money demand and a considerable rise in dollarisation fol-
lowed. The T-bill market also came to an end. This reflect-
ed a lack of will on the part of the Georgina government
to increase yields and rollover the maturity of T-bills (IMF,
2000c). The tightening of monetary policy after Septem-
ber 1998 and heavy interventions from the central bank on
the exchange market to defend the lari exchange rate
drained international reserves. On December 7, 1998,
when reserves reached a low of US$64 million (an equiv-
alent of 3 weeks of imports), the monetary authorities
decided to float the exchange rate. The subsequent and
immediate depreciation of the lari against the dollar was
20 per cent. 
Kazakhstan was the last victim among the CIS coun-
tries of the Russian crisis, though the reaction of financial
markets was very rapid. As turmoil in Russia mounted, the
premium on Eurobonds issued by Kazakhstan jumped by
as high as 2000 basis points [IMF, 2000b]. This eventually
cut Kazakhs off from foreign sources of financing. In par-
ticular, credit lines from foreign banks were cut short.
After mid-1998 the average nominal rate of monthly
depreciation of the tenge against the dollar rose and hov-
ered around 1–2 per cent until March 1999. The central
bank increased interest rates in an attempt to prop up the
currency. Market-determined interest rates were also on
the rise. As the policy measures proved ineffective, the
authorities decided to float the tenge in early April 1999.
It is also important to note that Kazakhstan was also affect-
ed at that time by two other negative shocks: a decline in
oil prices and drought (lower crops), causing losses in
export revenues.
After this very brief background, the role of Russia as
an economic centre cannot be underestimated. All the
above-mentioned countries have strong economic link-
ages with Russia – both in terms of foreign trade and finan-
cial markets. However, the importance of Russia as an
export market differs quite significantly between countries
(see Table 5-1 – the complete trade matrix can be found
in Appendix 2). The exact financial linkages are hard to
pinpoint due to the lack of relevant data, though expert
knowledge suggests that in some cases they played an
important role. Many foreign investors (primarily with
Baltic states and Russian off-shore origins) were involved
in the financial markets in Russia and other CIS countries,
e.g. Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Ukraine [D¹brows-
ki, 2000]. Also, ties between banks in various CIS coun-
tries were relatively strong. Thus, the shocks of the Russ-
ian financial market in Autumn 1998 most definitely
impacted Russia's adjacent economies.
Finally, a few remarks on the nature of financial markets
should be made. In many studies on currency crises 'finan-
cial markets' have proved a very important factor, though
without much explanation of how they are defined and
what their specific characteristics are. This would appear to
be a serious case of oversight, especially in papers dealing
with the identification of the general causes of crises over a
large sample of countries given the heterogeneous nature of
financial markets. 
In order to test comprehensively the financial channels
in the spread of crises, financial markets should be defined
clearly. This would facilitate better modelling of these chan-
nels. In particular, in the case of CIS countries an analysis of
financial markets is very important as they feature many
peculiarities. Below are a few points on the nature of finan-
cial markets in CIS countries and a comparison of the basic
financial indicators of selected Asian economies. This com-
parison illustrates the importance of a clear-cut definition of
financial markets.
Financial markets (in terms of financial institutions and
mechanisms – stock markets, currency markets, govern-
ment securities markets, the banking system, and so on) are
generally poorly developed in the countries covered in this
paper (with the exception of the most advanced countries
such as the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, the Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, Turkey, and to some extent also Russia).
For instance, when looking at stock market capitalisation
(see Table 5-2) there are huge discrepancies among select-
ed Asian economies and more developed CEE countries, as
well as CIS countries. In the latter case stock markets are
virtually non-existent.
Information on the key players in financial markets
and the extent to which given countries are integrated
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Table 5-1. Trade matrix in 1997 (% of total exports)
A\B Russia Ukraine Moldova Kyrgyz Rep. Belarus Georgia Kazakhstan
Russia 26.2 58.2 16.3 64.5 30.0 33.9
Ukraine 8.5 5.6 0.8 5.9 3.5 4.8
Moldova 0.4 2.1 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.0
Kyrgyz Rep. 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0
Belarus 5.4 5.8 4.0 1.5 0.4 0.7
Georgia 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0
Kazakhstan 2.9 0.7 0.2 14.3 0.7 1.7
Source: Author's calculations based on IMF data - Direction of Trade Statistics, 2000.
Note: % of country B's exports to country A in terms of country B's total exports .
86
Marek D¹browski (ed.)
CASE Reports No. 41
Table 5-2. Stocks traded, total value (% of GDP)
1996 1997 1998 1996 1997 1998
Armenia - 0.06 0.05 Albania - - -
Azerbaijan - - - Bulgaria - - 0.10
Belarus - - - Czech Rep. 14.56 13.31 8.41
Estonia - 31.15 18.20 Hungary 3.63 16.81 33.75
Georgia - - - Macedonia, FYR - - -
Kazakhstan - - - Poland 3.87 5.57 5.63
Kyrgyz Rep. 0.00 0.00 - Romania 0.02 0.77 1.55
Latvia 0.23 1.49 1.34 Slovak Rep. 12.36 11.13 5.09
Lithuania 0.60 2.49 2.07 Slovenia 2.12 1.93 3.59
Moldova - - - Turkey 20.27 31.00 34.52
Tajikistan - - - Average 8.12 11.50 11.58
Turkmenistan - - - China 31.35 41.14 29.69
Ukraine - - 0.12 Hong Kong 107.99 281.88 123.72
Uzbekistan 0.30 0.14 - India 6.70 12.82 15.00
Russia 0.71 3.75 2.46 Indonesia 14.14 19.30 10.31
Average 0.37 5.58 4.04 Korea 34.08 35.73 42.98
Malaysia 172.10 146.74 39.78
Philippines 30.80 24.08 15.35
Singapore 46.72 67.22 60.13
Thailand 24.45 15.51 18.62
Average 52.04 71.60 39.51
Source: World Development Indicators 2000, World Bank.
Notes: Averages do not take into account missing observations.
Table 5-3. Bank loans as a percentage of GDP, 1996-1999
1996 1997 1998 1999 1996 1997 1998 1999
Armenia 1.44 2.26 3.16 2.32 Albania 1.97 2.10 2.39 1.50
Azerbaijan 0.93 0.62 0.36 2.18 Bulgaria 15.32 12.23 5.98 5.04
Belarus 2.64 2.11 2.12 2.26 Czech Rep. 14.99 16.67 16.36 15.59
Estonia 2.71 14.82 19.05 12.07 Hungary 13.06 13.21 15.06 13.49
Georgia 3.03 0.52 1.26 -0.15 Macedonia, FYR 0.61 1.43 1.73 3.73
Kazakhstan 3.71 3.45 3.79 5.69 Poland 3.20 4.61 5.87 7.06
Kyrgyz Rep. 2.37 3.29 5.41 6.39 Romania 7.52 7.52 6.33 6.35
Latvia 1.87 2.94 6.16 5.40 Slovak Rep. 11.73 20.77 21.24 15.16
Lithuania 3.00 4.57 8.10 8.34 Slovenia 5.55 5.70 6.78 9.90
Moldova 1.65 1.74 1.76 4.30 Turkey 13.09 14.74 15.87 19.61
Tajikistan 0.48 2.57 6.90 5.96 Average 8.70 9.90 9.76 9.74
Turkmenistan 19.59 33.08 36.03 33.85 China 9.53 12.13 8.10 6.27
Ukraine 2.44 2.52 2.19 2.16 Hong Kong 298.79 271.63 189.09 155.18
Uzbekistan 2.56 2.71 3.79 5.84 India 5.04 5.15 4.74 4.66
Russia 12.33 12.04 18.30 22.27 Indonesia 24.61 30.33 52.12 27.92
Average 4.05 5.95 7.89 7.92 Korea 18.34 21.30 18.51 14.31
Malaysia 22.13 26.78 27.38 21.22
Philippines 14.77 20.41 19.50 18.95
Singapore 311.24 331.10 314.80 253.73
Thailand 52.98 55.10 42.20 26.03
Average 84.16 85.99 75.16 58.70
Source: Author's calculations based on BIS debt data and IMF World Economic Outlook GDP data. 
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into the international financial community are of signifi-
cance. The degree of integration can be demonstrated by
the share of bank loans as a percentage of GDP (see
Table 5-3). It is clearly evident that CIS countries enjoyed
very small bank loans as a percentage of GDP (with the
exception of Estonia, Russia, and Turkmenistan). The
average in these countries ranges between 4 and 8 per
cent over the period 1996–1999, whereas in CEE and
Asian countries it ranges between 8–10 and 58–86 per
cent, respectively. This data also highlights the difference
in the creditor structure. Tables 5-3 and 5-4 illustrate that
the dependence of CIS countries on financing from inter-
national organisations (proxied with multilateral claims –
i.e., loans from the Asian Development Bank, the use of
IMF credit, IBRD loans and IDA credits from the World
Bank) is far greater than in Asian countries. It is also much
greater than the dependence on private sources (proxied
with bank loans).
When discussing financial linkages in CIS countries one
cannot ignore capital flows related to remittance given that
labour emigration has been pervasive. These flows have
been very important especially for Georgia, Armenia, and
Moldova (D¹browski, 2000). Many citizens of these coun-
tries used to work in Russia and transfer their income back
home. The crisis-driven depreciation of the Russian rouble
against the dollar caused remittance flows in dollar terms to
drop significantly.
Finally, it should be stressed that many CIS economies
are characterised by high dollarisation (e.g., Georgia, the
Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Ukraine). Thus, one could say
that these economies were in a state of permanent crisis, if
a crisis is understood in terms of lack of confidence in a cur-
rency. In this respect, the behaviour of households was also
an important additional factor in creating crisis pressure.
Therefore, private domestic entities should be treaded as a
part of financial markets as well. When the crisis came,
households in many CIS countries got out of domestic cur-
rencies and bought dollars, contrary to the situation in the
Asian economies during the 1997 crisis.
The above facts indicate that, analysis of the crises prop-
agation via financial channels should take into account inter-
national organisations owing to the considerable role they
play in these economies as compared to private investors.
Further investigation of the role of the IMF in the spread of
crises would be extremely interesting. The behaviour of
international organisations may vary considerably from
country to country. One could argue that the IMF may be
far less concerned about financial turmoil in small
economies like the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, etc. because
the implications for the international stability of financial
markets are negligible and the potential costs of bailouts and
assistance programmes relatively low. 
Bearing in mind these characteristics of financial markets
it should be said that the testing of the role played by finan-
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Table 5-4. Multilateral claims as a percentage of GDP, 1996-1999
1996 1997 1998 1999 1996 1997 1998 1999
Armenia 14.94 22.14 22.54 28.59 Albania 6.99 8.14 8.89 10.09
Azerbaijan 5.89 8.47 10.70 16.38 Bulgaria 10.68 13.69 13.76 15.41
Belarus 2.85 2.82 2.56 2.74 Czech Rep. 0.77 0.73 0.65 0.61
Estonia 3.26 2.76 2.28 2.26 Hungary 5.22 3.77 1.44 1.40
Georgia 9.29 11.23 19.92 24.58 Macedonia, FYR 5.36 8.28 10.41 12.11
Kazakhstan 5.43 5.58 6.70 10.96 Poland 1.58 1.47 1.31 1.36
Kyrgyz Rep. 21.46 26.14 37.11 60.04 Romania 4.88 5.69 4.70 6.24
Latvia 4.05 3.64 3.93 3.88 Slovak Rep. 3.16 2.54 2.07 1.88
Lithuania 4.37 4.13 3.89 4.01 Slovenia 0.86 0.74 0.65 0.53
Moldova 20.40 17.27 20.05 35.53 Turkey 2.99 2.33 1.91 1.68
Tajikistan 3.55 6.19 11.65 21.09 Average 4.25 4.74 4.58 5.13
Turkmenistan 0.13 0.22 0.31 0.21 China 2.11 2.05 2.19 2.34
Ukraine 6.17 7.54 9.86 16.27 Hong Kong 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Uzbekistan 2.83 2.56 2.61 2.57 India 8.26 7.44 7.13 7.05
Russia 3.36 3.98 9.17 12.64 Indonesia 7.84 7.36 25.18 19.32
Average 7.20 8.31 10.89 16.12 Korea 0.49 0.42 8.87 4.59
Malaysia 1.45 1.29 1.99 1.83
Philippines 10.36 10.36 12.77 12.55
Singapore 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Thailand 1.59 2.94 6.43 6.78
Average 3.57 3.54 7.17 6.05
Average* 4.58 4.55 9.22 7.78
Source: Author's calculations based on BIS debt data and IMF World Economic Outlook GDP data. 
Note: * - excluding Hong Kong and Singapore.
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cial channels in CIS countries is more difficult than is the case
in developed markets. Theoretically, it would be easier to
identify the reaction function of investors if there were no
distortions in the markets. This is definitely not the case for
CIS countries as multiple (Belarus and Uzbekistan) or dou-
ble exchange rate systems (Turkmenistan) and restrictions
on foreign currency transactions (Belarus) exist. In addition,
the availability and reliability of financial data is far worse
than in developed countries. On the other hand, the multi-
plicity of financial instruments in developed economies does
not make the analysis easier. 
5.5.3. The Probit Model
In order to test the role of trade linkages (and, in turn,
of spillovers) in the propagation of the Russian crisis we have
estimated a simple probit model. The crisis is defined with a
binary variable (1 – crisis occurred, 0 no crisis occurred).
Russia represents the ground-zero country. Of the 24 coun-
tries in the sample (a detailed list is provided in Appendix 1),
6 were identified as crisis-hit countries (Belarus, Georgia,
Moldova, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, and Ukraine).
Given the numerous problems with data availability and reli-
ability the crisis variable is explained only with the use of
trade shares and a single macroeconomic variable. 
The trade variable is constructed so as to indicate the
importance in any given crisis-hit country of export markets.
This is the cumulative share of exports in their total exports.
As such, this variable takes into account not only the ground-
zero country, but also those countries that were infected
with the crisis previously. For countries that did not experi-
ence the crisis it is the cumulative share of exports to all cri-
sis-hit countries. The shares are based on annual data from
1997. 1998 was not chosen as the reference year as the con-
siderable devaluations/deprecations that occurred in this
year could bias the results. It was decided to incorporate
only the direct trade channel (see Section 5.3), as no detailed
data on the commodity structure of analysed countries were
available and it was thus impossible to make any inference in
terms of the competition effect in third markets or the bar-
gaining effect. 
The higher the share of exports to crisis-hit countries
(i.e., countries that devalued/depreciated their currencies),
the higher probability, ceteris paribus, of a trade balance
deterioration in the given country. As a consequence, this
may lead to a balance of payments crisis. Thus, the expect-
ed sign of this variable in the model is positive. At this point
is should be stressed that trade statistics in CIS countries are
widely deemed to be erratic and thus should be treaded
with great caution. This problem stems primarily from
'transparent' borders, low statistical coverage, discrepancies
due to the translation into dollars and the large share of
barter and shuttle trade.
Due to hard data constraints (both with regard to avail-
ability and reliability) the macroeconomic variable covers
only the ratio of total reserves minus gold (as of the end of
the third quarter of 1998) to exports (for 1998 as a whole,
fob).  The higher the ratio, the lower probability that a
shock to the trade balance will cause balance of payments
problems (higher/lower trade deficit/surplus can be financed
with reserves). Therefore, this coefficient's sign should be
negative.
A richer set of macroeconomic variables would seem to
be more instructive and an occurrence of the omitted vari-
able error less probable. Unfortunately, the small sample
size made it impossible to estimate such a model. In various
papers macroeconomic variables are added in order to con-
trol for differences in these variables across countries. For
instance, Glick and Rose (1999) inserted credit growth, bud-
get balance to GDP, current account balance to GDP, GDP
growth, M2 to reserves and inflation. However, as Pritsker
(2000) noted, the inclusion of fundamentals is not the same
as controlling for them in an economic model.  Properly
controlling the role of fundamental is possible only when all
the ways in which the fundamentals can influence the eco-
nomic situation are identified. 
Prior to turning to the discussion of results, the problem
of 'time inconsistency' in the variables of the above model
should be brought to attention. The variables are measured
at different points in time, which is conceptually incorrect.
On reason behind such a situation is the previously dis-
cussed problem of defining the moments of crisis outbreak
and elapse. The other handicap is the lack of high-frequen-
cy data. For instance, in the case of this paper's country cov-
erage debt data are only available on an annual basis with
some exceptions on a quarterly basis. The problem is even
more profound when ratios are used. In this case variables
are usually not only measured in different points in time, but
also stock and flow variables are mixed. The long time-scale
of crisis spreading under the investigation here does not
make things easier, especially if it covers the turn of two
years. 
A potential solution to this problem could be the
employment of multiperiod multinomial discrete choice and
discrete/continuous econometric specifications with flexible
correlation structures in unobservables as developed by
Hajivassiliou and McFadden (1990). They illustrated that the
estimation of these models based on simulation methods
has attractive statistical properties and is computationally
tractable. The models were applied to an analysis of exter-
nal debt crises in developing countries. 
The detailed results of the estimatesion are presented in
Appendix 3. Below we outline only the probabilities of a cri-
sis in a given country as computed in the model (see Table
5-5). Given a cut-off point of 50 per cent, the model pre-
dicted one crisis out of six and also two crises which did not
happen. The former case applies to the Kyrgyz Republic.
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This is hardly surprising given its low official share of exports
to Russia and other crisis-hit countries. However, there are
reasons – discussed later in this paper – to expect a stronger
trade impact than the official data suggest. The model pre-
dicts a crisis in Lithuania (mainly due to its very high share of
exports compared to crisis-hit countries – of over 45 per
cent) as well as in Tajikistan, where the ratio of reserves to
exports was very low, at 11.1 per cent (whereas the trade
share remained small – around 11 per cent). Given the
above result, one should seek other explanations as to why
these countries did or did not experience a crisis. 
It should be also noted that if the cut-off threshold was
set at 75 per cent, then the model would fail to predict a cri-
sis not only in the Kyrgyz Republic but also in Georgia,
though the non-crisis cases would be fully identified. For
this reason sensitivity to the cut-off threshold should be
taken into consideration in further analysis. 
The small size of the sample, poor quality data, time
inconsistency in the variables as well as conceptual short-
comings of the above model all oblige one to treat these
results with caution. The result should be treated as a rough
indicator pointing to which trade links were helpful in
explaining the propagation of crises which not. In order to
gain more insights into how the Russian crisis spread back-
of-the-envelope calculations within the framework of a bal-
ance of payments model are conducted.
5.5.4. The Balance of Payments Model
Masson's (1999) simple balance of payments model is
capable of demonstrating how a large enough shock to the
current account can trigger a crisis if foreign debt servicing
exceeds a certain level. Borrowing costs reflect expecta-
tions of crisis. Higher interest rates make debt servicing
more expensive and can deplete reserves, which in turn
may lead to devaluation. In this framework, the size of
external debt is an important determinant of when a crisis
breaks out.
Given the level of external debt, the size of the expect-
ed devaluation, expectations with regard to the trade bal-
ance and the standard deviation of the trade balance shock
one can calculate levels of fundamentals (i.e., a level of
reserves as a percentage of GDP) that set ranges in which:
i) devaluation probability is uniquely defined and close to
zero; ii) devaluation probability can take three different val-
ues – multiple equilibria; iii) devaluation probability is
uniquely defined and close to 1.
The respective levels of reserves as a percentage of
GDP are computed according to the following formula:
Rmin, max ≡ Φmin, max - Et(Tt+1) + r*D + Rc,
where T is the foreign trade balance, D is the stock of for-
eign debt, r* – the risk-neutral interest rate that must be
compensated to investors given the expectations of devalu-
ation (δ), Rc – the critical level of reserves – if reserves fall
below this level crisis occurs. Φ ≡ Et [bt+1] and the min and
max values are derived from the conditions on multiple
equilibria occurrence derived from Jeanne (1997) and Mas-
son (1999).
In order to compute Rmin, max and Φmin, max one has to
assume a level of expected devaluation (δ), the variance of the
trade balance equation σ (ε = [Tt - r*D + Rt-1 - Rc] - Φt-1), the
expected trade balance (Et [Tt+1]), the risk-neutral interest
rate (r*) and the critical level of reserves (Rc). Besides this,
the stock of external debt (D) and the level of reserves (R)
must be known. Given these inputs one can determine the
probability of a crisis (πt) in a given country at a certain point
in time according to the following algorithm:
if
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Table 5-5. The Results of the Probit Model
Actual Fitted
probability
Cut-off
= 0.50
Cut-off
= 0.75
Actual Fitted
probability
Cut-off
= 0.50
Cut-off
= 0.75
1 Ukraine 1 0.9154 1 1 13 Latvia 0 0.1640 0 0
2 Moldova 1 0.9474 1 1 14 Lithuania 0 0.5277 1 0
3 Kyrgyz Rep. 1 0.1411 0 0 15 Poland 0 0.0000 0 0
4 Belarus 1 1.0000 1 1 16 Romania 0 0.0109 0 0
5 Georgia 1 0.5739 1 0 17 Slovak Rep. 0 0.0424 0 0
6 Kazakhstan 1 0.8924 1 1 18 Slovenia 0 0.0013 0 0
7 Armenia 0 0.0000 0 0 19 Tajikistan 0 0.5309 1 0
8 Azerbaijan 0 0.0011 0 0 20 Turkey 0 0.0000 0 0
9 Bulgaria 0 0.0000 0 0 21 Turkmenistan 0 0.0000 0 0
10 Czech Rep. 0 0.0002 0 0 22 Albania 0 0.0000 0 0
11 Estonia 0 0.3009 0 0 23 Croatia 0 0.0000 0 0
12 Hungary 0 0.0018 0 0 24 Macedonia, FYR 0 0.0656 0 0
Source: Author's calculations.
 < Rmin  πt ≈ 1
Rt  ∈ [Rmin, Rmax] then  multiple equilibria
 > Rmax  πt ≈ 0
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Given the focus here on the Russian crisis and its
impact the probability of a crisis outbreak at the end of
1997 over a one-year period is determined. In the exer-
cise the following assumptions were made: the level of
expected devaluation (δ) was set at 20 per cent, which is
well below depreciations that took place in some crisis-hit
countries; the expected trade balance was the actual
trade balance at the end of 1998, the risk-neutral rate was
equal to the German 1-year inter-bank interest rate at the
end of 1997 (r* = 4.53 per cent) and the critical reserve
level (Rc) was set at 1 per cent of GDP. The biggest prob-
lem was estimating the variance of the trade balance (σ)
due to the lack of sufficient number of observations. Thus,
as no other option was feasible, it was arbitrarily assumed
for every country. Sensitivity tests of this parameter on
the final outcome proved that it does not influence inter-
ference significantly. It is likely, however, that in some
cases the computation of the Rmin and Rmax would not be
possible given the estimated values of σ.
When considering data issues the problem of debt
should be brought to the agenda. The logic of Masson's
(1999) model applies primarily to domestic currency
denominated external debt because this accounts for the
perspective of foreign investors. Noting et as a spot
exchange rate at time t and et+1 the spot exchange rate
for the next period (if devaluation does not occur then
et+1 = et), the ex ante logarithm of the return on liabili-
ties denominated in local currency can be written as fol-
lows:
Thus, as Masson (1999) points out, a risk-neutral
investor must be compensated by the neutral-risk interest
rate plus the probability of devaluation (πt) times its size
(δ).
However, Masson (1999) proves that the model may
also suit the foreign currency denominated debt (not sub-
ject to devaluation risk), only if there is a risk of default. In
general terms, the threat of devaluation and default are
linked: devaluation makes it harder to repay debts as it
increases the chances for default, and, conversely, defaults
may induce devaluations in order to boost net exports in
the face of the drop in capital inflows. If one assumes this
in the event of partial default (of amount δ), it can be
demonstrated that the ex ante logarithm return on assets
is equal to:
where Vt and Vt+1 are values of assets at period t and t+1,
respectively. If the default does not take place, then Vt+1 =
Vt. 
There is also the issue of debt maturity. In the model
only debt with maturity of 1 year (the horizon of investors'
expectations) should be taken into account. However, data
constraints make such an analysis virtually impossible.
Besides, the risk of default may be an argument in favour of
the inclusion of total debt disregarding maturity structure.
The results of the calculations in the framework of the
Masson (1999) balance of payments model are shown in
Table 5-6. They indicate that most of the countries under
investigation (18 out of 24) had fundamentals at the end of
1997 that were conducive to the outbreak of crisis. Only
two fell in the multiple region (Bulgaria and Poland) and 5
featured 'healthy' fundamentals (the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Russia, Slovenia, Turkmenistan). Among the countries
with a low probability of crisis, Russia and Turkmenistan
deserve closer examination. Russia, despite its very low
reserves (even by the standards of the sample countries)
and significant external debt, recorded a substantial trade
surplus of 6.2 per cent of GDP. The latter meant the calcu-
lated values of Rmin and Rmax became negative and thus unre-
liable.  It should be noted that the high surplus in Russia has
been overestimated as the deficit in shuttle trade is not
included. In the case of Turkmenistan, very high reserves
(over 47 per cent) made it, according to the model, resistant
to balance of payments shocks.
The frequent occurrence of high probabilities of crisis in
the sample should not be surprising given the structure of
the employed balance of payments model. These results
may be viewed as biased to some extent. There are two
main reasons behind this. First, most of the countries were
characterised with high debt and trade deficit ratios. Trade
deficits seem to be a permanent feature of developing and
transition economies. Therefore, assuming the perfect fore-
sight of trade balances and their natural low value (not nec-
essarily as a consequence of external shock) the model
tends to indicate a high probability of a crisis.  In general
terms, emerging and developing countries suffer capital defi-
ciencies and are therefore notorious for having various
financial and macroeconomic imbalances. It this case, it
could be inferred that crises stems primarily from these
imbalances. The shock propagation appears to be the final
nail in the country's coffin. 
Second, the inclusion of total external debt may also
cause a bias in the same direction. In addition to the divi-
sion into short- and long-term debt, one should pay atten-
tion to the creditor structure. Many countries were
indebted to a large extent to international organisations
such as the World Bank, the IMF, etc. (see Table 5-7). In
many developing countries these loans have long maturi-
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Et [ln (1+rt)/(et + et+1)]    =  Et [ ln(1 + rt) – ln(et+1/et)]
 = πt* [ ln(1 + rt) – ln(et+1/et)]+
     + (1 – πt) *
    * [ ln(1 + rt) – ln(et+1/et)]
 = ln (1 + rt) – πt* ln(1 + δ)
 ≈ rt - πtδ.
Et [ln (1+rt)/(Vt + Vt+1)]   ≈  rt - πtδ,
91
Currency Crises in Emerging Markets – Selected Comparative ...
ties and feature concessional clauses. In this respect, even
the heavy exposure to foreign financing may bear very dif-
ferent consequences for risk of devaluation or default.
This problem highlights the importance of cautious analy-
sis of financial markets as was already pointed out (see
Section 5.5.2.).
Finally, it should be noted that the definition of good and
bad fundamentals could include a broader set of macroeco-
nomic variables (e.g., public finance debt, current account
balance, inflation, unemployment, the structure of foreign
capital flows, etc.). However, given the limited scope of this
paper and problems with deciding on a system of universal
and formal assessment of various fundamentals such an
analysis is not pursued. In addition, the implications of the
exchange rate arrangement should be taken into considera-
tion. For instance, countries that adopted a currency board
system may sustain higher current account deficits without
inflicting devaluation risks and thus should be assessed on a
different basis than countries with other exchange rate
arrangements. 
Bearing in mind all these reservations we can turn to a
comparison of the results obtained in the probit and balance
of payments models and focus on a case-by-case analysis.
The combined outcome of the two analyses is presented in
Table 5-8. Significant/insignificant trade linkages are deter-
mined on the basis of the probit model, whereas good/bad
fundamentals are determined on the basis of our back-of-
the-envelope calculations in the manner deployed by Mas-
son (1999). 
From Table 5-8 it is clear that most countries that did
not experience a crisis (Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Croa-
tia, Estonia, Latvia, Macedonia FYR, the Slovak Republic,
Turkey, Turkmenistan) had bad fundamentals though there
was insufficient crisis propagation to trigger crises there (at
least in terms of trade linkages, as no formal inferences
about financial linkages can be drawn). However, as was
noted earlier, the criteria for 'bad fundamentals' could be
biased and tend to indicate more frequently those countries
with bad rather than good fundamentals. Thus, the group
may incorporate countries that either had bad fundamentals
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Table 5-6. Calculations of crisis probabilities in the Masson (1999) balance of payments model
Reserves
as % of
GDP
Debt as
% of
GDP
Variance
of
trade
shock
Expected
value
of trade
balance
Rmin Rmax Crisis Multiple
Equilibria
No
Crisis
1 Albania 13.5 33.1 2.0 -19.7 25.2 25.9 1
2 Armenia 14.0 48.0 3.0 -30.4 38.0 38.8 1
3 Azerbaijan 11.5 14.8 1.0 -25.2 28.2 28.4 1
4 Belarus 2.9 17.2 1.0 -9.9 13.2 13.5 1
5 Bulgaria 22.2 95.0 5.0 -3.1 16.4 19.4 1
6 Croatia 12.6 37.1 2.0 -19.1 24.9 26.0 1
7 Czech Rep. 18.4 40.3 3.0 -4.7 11.5 11.6 1
8 Estonia 16.3 57.1 4.0 -21.4 30.5 30.9 1
9 Georgia 5.8 43.7 3.0 -28.1 35.3 35.6 1
10 Hungary 18.4 51.9 4.0 -5.0 13.5 13.6 1
11 Kazakhstan 7.6 26.9 2.0 -3.7 8.5 8.6 1
12 Kyrgyz Rep. 9.6 76.8 5.0 -13.6 25.2 26.2 1
13 Latvia 12.5 48.4 3.0 -18.6 26.2 27.0 1
14 Lithuania 10.5 33.8 2.0 -14.1 19.7 20.4 1
15 Macedonia, FYR 6.9 30.5 2.0 -12.1 17.4 17.7 1
16 Moldova 16.7 47.9 3.0 -20.1 27.7 28.5 1
17 Poland 14.3 36.0 2.0 -8.2 13.9 14.9 1
18 Romania 10.8 30.1 2.0 -6.3 11.5 11.9 1
19 Russia 3.0 29.8 2.0 6.2 -1.0 -0.7 1
20 Slovak Rep. 16.6 50.9 4.0 -11.5 19.9 19.9 1
21 Slovenia 17.4 22.9 1.5 -4.0 8.2 8.4 1
22 Tajikistan 2.7 98.5 5.0 -11.1 24.7 28.2 1
23 Turkey 9.8 47.8 3.0 -7.1 14.7 15.4 1
24 Turkmenistan 47.9 65.3 5.0 -18.3 28.7 28.8 1
25 Ukraine 5.4 23.5 1.5 -6.2 10.4 10.8 1
Source: Author's calculations.
Note: Calculations made on the following assumptions: r* = 4.31 per cent, δ = 20 per cent, Rc = 1 per cent of GDP.
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and no crisis propagation (both via trade and financial chan-
nels) or had relatively good fundamentals and crisis propa-
gation (if any) was not strong enough to trigger financial tur-
moil. Unfortunately, the data and tools available make it
impossible to differentiate between these cases in a formal
manner. 
Five countries (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, and Slovenia) proved to be in 'healthy' condition
(Bulgaria and Poland had tendencies to multiple equilibria)
and have insignificant trade linkages.  As these countries did
not experience a crisis, it seems reasonable to assume that
there was also not enough crisis propagation via financial
channels.
Lithuania and Tajikistan turned out to be interesting
cases. These countries were not defined as crisis-hit, though
both the probit model and balance of payments model indi-
cate that they should have had crises. Although Tajikistan
was not chosen as a crisis-hit country it experienced depre-
ciation of its rouble in November 1998. But this can be
ignored given the reasons presented in the discussion on the
probit model's results (its trade share was actually small) and
probably should be included in the group of countries with
insignificant trade linkages. 
So why did Lithuania not succumb to crisis? 45 per cent of
its exports in 1997 went to crisis-hit countries (only 24.5 per
cent to Russia), its external debt stood at 33.8 per cent of
GDP (28.2 per cent excluding multilateral claims). What was
special about Lithuania (and can serve as an explanation to the
question) was its exchange rate regime. In April 1994 Lithua-
nia adopted the currency board arrangement. When the cri-
sis broke out in Russia, the Lithuanian authorities halted the
implementation of a policy to abolish the exchange rate
arrangement over the medium term [IMF, 1999e]. Thus, their
strong determination to maintain the currency board could
serve as a strong reputational signal and deter investors spec-
ulation. In addition, the currency board's automatic mecha-
nisms jump-started heavy sales of foreign exchange to the
banking system and this propped up the exchange rate. Fur-
thermore, interest rates, which automatically went up, also
help a great deal. Throughout the period of financial turmoil
in Russia international reserves remained at a comfortable
level covering over 100 per cent of the litas' liabilities. 
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Table 5-7. Share of multilateral claims in total external debt (per cent)
1997 1998 1997 1998
1 Albania 25.4 35.9 14 Lithuania 16.7 12.9
2 Armenia 59.1 54.5 15 Macedonia 27.4 31.9
3 Azerbaijan 61.4 78.1 16 Moldova 46.4 36.9
4 Belarus 17.9 15.9 17 Poland 4.4 4.2
5 Bulgaria 14.6 17.4 18 Romania 23.3 20.6
6 Croatia 8.7 7.2 19 Russia 12.8 19.0
7 Czech Republic 1.9 1.7 20 Slovak Republic 6.4 4.3
8 Estonia 9.2 4.5 21 Slovenia 3.5 3.1
9 Georgia 28.8 35.6 22 Tajikistan 8.1 13.8
10 Hungary 6.2 2.9 23 Turkey 5.3 4.2
11 Kazakhstan 29.8 24.6 24 Turkmenistan 0.9 0.7
12 Kyrgyz Republic 40.0 44.5 25 Ukraine 35.8 34.9
13 Latvia 10.1 8.8
Source: Author's calculations based on EBRD (total external debt) and BIS data (multilateral claims).
Note: Multilateral claims - loans from the Asian Development Bank, use of IMF credit and IBRD loans and IDA credits from the World Bank. 
Table 5-8. Comparison of the results of the probit and balance of payments models
Crisis No crisis
Good fundamentals Bad fundamentals Good fundamentals Bad fundamentals
Significant
trade linkages
Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan, Moldova,
Ukraine
Lithuania, Tajikistan
Insignificant
trade linkages Kyrgyz Republic
Bulgaria*,
Czech Republic,
Hungary,
Poland*,
Slovenia
Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Croatia,
Estonia, Latvia,
Macedonia FYR,
Slovak Republic.
Turkey, Turkmenistan
Source: Author's calculations.
Notes: * - multiple equilibria.
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The second interesting case is the Kyrgyz Republic.  In
terms of official trade linkages one could have expected
the country to avoid a currency crisis given its low share of
exports to crisis-hit countries. However, these figures may
be slightly misleading. IMF trade statistics do not include
shuttle trade. It is believed that such trade constitutes a
large share of official trade figures (both with respect to
imports and exports). The geographic structure of shuttle
trade should not differ significantly from registered trade
flows. Thus, in principle, the share of exports to crisis-hit
countries, in particularly to Russia, should be higher, if
accounting for shuttle trade, and consequently, the trade
model should have been able to predict a crisis in the Kyr-
gyz Republic. In addition, although external debt (excluding
multilateral claims) at over 40 per cent of GDP (see
Appendix 4) was not that high by regional standards, it
seems that financial channels were the underlying cause of
the propagation of the crisis. At the end of 1997, 18.7 per
cent of the country's external public debt was owed to CIS
creditors on a non-concessional basis and this was roughly
at the level of international reserves excluding gold. Thus,
the withdrawal of Russian and Kazakh creditors [IMF,
1999c] could have impacted the market, especially in the
face of a very shallow exchange rate market. Moreover, a
lack of confidence in the som was also expressed on the
household side – high dollarisation and low household
banking deposits are a fact in the Kyrgyz Republic. Finally,
it should be noted that external pressures in the aftermath
of the Russian crisis coincided with other unfavourable
developments. Kyrgyz exports were hit by protectionist
trade measures introduced by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
– important trading partners – and the drop in gold prices
in 1998. Gold comprises a significant share of official Kyr-
gyz exports. These two factors definitely increased the
odds of a crisis in the Kyrgyz Republic.
Summarising these results, one can say that all of the cri-
sis-hit countries should be classified as having conditions
conducive to crisis and that the actual timing of crises was
determined by the shock propagation (both trade and finan-
cial channels were important). These conducive conditions
do not have to be defined only in terms of the balance of
payments model, but also in terms of various macroeco-
nomic imbalances that were present in many analysed coun-
tries (for instance high current account and budget deficits).
It would be also interesting to know if any of the crisis-
inflicted countries would have had a crisis regardless of
developments in Russia. Unfortunately, there are no formal
tools to assess such a possibility, though one could make an
expert guess based on the available information. Among
others, Ukraine would have appeared to be such a country.
As Markiewicz (2001) noted, Ukraine had been on the
verge of crisis for some time prior to the financial turmoil in
Russia and the later developments only hastened the melt-
down. Also Moldova, the Kyrgyz Republic, Georgia and
Belarus, with profound fiscal imbalance problems, were
exposed to currency crisis risks. 
In the case of countries that did not experience crises
two groups are represented. The first comprises economies
that proved to be immune to financial turmoil and trade-
related spillovers. Financial linkages were insufficient to
change this. On the other hand, a second group was identi-
fied as having bad fundamentals and thus prone to crises. As
they did not actually suffer turmoil this tends to suggest that
the propagation mechanisms were not present. However, it
should be stressed that the differentiation between 'healthy'
and 'ill' countries is far from perfect. 
On top of the above-mentioned channels by which crisis
were spread in the Russian case one should also note the
psychological factor suggested by D¹browski (2000)  which
refers in particular to FSU states. The legacy of former inte-
gration and centralisation in the framework of the USSR's
command economy inclined many politicians, economists as
well as ordinary people to think that economic develop-
ments in Russian must follow the same path in other FSU
states. As such, in the aftermath of the Russian crisis there
were strong expectations of financial turmoil in other CIS
countries. In some cases – the Kyrgyz Republic and Kaza-
khstan – this proved a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
5.6. Conclusions
The recent wave of currency crises in the 1980s and
1990s has led to a resumption of studies on this economic
phenomenon and, in particular, on the propagation of crisis.
Despite the proliferation of studies and advancements in
theory and empirical research, there are still some unclear
aspects. One reason behind this is the problem of finding a
universal and formal definition of crisis as well as of conta-
gion. Nonetheless, there is a consensus over the channels by
which crisis spread. These are multiple equilibria, endoge-
nous liquidity shock (or common bank lender), political con-
tagion, trade, and common aggregate shocks. Empirical test-
ing took one of two paths: testing if contagion was present
and testing what influences the propagation. The former
generally used correlation-coefficient based models, while
the latter used limited dependent variable models. Both
approaches suffer from econometric problems of omitted
variables, heteroscedasticity, and endogeneity. 
This paper claims that empirical research lags behind the
development of contagion theory because of: problems of
crisis definition, real world complexities, the mutual deter-
mination of various channels that cannot be single out – for
instance interdependence of fundamentals and expectations
of financial markets and finally the impossibility of properly
incorporating financial markets. The latter stems primarily
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from the heterogeneity of financial markets, probably
instantaneous changes in parameters of their reaction func-
tions and informational asymmetries. 
Recognising these problems and data constraints (both
with regard to availability and reliability) the paper analyses
the propagation of the Russian crisis among 24 CEE and CIS
countries. The simple probit model and the balance of pay-
ments model developed by Masson (1999) have been
employed. The former identified the significance of trade
links and the latter the stance of fundamentals in terms of
debt exposure and susceptibility to trade balance shocks.
Given their methodological and data deficiencies the results
have been treated with caution. Thus, they were analysed
against the background of stylised facts and specific features
of financial markets in CIS countries. 
The research proved that the propagation of crises took
place mostly in countries with very bad fundamentals and
strong trade linkages to the ground-zero country – Russia.
However, the linkages were not the whole story as in the
case of Lithuania the exchange rate regime acted as a suc-
cessful defender against the crisis or, as in the case of the
Kyrgyz Republic, the small official trade exposure did not
prevent financial factors from triggering a crisis. 
Among countries not affected by crises many were
found to be in poor condition, though the crisis propagation
was not able to trigger financial turmoil due to a lack of sig-
nificant trade and financial linkages. 
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Appendix 1. Country list and their exchange rate arrangements as for end-1997
Country Currency Exchange rate arrangement
1 Albania lek Independent floating
2 Armenia dram Independent floating
3 Azerbaijan manat Independent floating
4 Belarus roubel Managed floating with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate
5 Bulgaria lev Currency board arrangement (DM and euro)
6 Croatia kuna Pegged exchange rate with horizontal bands
7 Czech Rep. koruna Managed floating with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate
8 Estonia kroon Currency board arrangement (euro)
9 Georgia lari Managed floating
10 Hungary forint Crawling band (euro and US$)
11 Kazakhstan tenge Managed floating with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate
12 Kyrgyz Rep. som Managed floating with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate
13 Latvia lats Conventional pegged arrangement (SDR basket)
14 Lithuania litas Currency board arrangement (US$)
15 Macedonia denar Conventional pegged arrangement
16 Moldova leu Independent floating
17 Poland zloty Crawling band (US$and DM)
18 Romania leu Managed floating with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate
19 Russia rouble Managed floating with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate
20 Slovak Rep. koruna Conventional pegged arrangement (US$ and DM)
21 Slovenia tolar Managed floating with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate
22 Tajikistan rouble Managed floating with no pre-announced path for the exchange rate
23 Turkey lira Crawling peg
24 Turkmenistan manat Managed floating
25 Uk i h i P d h i h h i l b dSource: Exchange Rate Arrangements 1998 and 1999, IMF.
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Appendix 2. Trade matrix
Albania
Arme-
nia
Azer-
baijan
Belarus Bulgaria Croatia
Czech
Rep.
Estonia
Geor-
gia
Hunga-
ry
Kaza-
khstan
Kyrgyz
Rep.
Latvia
Albania - - - 0.5 0.1 - - - 0.1 - - -
Armenia - - - 0.3 - - - 8.3 - - - -
Azerbaijan - - 0.1 0.3 - - - 10.9 - 0.4 0.5 0.1
Belarus - 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.4 0.4 0.3 0.7 1.5 3.2
Bulgaria - - 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.3 - 3.9 0.2 - 0.2 -
Croatia - - - 0.2 0.3 0.8 - - 1.2 - - -
Czech Rep. - - 0.5 0.4 0.4 1.1 0.1 - 1.7 0.3 2.5 0.4
Estonia - - 0.1 0.2 0.1 - 0.1 - 0.1 0.7 - 4.2
Georgia - 4.7 17.0 - 2.6 - - - 0.1 - 0.2 -
Hungary - - 0.5 0.5 0.5 1.1 1.9 - - 0.1 0.2 0.1
Kazakhstan - 0.4 1.2 0.7 0.2 - 0.1 0.4 1.7 0.2 14.3 0.6
Kyrgyz Rep. - - 0.3 0.1 - - - 0.1 - - 1.0 0.1
Latvia - - 0.3 1.0 0.1 - - 8.6 - 0.1 0.3 -
Lithuania - - 0.1 1.9 0.2 - 0.5 6.1 - 0.3 0.7 0.5 7.5
Macedonia, FYR 2.8 - - - 2.0 1.8 0.1 - - 0.1 - - -
Moldova - - 0.1 1.3 2.1 - 0.1 0.2 - 0.1 - - 0.2
Poland - - 0.4 3.4 - 1.1 5.6 0.9 0.4 2.7 0.4 0.2 1.2
Romania - - - 0.4 1.4 0.3 0.4 - - - 0.1 0.2 -
Russia - 27.0 23.2 64.5 7.9 3.8 3.3 18.8 30 5.1 33.9 16.3 21.0
Slovak Rep. - - 0.1 0.4 - 0.5 12.9 - - 1.4 0.2 0.2 0.2
Slovenia 1.4 - - - 0.2 12.2 0.9 - - 1.5 - - 0.1
Tajikistan - - 0.4 0.1 0.4 - - 0.1 0.4 - 0.9 2.1 -
Turkey 0.7 3.0 5.2 - 9.9 0.2 0.3 0.4 13.0 0.4 1.6 1.3 0.1
Turkmenistan - 6.0 1.2 0.1 0.1 - - - 2.6 - 0.8 0.5 -
Ukraine - 1.3 4.1 5.9 - 0.3 - 5.0 3.5 1.3 4.8 0.8 3.9
Industrial states 89.4 32.2 12.3 9.0 50.6 55.0 65.2 55.0 16.5 76.7 35.2 34.8 52.3
Developing
states
10.6 67.0 87.6 90.8 49.1 44.1 34.5 45.0 83.5 23.3 64.8 65.4 47.7
   Africa - - - - 1.4 3.2 0.3 0.3 - 0.4 0.2 - 0.6
   Asia - - 5.9 3.3 3.6 0.6 3.0 1.4 0.9 1.1 12.5 6.4 2.2
   Europe 10.6 44.2 56.2 82.1 39.0 38.9 28.6 42.7 77.4 20.2 49.5 57.6 43.8
  Middle East - 22.7 25.2 1.1 - - 1.9 0.3 1.7 1.3 2.0 1.1 0.7
  Western
Hemishpere
- - 0.3 3.0 - - 0.7 0.3 3.0 0.4 0.6 - 0.4
Source: Author's calculations based on the IMF data - Direction of Trade Statistics, 2000.
Note: the % of country B's exports to country A in country B's total exports; '-' signifies either no trade or the share less then 0.1 per cent.
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Appendix 2. Trade matrix (continued)
Lithu-
ania
Mace-
donia
Moldo-
va
Poland
Roma-
nia
Russia
Slovak
Rep.
Slove-
nia
Tajiki-
stan
Turkey
Turkm-
enistan
Ukra-
ine
Albania - 2.7 0.1 - - - - 0.1 - 0.2 - -
Armenia - - - - - 0.1 - - - - - 0.1
Azerbaijan 0.2 - 0.1 0.2 - 0.3 - - - 1.2 3.9 0.6
Belarus 10.3 0.4 4.0 1.2 - 5.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 - 0.1 5.8
Bulgaria 0.1 2.7 1.1 0.2 0.7 1.1 0.3 0.2 - 0.7 0.1 1.1
Croatia - 3.1 - 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.9 10.0 - 0.1 - 0.1
Czech Rep. 0.4 0.5 0.1 3.5 0.2 2.1 25.5 1.8 - 0.3 0.1 1.2
Estonia 2.5 - 0.2 0.2 - 0.6 0.1 - 0.1 - - 0.3
Georgia 0.1 - 0.5 - 0.4 0.2 - - - 0.7 1.5 0.3
Hungary 0.3 0.4 0.2 1.5 2.2 2.2 4.5 1.4 1.6 0.5 - 2.2
Kazakhstan 1.1 - 0.2 0.2 - 2.9 0.1 0.1 1.2 0.8 4.1 0.7
Kyrgyz Rep. 0.1 - - - - 0.2 - - 1.1 0.2 1.7 -
Latvia 8.6 - 0.9 0.4 - 1.4 0.2 - 8.0 - - 0.6
Lithuania - 1.3 1.3 - 1.6 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 - -
Macedonia, FYR - - - 0.1 - 0.1 1.8 - 0.3 - 0.3
Moldova 0.3 - 0.2 1.5 0.4 0.1 - - 0.1 - 2.1
Poland 2.3 0.3 0.2 1.2 3.0 5.2 1.9 - 1.0 - 2.7
Romania 0.1 0.3 6.7 0.3 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.2 1.4 0.1 1.0
Russia 24.5 2.1 58.2 8.4 3.0 3.5 3.9 7.8 7.8 7.6 26.2
Slovak Rep. 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.2 0.3 2.0 - 0.1 0.1 - 2.0
Slovenia 0.1 4.6 - 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 - 0.1 - -
Tajikistan 0.2 - - - - 0.1 - - - 4.0 0.6
Turkey 0.8 - 0.6 0.2 4.2 2.3 0.3 0.4 1.0 6.8 4.7
Turkmenistan 0.1 - - - - 0.3 - - 1.2 0.4 1.2
Ukraine 8.9 - 5.6 4.7 1.1 8.5 2.8 0.5 0.5 1.3 0.1
Industrial states 36.0 52.6 17.9 69.0 62.6 47.0 50.6 68.2 51.6 57.2 9.1 16.2
Developing
states
63.9 44.5 82.1 30.9 37.0 52.5 49.3 43.7 48.3 37.9 54.6 83.7
   Africa 0.2 0.2 - 0.9 2.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 - 2.8 0.3 2.0
   Asia 1.1 0.2 0.1 2.6 5.4 8.8 1.1 0.9 2.6 4.6 6.9 16.0
   Europe 61.9 43.1 81.3 25.2 18.5 39.2 46.5 28.4 45.2 18.8 30.9 56.8
  Middle East 0.1 - 0.5 1.2 9.4 2.1 0.8 1.5 0.5 10.7 16.5 6.5
  Western
Hemishpere
0.6 - 0.1 0.9 1.3 2.0 0.6 0.6 - 0.9 - 2.3
Source: Author's calculations based on the IMF data - Direction of Trade Statistics, 2000.
Note: the % of country B's exports to country A in country B's total exports; '-' signifies either no trade or the share less then 0.1 per cent.
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Appendix 3. Trade matrix in 1997 (% of total exports)
Dependent Variable: CRISIS
Method: ML - Binary Probit
Included observations: 24
Convergence achieved after 8 iterations
Variable Coefficient Std. Error z-Statistic Prob.
C 0.309071 1.377686 0.224341 0.8225
RES_EXP3Q98 -0.086901 -0.053646 -1.619899 0.1053
S_TRADE -0.066057 -0.034255 1.928367 -0.0538
Mean dependent var 0.250000     S.D. dependent var 0.442326
S.E. of regression 0.278157     Akaike info criterion 0.661704
Sum squared resid 1.624792     Schwarz criterion 0.808961
Log likelihood -4.940451     Hannan-Quinn criter. 0.700771
Restr. log likelihood -13.49604     Avg. log likelihood -0.205852
LR statistic (2 df) 17.11119     McFadden R-squared 0.633933
Probability(LR stat) -0.000192
Obs with Dep=0 18      Total obs 24
Obs with Dep=1 6
Notes: res_exp3Q98 – export-reserves ratio variable; s_trad – exports share variable.
Dependent Variable: CRISIS
Method: ML - Binary Probit
Included observations: 24
Prediction Evaluation (success cutoff C = 0.5)
           Estimated Equation            Constant Probability
Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total
P(Dep=1)<=C 16 1 17 18 6 24
P(Dep=1)>C 2 5 7 0 0 0
Total 18 6 24 18 6 24
Correct 16 5 21 18 0 18
% Correct 88.89 83.33 87.50 100.00 0.00 75.00
% Incorrect 11.11 16.67 12.50 0.00 100.00 25.00
Total Gain* -11.11 83.33 12.50
Percent Gain**  NA 83.33 50.00
           Estimated Equation            Constant Probability
Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total
E(# of Dep=0) 16.35 1.53 17.88 13.50 4.50 18.00
E(# of Dep=1) 1.65 4.47 6.12 4.50 1.50 6.00
Total 18.00 6.00 24.00 18.00 6.00 24.00
Correct 16.35 4.47 20.82 13.50 1.50 15.00
% Correct 90.85 74.50 86.76 75.00 25.00 62.50
% Incorrect 9.15 25.50 13.24 25.00 75.00 37.50
Total Gain* 15.85 49.50 24.26
Percent Gain** 63.40 66.00 64.70
*Change in "% Correct" from default (constant probability) specification
**Percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected by equation
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Appendix 3. Trade matrix in 1997 (% of total exports)
Dependent Variable: CRISIS
Method: ML - Binary Probit
Included observations: 24
Prediction Evaluation (success cutoff C = 0.75)
           Estimated Equation            Constant Probability
Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total
P(Dep=1)<=C 18 2 20 18 6 24
P(Dep=1)>C 0 4 4 0 0 0
Total 18 6 24 18 6 24
Correct 18 4 22 18 0 18
% Correct 100.00 66.67 91.67 100.00 0.00 75.00
% Incorrect 0.00 33.33 8.33 0.00 100.00 25.00
Total Gain* 0.00 66.67 16.67
Percent Gain**  NA 66.67 66.67
           Estimated Equation            Constant Probability
Dep=0 Dep=1 Total Dep=0 Dep=1 Total
E(# of Dep=0) 16.35 1.53 17.88 13.50 4.50 18.00
E(# of Dep=1) 1.65 4.47 6.12 4.50 1.50 6.00
Total 18.00 6.00 24.00 18.00 6.00 24.00
Correct 16.35 4.47 20.82 13.50 1.50 15.00
% Correct 90.85 74.50 86.76 75.00 25.00 62.50
% Incorrect 9.15 25.50 13.24 25.00 75.00 37.50
Total Gain* 15.85 49.50 24.26
Percent Gain** 63.40 66.00 64.70
*Change in "% Correct" from default (constant probability) specification
**Percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected by equation
Appendix 4. External debt as a percentage of GDP, 1997-1998
1997 1998 1997 1998
A B A B A B A B
1 Albania 33.1 18.0 28.7 18.7 14 Lithuania 33.8 35.7 34.7 41.8
2 Armenia 48.0 22.4 42.2 16.9 15 Macedonia 30.5 17.5 39.4 21.9
3 Azerbaijan 14.8 3.8 16.6 2.0 16 Moldova 47.9 34.1 53.8 28.5
4 Belarus 17.2 14.2 17.6 15.8 17 Poland 36.0 32.8 36.2 38.3
5 Bulgaria 95.0 81.3 82.4 82.8 18 Romania 30.1 21.3 23.2 21.2
6 Croatia 37.1 34.8 44.1 45.2 19 Russia 29.8 25.9 58.6 32.1
7 Czech Rep. 40.3 36.2 42.6 41.0 20 Slovak Rep. 50.9 50.4 58.5 61.5
8 Estonia 57.1 58.0 53.0 60.8 21 Slovenia 22.9 21.4 25.4 25.7
9 Georgia 43.7 32.9 47.4 32.4 22 Tajikistan 98.5 91.4 90.5 90.3
10 Hungary 51.9 51.1 56.9 57.7 23 Turkey 47.8 49.4 50.4 55.5
11 Kazakhstan 26.9 21.5 36.0 29.8 24 Turkmenistan 65.3 56.6 75.6 73.3
12 Kyrgyz Rep. 76.8 41.5 89.5 40.3 25 Ukraine 23.5 18.0 27.6 15.7
13 Latvia 48.4 48.5 50.4 54.8
Source: Author's calculations based on EBRD, BIS and IMF data.
Note: A - total external debt, B - total external debt excluding multilateral claims.
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6.1. Introduction
The 1990s have witnessed five waves of financial turbu-
lence in international capital markets: the EMS crisis of
1992–1993, the Mexican peso crisis and its aftermath
(1994–1995), the Asian crisis of 1997, the Russian crisis and
consequent crashes in several former Soviet Union coun-
tries (FSU), and finally Brazil and Turkey. Financial crises are
not the new phenomena, and have occurred with occasion-
ally higher or lower intensities for at least the last two cen-
turies (a good historical panorama is provided, e.g., by
Bordo and Schwartz, 1999 and Kindleberger, 2000). How-
ever, along with proceeding globalization, the nature of
financial collapses has been changing. 
The literature dealing with the causes of financial crises
is vast and, especially in recent years, much progress has
been recorded in this field. However, the consequences of
financial turbulence are rarely examined. The establishment
of the set of 'early warning indicators' is of course highly
desirable since it helps to predict crises, but the diagnosis of
the performance of economies after crises is at least equal-
ly important. For example, were it the case that crises are a
crude but optimal way of removing the imbalances in an
economy, it would then become unnecessary to analyze
indexes of financial market pressure (what brings question-
able results anyway) or other ways of measuring potential
vulnerabilities. Moreover, transition economies are often
excluded from analyses. The most serious reason for this is
perhaps the lack of good quality data. Also, the transition
process itself embraces great systemic changes to the func-
tioning of economies, so it is extremely difficult to separate
the effects of these changes from those stemming from
crises. 
In the public discussion about financial turbulence (that
has been very vivid recently and took part on a popular level
also, e.g. in international press) the majority of voices seem
to share the view that crises are unfavorable incidents that
should be avoided using all possible means. The arguments
usually point at the severe costs the crashes bring [Stiglitz,
1998]. On the other hand, in some cases authors emphasize
the positive impact of turmoil on the economic policies, and
the progress of reforms [e.g. Bulgarian crisis of 1996; cf.
IMF, 1999] or developments in the real sector and function-
ing of an economy in general [e.g. Russian crisis of 1998; cf.
Westin, 1999].
Actually, it turns out that that much evidence on which
the reasoning in both directions hinges is rather weak. Cer-
tainly, countries that underwent problems with financial sta-
bility are very different, and so were natures of the crises
and their consequences. Thus, it is impossible to find gen-
erally binding rules assigned to crises' consequences. Yet, it
is possible to discover statistical regularities in the results of
crises and to present some stylized types of interactions
that tend to strengthen either negative or positive out-
comes. 
This paper attempts to investigate the consequences of
financial crises from an international perspective. It does so
by analyzing the behavior of several macroeconomic vari-
ables before and after episodes of financial turbulence and
describes both their positive and negative consequences.
The analysis is limited to the 1990s and covers mostly tran-
sition economies. The time constrains were set in order to
focus on recent developments in world financial markets;
the inclusion of considerable number of transition
economies was motivated by the willingness to fill in a gap
existing in the literature. 
The paper also analyzes the channels through which
crises affect various economic and social spheres. In addi-
tion, some checks are carried to see whether and under
what circumstances crises can have a lasting and positive (or
at least neutral) influence on economies in the medium term
perspective. The paper further focuses on the question how
long the post-crisis effects are present and if the recovery
process removes the pre-crisis imbalances.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section
two a brief survey of literature dealing with consequences
of financial crises is presented. Section three is devoted to
the presentation of graphical analysis of the behavior of
selected macroeconomic variables in a period before and
after a crisis. Various notions of costs related to financial tur-
moil are dealt with in section four. Section five discusses
what the possible positive outcomes of crises are and under
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what circumstances they are likely to occur. Conclusions
comprise section six.
6.2. Review of the Literature 
As indicated, the recent outburst of literature dealing
with causes of financial crises apparently has not been
accompanied by a similar development in the field of crises'
consequences. There are perhaps several reasons behind
this. One is certainly the fashion. Also, the task of detecting
some common features in the aftermath of crises is perhaps
more difficult than in the case of its causes. Finally, the
importance of taking lessons from outcomes of financial tur-
bulence seems to be underestimated. 
The studies dealing with the consequences of financial
crisis episodes can be broadly divided into two groups. The
first one comprises papers studying results of a crisis in a
particular country, a few consecutive crises in one country,
or within a region. Such analyses benefit from access to dis-
aggregated and comparable data that allow for using fine
statistical tools. Also, the authors are often able to use their
detailed knowledge of the situation in a given country that is
not captured by official data. The studies of that kind fre-
quently produce meaningful and interesting results. The
examples of such papers are Berry et al. (1999), Ferri
(1998), and Cutler, et al. (2000). The main disadvantage of
such an approach is that obtained results are country or
region specific and usually cannot be sensibly generalized.
The second group covers studies undertaking cross-
country analyses. Unfortunately, there are not too many
papers of that kind, and they all tend to use similar method-
ology that is not free from serious limitations and short-
comings. The typical approach is to consider a large sample
of countries (from a few dozens to close to two hundred)
over a rather long time (20 or more years). The crisis
episodes are then mechanically identified using some index
measure. The standard procedure is then to analyze (usual-
ly graphically) the behavior of several macroeconomic vari-
ables in the so-called crisis window, i.e. in the period before
and after a crisis. The average values of particular variables
are plotted in levels or against their tranquil period average,
i.e. the average of all time points outside a crisis window.
The examples of such studies include IMF (1998a), Milesi-
Ferretti and Razin (1998), Aziz et al. (2000), and Bordo and
Schwartz (2000). 
The first important limitation of this approach is that as
all crises are treated as identical events, therefore, there is
not much place for studying the causal relationships. Milesi-
Ferretti and Razin (1998) attempt to establish a causal rela-
tionship between growth performance after a crisis and
other variables. They run an OLS regression with a three-
year average GDP growth rate after the crisis as a depen-
dent variable and a set of explanatory variables. Their results
are, however, not very robust, with growth rate before the
crisis and openness to trade being the best predictors.
An attempt to do a similar exercise for the sample exam-
ined in this paper failed to produce any meaningful results.
At this point one should once again note that the whole dis-
cussion relates to 'typical' relationships and holds 'on aver-
age'. In fact, financial crises are very different and any par-
ticular event can exhibit characteristics not present in case
of other crises. 
Another problem is that the methodology does not
allow for any check of whether the levels of certain macro-
economic variables achieved before a crisis may be consid-
ered sustainable. It is thus impossible to decide to what
extent crises bring the economies back to equilibrium and
to what extent they constitute a break in an otherwise sus-
tainable trend. This limitation can hardly be efficiently over-
come. The problem lies in the lack of trustworthy models of
estimating 'typical', 'trend' or 'sustainable' ranges of values
for the most of economic variables. 
6.3. Some Statistical Exercises
As discussed above, one possible method of analyzing the
behavior of macroeconomic variables over the crisis period
is the 'before-after' approach, which compares the perfor-
mance of selected variables in the period before and after a
crisis. This method, while not free from faults, can still be
useful for policymaking. This is because the macroeconomic
stabilization policies as well as structural reforms are key to
the process of recovery. If misdirected they not only fail to
restore credibility and the balance of an economy, but are
also likely to have long-lasting effects on the real sector. This
scenario holds whether the crisis results from fundamental
problems or is rooted in investors' panic. Thus, if there exists
any cross-country pattern in the behavior of particular eco-
nomic indicators over the crisis window, identifying it might
contribute to better management of the crisis. 
6.3.1. The Definition of a Crisis
In order to conduct the above analysis, first of all, it is
necessary to identify the exact time the financial crisis erupt-
ed in each country under consideration. Several approaches
can be found in literature. An interesting discussion of the
issue can be found in Szczurek (2001). For the purpose of
this paper, we decided to employ the methodology similar
to that of Eichengreen et. al (1996). It relies on the index of
speculative pressure calculated on the quarterly basis. The
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index is a combination of the exchange rate, interest rate
and domestic reserves of foreign exchange. The pressure
increases as the exchange rate depreciates, reserves deplete
and interest rates go up. If the attack is successful devalua-
tion occurs, but authorities may try to defend the currency
by running down international reserves or raising interest
rates. The crisis episode is defined as an unusually rapid
increase in the index. A formal presentation can be found in
Appendix 1.
The presented methodology captured 27 crisis episodes
with Brazil, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova and
Ukraine suffering from financial turbulence twice over the
studied period.
6.3.2. The Sample
The sample spans from 1990 to 1999 and covers 43
countries. The list of all countries included can be found in
Appendix 2. Such a choice was determined by the aim to
concentrate on the recent crise only (i.e. the financial crise
of the 1990s) and to include as many transition countries (in
particular the FSU countries) as possible. In this respect the
statistical analysis presented below differs from the one con-
ducted in several other studies. 
6.3.3. Data
Having identified crisis episodes, it is necessary to evalu-
ate the performance of economic variables that according to
theory can be affected by a financial crisis. The rationality
behind the choice of indicators presented below lies in two
facts. First, the deviation of these variables from their equi-
librium levels (that can somehow be established) has led
many countries to problems and was recognized by
researches as central to the incidences of crise [e.g. see
Kaminsky et al., 1998; Flood et al., 1998]. Then, if the crisis
was to help to restore the balance in an economy, one
should observe striking changes in the performance of for-
mer predictors of crises. Second, as social repercussions of
a crisis also lie within our interests, the analysis cannot be
constraint to macroeconomic indicators only. For instance,
households can be worse off due to the decline in the value
of their assets or because of a post-crisis economic contrac-
tion affecting them through various channels (see section 4
for a more detailed discussion). 
The analysis below focuses on the following indicators:
– GDP per capita, 
– GDP growth,
– inflation,
– real and nominal interest rates,
– current account balance,
– capital flows, exchange rate,
– changes in government and private consumption,
– investment rates,
– trade performance
– unemployment rate. 
The main source of data is the International Financial
Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Found (IMF).
GDP data are taken from the IMF's World Economic Out-
look database (May 2001). Additional data sources (such as
Asian Development Bank, and the countries' statistical agen-
cies) were also used in some instances. Unemployment
rates and nominal wages come from the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and the World Health Organization
(WHO), respectively. GDP per capita in PPP terms is from
WHO. 
6.3.4. Economic Performance before and after
the Crisis 
The following discussion focuses on the behavior of
selected macroeconomic variables in the 'crisis window'. We
start from checking some characteristics of countries in our
sample. Assessing the level of development of analyzed
countries is important as it certainly influences eventual
impact of financial crises. In poor countries crisis spillovers
are likely to be more difficult to manage. In particular, the
impact on the social sphere might have significant conse-
quences, e.g. rising poverty. 
In order to see the development level of the countries
in the sample we calculated average GDP per capita. As evi-
dent from the picture, on average (median), countries under
Figure 6-1. GDP per capita in a crisis window, USD
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Note: Graph plots a median GDP per capita on annual basis in a cri-
sis window of three years before and after a crisis.
Sources: IMF IFS (2001), WHO (2001).
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consideration fall short of developed economies with GDP
per capita not exceeding 4500 US dollars in PPP terms and
2500 US dollars using market exchange rates. Furthermore,
three years after the crises, income still does not go back to
the levels achieved three years before the crises. The same
patterns are repeated in all but one of the identified sub-
groups [1]. By definition, developing countries must have
minimally increasing GDP per capita in order to reduce the
poverty and lower the distance to advanced economies.
This was not the case for the analyzed sample. 
6.3.4.1. GDP Growth
Financial crises often deteriorate into systemic crises and
are most pronouncedly reflected in the erosion of econom-
ic activity. Looking at the behavior of GDP growth rates for
the whole sample (ALL), the economic stagnation around a
crisis year is clear. On average [2], countries already demon-
strate signs of the slowdown two years before a crisis with
the 1.5% recession in the crisis year. However, from there
on economies grow faster than before.
Similar situation (the drop of output in the crisis year) is
observed for transition economies. But this group already
suffers from recession three years before a crisis. Then the
situation improves but, together with a crisis, it worsens
again and the average growth rate drops to -6.5%. GDP
returns to its pre-crisis level a year after the crisis and eco-
nomic growth resumes thereafter. It should be stressed that
the behavior of GDP in a crisis window is strongly influenced
by the transition process itself. The pre-crisis recession visi-
ble in the graph often results from the experience of dra-
matic economic contraction in the early stages of transition.
Actually, a simple approach, such as the one implemented
here, does not allow for dismantling the impact of crises
from the one of the transition process.
The same problem applies to the FSU98 group. The crises
in 1998 and 1999 occurred exactly when the economies start-
ed to recover after a few years of recession. Consequently, the
impact of a transition itself was perhaps more pronounced
than the impact of the crises. Also, one should note that the
median does not perform well in describing the behavior of
GDP growth in this group of countries around 1998. Actually,
five out of six countries belonging to the group recorded a siz-
able slowdown in growth rates (or deepening of recession) in
the crisis year with respect to the previous year. This is also
reflected by arithmetic average of growth rates dropping from
4.2% to 0.4% in this period. The crisis did represent a major
setback to a weak recovery that started to be seen in FSU
countries around 1997. Three years after the crises growth
rates remained positive staying in the range of 3–4%. Howev-
er, given the recession record of the early 1990s, the recovery
is rather modest and growth rates are likely to be reduced in
2001 (third year after the crisis) [3].
[1] These are crises in transition economies (TR), crises in FSU countries in 1998 and 1999 (FSU98), crises in South-East Asian economies in 1997
(ASIA97), and Latin American crises (LAM). See Annex 2 for a detailed sample description.
[2] In order to reduce distortions resulting from large variation in some economic variables across the sample, in the statistical analysis median was
used instead of arithmetic average. Unless otherwise indicated, whenever in the paper we write 'average' it actually means 'median'.
[3] The last year in the crisis window for the FSU98 group is the IMF forecast from May 2001 and therefore might be changed.
Figure 6-2. GDP per capita in a crisis window, USD
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Note: Graph plots a median GDP per capita on annual basis in a crisis window of three years before and after a crisis.
Sources: IMF IFS (2001), WHO (2001).
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In South-East Asia, the 1997 crisis brought the average
rate of output growth down from more than 8% in 1994 to
an estimated 4.8% in 2001. In terms of the scale of growth
contraction, the ASIA97 group stands out in the entire
examined sample (with the recession of 7.4% a year after
the shock). However, this group is also exceptional in terms
of its pre-crisis stance, when the Asian economies recorded
astounding growth rates of around 8% annually. Further-
more, the 1997 crisis was not a typical one with chronic
internal or external imbalances playing a decisive role. The
problem was more complex. In short, apart from the Philip-
pines, the crises were driven by the developments in the
capital account. 'Asian Tigers' were growing fast, attracting
huge amounts of foreign capital (on average 40% of GDP in
1990–1996) that led to an investment boom. After the cri-
sis, investors discounted the market that deepened the
recession and reduced the growth stimulus stemming from
increased competitiveness. 
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Figure 6-3. Real GDP growth (median), %
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Figure 6-4. Real GDP growth differential (median), %
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Note: GDP growth differential is defined as a difference between a crisis country growth rate and advanced economies average GDP growth (the
aggregate is provided by the IMF, World Economic Outlook 2001 database).
Source: IMF, WEO database.
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The economic growth in Latin America started slowing
down already two years prior to crise with the sharpest
drop a year before an event. Following crisis episodes the
improvement was observed and two years later GDP
growth rate, on average, surpassed its pre-crisis high. 
Summing up, on average financial crises brought a
substantial setback to growth prospects of countries in
our sample. Due to data limitations (not enough time
passed since many of the analyzed crisis episodes), it is
hard to judge what was the impact on countries' long-
term growth prospects. Growth rates three years after a
shock do not significantly exceed the pre-crises levels.
On average, crisis economies – instead of catching up
with the advanced countries growth rates – were losing
or just keeping their pace within the whole crisis window
examined. 
6.3.4.2. Expenditure on GDP
To have a clear picture about the growth development
in countries affected by the crises, it is necessary to check
the performance of growth key drivers, namely private and
public consumption, investments as well as external bal-
ance. 
Looking at the above figures one general conclusion can
be made: the output decline is mostly associated with a
sharp contraction in investments and imports. The former
seems to be crowded out more permanently as a result of a
crisis. Exports remain a main driving force of GDP growth.
The fact that imports already pick up a year after turbulence
may imply the rebound in an economy. Strikingly, invest-
ment expenditures are seriously undermined and despite
some signs of improvement two years after a crisis they
drop again in the third year. This observation supports the
CASE Reports No. 41
Figure 6-5. GDP components, % change
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Notes: Graph plot y-o-y percentage changes of aggregates. The upper right picture plots the median of all crisis economies included in the sam-
ple. The changes of all components of GDP but trade balance are calculated in real terms (y-o-y). Exports and imports are calculated in current prices
in USD. For the Asia97 group all values are real and come from national accounts. The inconsistency in methodology is due to data availability, but
should not influence the results of the analysis.
Source: IMF IFS, Asian Development Bank, statistical agencies.
109
Currency Crises in Emerging Markets – Selected Comparative ...
view that, on average, the post-crisis recovery in our sam-
ple remains fragile. 
In Asia, the analysis is only preliminary since at the time
of writing (April 2001) national accounts provide data only
up to 1999 [4]. Nevertheless, in terms of causes of output
contraction, the predominant element in Asia was more
than a proportional decline in investments. Additionally,
the 1997 crisis hit private and public consumption (it
declined by 10% and 2% (y-o-y) respectively) as well as
imports. While currency devaluation in Asia certainly
increased external competitiveness, on average, exports in
1999 remained lower than prior to the crisis. The
improvement in external balance a year after devaluation
was due more to the decline in imports than the exports
expansion. 
In transition economies crises were accompanied by a
precipitous drop in all components of GDP. Investments
continued a downward trend for the next three years.
Actually, they were under-performing throughout the
entire crisis window, but before crises these contractions
were decreasing, and crises represented a sizable setback
in this trend. The post-crisis recovery in the transition
group was supported mainly by an increase in exports. In
the second year imports and public consumption boosted;
private consumption was on the rise only in the third year
after a crisis.
In terms of the deceleration in investment demand,
Latin American economies performed relatively better;
nevertheless, the 4% drop was the major factor reducing
growth around the crisis year. The same holds for private
consumption, which kept growing, albeit at a slower pace.
What is interesting in the case of Latin America is the eco-
nomic outlook in the last year of the window examined.
Public and private consumption as well as investments
grew, but both export and import expansion slowed
down. Widening trade deficit increased volatility.
6.3.4.3. Real Exchange Rate
Since the exchange rate is a crucial indicator of the com-
petitiveness of a country and its behavior is usually strongly
affected by financial crises (by sudden devaluation), before
we turn to the assessment of the external position of crisis
economies, it is useful to check the behavior of the real
effective exchange rate over a crisis window. 
From the chart below it is clear that for the sample of
10-15 countries (subject to data availability) the exchange
rates were on average appreciating up to the crisis. Then
it depreciated sharply by around 20% and remained
below its pre-crisis level for the next four years. Also,
crises occurred when real exchange rates reached the
average for the whole sample over a 20 years period (or
shorter, subject to data availability). Such long-term aver-
ages are often treated and referred to as 'equilibrium' real
exchange rates. This exercise depicts one major weakness
of such an approach. The (theoretical) equilibrium rate (if
anything like that exist) must be changing over time,
reflecting different stages of country development [cf.
Sasin, 2001]. 
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[4] For the same reason the FSU98 group is not presented. 
Figure 6-6. Real exchange rate in a crisis window, monthly data, index
0.70
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
c-48 c-36 c-24 c-12 crisis c+12 c+24 c+36 c+48
Note: Index, 1=average index value for 1981–2000 period (or shorter, subject to data availability). The window spans 48 month before and after
a crisis.
Source: IMF IFS (2001).
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6.3.4.4. External Balance
The supplementary indicator of country competitive-
ness is its trade balance. Usually countries which export
more grow faster. There is also a direct link between the
trade and current account balance as the latter consists of
the former [5]. Thus, both indicators provide an important
measurement of the country external position, and the
overall health of the economy. Yet, it is extremely difficult
to assess what level of current account deficit can be
financed (Sasin, 2001); e.g. even outsized current account
deficit might be sustainable if trade turnovers are favor-
able. Rapidly accelerating imports if associated with a
lagged exports boom may be beneficial for the economy.
While developing countries usually need current account
(CA) deficits to support growth rates, financial crise are
very often associated exactly with the persistent current
account imbalances. Therefore, the difficult challenge is to
avoid excessive growth in domestic absorption. Of course,
CASE Reports No. 41
[5] For developing countries other elements of CA (like services balance) are usually of lower importance.
Figure 6-7. Tade balance (median), US$ billion
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Figure 6-8. Current Account Balance, % of GDP
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every country is specific, and so are roots underlying the
excess of investments over savings, but the outcome is the
same – a fragile external position. 
From the above picture it is clear that all countries in
the sample suffered from persistent current account
imbalances. Moreover, on average, our "crise sample" sup-
ports the common view, that a CA deficit oscillating
around 5% of GDP is a precarious one and should be a
"warning flag" for policy makers. As for sub-groups, the
biggest savings-investments gap is evident in transition
economies. A year before a crisis the average deficit for
these countries was equal to 7.4% of GDP. 
Interestingly, the advantageous role of the weak curren-
cy (as a result of devaluation) associated with financial crash-
es was not strongly supported by the data. The impact on
trade balance proved to be limited. On average, trade bal-
ance was worsening until one year before crises not only for
the whole sample, but also for individual sub-samples. Then,
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Figure 6-10. Exports growth (median), % change
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Figure 6-9. Imports growth (median), % change
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on average, it started to improve, but turned positive only in
Asia and Latin America. In the third year after the crisis, the
trade balance for the whole sample deteriorated again. 
In Latin American countries imports outperformed
exports already in the second year after the crisis. Trade bal-
ance in transition economies improved only for one year
after devaluation. FSU98 group is hard to gauge since the
time series is too short to justify the impact of the crisis on
trade. The only 'book case' scenario in which currency
devaluation improves competitiveness of a country is
observed in the Asia97 group. The pattern for CA recovery
is similar. This is only in Asia where a crisis brings the CA to
a surplus. In other groups, current account deficit shrinks
only during the first year after a crisis, but widens thereafter. 
6.3.4.5. Interest Rates
The changes in domestic deposit rates provide an impor-
tant indicator of a stance of monetary policy conducted in any
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Figure 6-12. Real interest rates (deposit or similar rate), %
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Figure 6-11. Nominal interest rates (deposit or similar rate), %
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particular country. Reflecting changes in various spheres of
the economy, interest rates affect other policies (e.g. the
room for maneuver of fiscal policy is subject to cost of debt
servicing) as well as consumers and producers behavior
(including expectations) through various transition channels
[Mishkin, 1996; Bernanke and Geritler, 1995]. High interest
rates are usually a feature of so-called emerging markets that
have to pay high-risk premium to attract capital. 
The purpose of this paper is not to discuss the theory
behind the interest rate policy. From the perspective of our
analysis the behavior of interest rates is interesting for one
major reason. In the onset of financial crises, in order to
defend the exchange rate and stop fleeing capital, interest
rates usually go up. After a crisis rising inflation drives nomi-
nal interest rates up. This brings recessionary tendencies and
exacerbates uncertainty related to the fact that high interest
rates increase the probability that productive investments are
not undertaken [see Mishkin, 1996]. If this was the case then,
some time after a crisis interest rates should start declining.
Indeed, in our sample, nominal interest rates return to pre-
crisis levels in the fourth quarter after a crisis. They remain
flat for another year to start growing in later quarters.
Real interest rates perform somehow differently. They
start increasing already a year before a crisis to reveal the
downward trend thereafter. Then, surprisingly, for more
than one year real interest rates remain negative (real
money market rates oscillate around 0%) with the slight
rebound in the end of this period. Such a behavior is driven
by high inflation levels (see below). Also, the limited size of
the sample for which the data were available might have
influenced the results.
Data availability did not allow for checking the perfor-
mance of lending rates. It seems that with the event of a cri-
sis the problem lies not so much in skyscraping interest
rates but a credit crunch may be driven by other factors.
Banks may simply become more become reluctant to lend
money and this is what depresses investments. Yet, to
prove such a hypothesis further investigation is required.
6.3.4.6. Capital Inflow
Less advanced economies need foreign capital to sup-
port growth. While there is a discussion on beneficiary role
of cross-border flows, nobody really denies their positive
contribution to growth [6]. Yet, the general problem, espe-
cially in countries with underdeveloped financial markets, is
the magnitude and composition of these flows. If the pro-
portion between foreign direct investments and portfolio
capital is inadequate and these are short-term flows which
play a major role in external financing, country's exposure to
a potential crisis increases. 
The fact that financial markets are not able to function
effectively adds to costs associated with financial crises (IMF,
1998a). In this case the increased uncertainty has a negative
impact on economic activity; i.e. in the light of a crisis investors
not sure about the overall health of the financial sector
become reluctant to allocate their assets in bonds or other
equities thus limiting available resources necessary to boost
growth. Accordingly, there might be a large net outflow of for-
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[6] For example, emerging economies are very often afraid of 'oligopolistic power' of foreign investors. There might also be some political reasons
making these countries reluctant to foreign capital (for details see IFC, 1997).
Figure 6-13. Net capital inflow, quarterly data, US$ million
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eign portfolio capital [7]. If a crisis brought necessary adjust-
ments, investors should restore their confidence in the overall
stability of an economy and continue to provide lending.
The above charts represent the behavior of cross-bor-
der flows in a crisis window. Unfortunately, limited data
available for this analysis, especially in the case of FDI flows,
make the results volatile to the sample size incorporated to
the crisis window. Consequently, the results should be treat-
ed with caution and analysis for individual sub-groups is not
undertaken [8].
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[7] Domestic rates of savings on its own even if high but allocated in the form of banks' deposits are very unlikely to boost dampened consumers'
demand (Japanese case provides a good example). Instead, increased public expenditures create a challenge in addressing large fiscal sector imbalances. 
[8] To obtain more reliable results analysis should focus on the spread on yields of sovereign debt of crisis economies and yields on US Treasury
Bonds. The downward trend would suggest restored confidence. This was not done in this paper due to data availability.
Figure 6-14. Foreign dorect investment, quarterly data, US$ million
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Figure 6-15. Portfolio investments, quarterly data, US$ million
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Up to one year before a crisis, countries in the sample
were experiencing net capital inflows of more than $300
million per quarter. This figure decreased significantly in
quarters preceding the crisis, turning negative in the first
quarter after the crisis episode. Then, net capital inflows
remained repressed for at least next two years, staying
below the pre-crises levels and below the median value for
the whole sample in the 1Q94-1Q00 suggesting that finan-
cial markets in countries under consideration remained
adversely affected. 
The same holds true for portfolio and foreign direct
investments; the drop in inflow associated with crisis is
clearly visible for both categories. Not surprisingly the drop
is sharper for short-term flows. Three years after the crisis
FDI and portfolio investments still remain substantially
lower than before.
6.3.4.7. Inflation
As most financial crises in our sample (and in general)
end up in a sizable change in the exchange rate it is natural
that they likely result in price hikes. Indeed, the pictures
presented below strongly support that hypothesis. This
CASE Reports No. 41
Figure 6-16.  CPI, y-o-y percentage change in crisis window; sample median, monthly data
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Figure 6-17.  CPI, y-o-y percentage change in crisis window; monthly data (medians for subgroups)
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result is also similar to results obtained in other studies for
different samples.
Interestingly, in the period before a crisis a clear disinfla-
tion trend can be observed and in general inflation is low,
staying at single digit levels. A crisis represents a dramatic
change in the trend with CPI rising on average (median of
the sample) by more than 40% during 12 months after the
crisis. The graph suggests that on average it takes at least
another year until 12-month rate of CPI growth returns to
single digit levels. As regards the behavior of prices among
different country groups, transition economies stand out. In
this group the crises of the 1990s tended to have the
strongest impact on prices. On the other end are Asian
countries that experienced the crisis of 1997. Here the hike
of CPI inflation was very moderate, with 12-month growth
rates rising, on average, from around 4% before the crisis to
some 10% a year later. The results are in line with the ones
obtained in other studies, e.g. Aziz et al. (2000).
6.4. The Cost of a Crisis
In this part we are trying to briefly discuss the notion of
the cost of a financial crisis and how can it possibly be mea-
sured. It is clear that financial turbulence often negatively
affects many aspects of economic and social spheres. One
can thus speak of many different costs brought by a crisis. A
broad but certainly non-comprehensive classification of
costs can be done in the following way:
– fiscal / quasi-fiscal cost; they emerge from at least two
distinct reasons: corporate and financial sector restructuring
and the rise in external and internal debt obligations (due to
devaluation and increase in interest rates). The need to bail
out or support corporate or financial sector institutions
stems from the fact that currency crises often coincide with
banking sector problems or even banking crises. These
costs vary substantially between different crises and can be
quite substantial. For example, Bank of Thailand estimated
that the special Fund established after the 1997 crisis had to
cover losses of about US$20–30 billion (Times of India,
2000). The costs related to the servicing of foreign debt are
hard to measure precisely, but it is clear that an increase in
debt burden can have severe and long lasting consequences
[cf. IMF and World Bank, 2001]. In Indonesia government
debt approached 100% of GDP in the beginning of 2001
[World Bank, 2001] in comparison to the pre-crisis level of
23%. One should note that increased indebtedness results
from a hike in interest rates and depreciation of national
currency (and consequent increase in foreign currency
denominated debt), as well as increased borrowing (usually
at higher premium) to cover the financial and corporate sec-
tor losses or other government actions aimed at reducing
the social impact of a crisis. For example, this was the case
in Thailand, where state total debt and obligations increased
two-fold (in nominal Baht terms) between November 1997
and September 1999 [Bangkok Post, 1999].
– costs related to lost economic growth; as the analysis
in section 6.3 shows, financial crises often result in a period
of recession or growth slowdown. 
– social costs; the term is very general, but also the pos-
sible impact of financial turbulence on social sphere can be
transferred through various channels. Several issues can be
raised:
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Figure 6-18. Real wages in crisis window (medians for subsamples; annual data, percentage changes)
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– unemployment
– decline in real incomes
– increased inflation resulting in changes in relative
prices and overall uncertainty about their future levels; this
can hit unevenly various social groups
– worsened health situation
– worsened educational situation
– increase in the number of people living in poverty
– costs related to changes in political sphere; a crisis is
likely to impact domestic policies (not only economic poli-
cies), international ratings (and thus availability of foreign
financing in the future), relations between various social
groups (as a crisis unevenly affects various groups, that
might create tensions).
Most of the above listed issues are very hard to measure,
especially in international comparisons. It is certainly the
case, that country specific conditions to a very large extent
determine what kind of consequences and how severe will
be felt. For example, Cutler et al. (2000) provide evidence
that health situation deteriorated (rise in mortality rates)
after several Mexican crises in the past two decades. Also,
the impact on education can be spotted (Oxfam, 1999 dis-
cusses the situation after the Asian 1997 crisis). 
For the sample of countries analyzed in this paper we
were able to find data on unemployment rates and changes
in real wages (though, data were not available for all coun-
tries and there are some doubts about its quality). With
respect to real wages development no clear single pattern
can be spotted. A drop of real wages is visible only in the
first year after a crisis. In the second year, wages tend to
rebound strongly. One should keep in mind that the impact
on real incomes is possibly stronger (due to increased
unemployment). A general downward trend in wages
before crises for the whole sample can perhaps be a result
of the inclusion of many crises events in transition
economies. These crises often happened during the period
of general economic decline.
A clearer picture can be observed in average (median)
unemployment rate. With the exception of Latin American
countries (those included in our sample), unemployment starts
to increase already a year before a crisis and continues a strong
upward trend afterwards. This suggests that episodes of finan-
cial crises where authorities facing problems like rising unem-
ployment decide to devalue (as in the ERM crisis of 1992 in the
UK) are not strongly represented in the sample examined.
The situation in the labor market usually deteriorated after the
onset of a crisis. Also, the average rise in the unemployment
rate was significant – from around 4% 2–3 years before a cri-
sis, to around 8% 2–3 years after a crisis. 
Another thing that can be somehow quantified is the out-
put loss due to a crisis. There are, however, some limitations
with that approach. It is not clear whether the growth path
before the outburst of a crisis was sustainable. This problem
is handled by adding some subjective corrections to the aver-
age growth rates before crisis episodes (used as an approxi-
mation of a trend). The results are summarized in the table
below. Several tentative conclusions could be drawn. Firstly,
the results for our sample do not differ significantly from the
results obtained for a larger sample of countries in IMF
(1998a). There is however large variation between particular
country groups. Latin American countries turn out to be rel-
atively weakly affected by crisis episodes of the last decade –
at least in terms of lost GDP growth. On the other hand, the
Asian countries that experienced turbulence in 1997 suffered
Figure 6-19. Unemployment rate in crisis window (medians for subsamples; annual data)
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massive losses in that presentation. This last result can be
explained by very strong growth rates experienced by the
region before 1997 (and consequently, even after some
downward corrections, high level of trend growth). Transition
countries and in particular FSU countries that experienced
the crises in 1998 and 1999 tend to recover relatively quickly
and with only limited output losses. Again, all the above indi-
cates, that the results should be treated with caution and that
they provide only indicative measures of the impact of finan-
cial crises on growth (complementary to the graphical pre-
sentation in section 6.3).
The notion of a cost of a financial crisis does not have a
precise narrow meaning. The discussion in this part leads to a
general conclusion that it is not possible to find a good defin-
ition suitable for all purposes. Rather, depending on particular
interests one can use specially designed notions. This is
indeed the case, with different studies concentrating on only
some aspects of crises' costs. For example, Dooley (2000)
refers to output losses (in a sense analogous to the one pre-
sented in a table above) as a cost of a crisis (actually, in that
study it is only relevant as a potential punishment for failing to
service foreign debt). Several other authors emphasize the
need to pay more attention to so-called social costs of finan-
cial turbulence. The notion, however, while intuitively very
important, up to date lacks appropriate measuring tools and
can hardly be tackled in a more scientific way. The main diffi-
culty seems to be the lack of appropriate comparable data.
The field certainly needs further studies.
6.5. Turning Crisis into Opportunity? Do
Crises Bring Catharisis to Economies?
It is relatively clear that a financial crisis can bring some
positive changes to the functioning of the economy. One
can show several fields where such changes are most like-
ly to happen. Financial turbulence may bring important
changes to the political situation in the country (e.g. a fall
of an irresponsible government, etc.). Such developments,
apart of possibly crucial though hard to measure influence
on other life spheres, can bring a major improvement in
economic policies. Bulgarian crisis of 1996 stands an excel-
lent example of such a scenario. The crisis experience may
speed up vital reforms and restructuring in the financial
and corporate sectors. Rodrik (1996) argues that thanks to
this mechanism crises actually enhance growth in the long
run. Also, the episodes of financial turbulence bring more
hints as to the functioning of the economy, thus helping in
proper shaping of economic policies of particular coun-
tries, as well as international financial organizations [Köh-
ler, 2001].
Also, a rapid adjustment of the exchange rate and
resulting competitiveness gain could bolster the real sector
of the economy. In particular, export oriented or import-
substituting industries are most likely to benefit from a cri-
sis. Actually, this is precisely the mechanism that usually
brings the economies back to a growth track. One should
note, however, that post-crisis real depreciation and
resulting increased competitiveness are temporary phe-
nomena. Consequently, a crucial question is whether com-
panies will be able to use this window of opportunity to
strengthen their stance (restructure) so that they can
remain competitive even after real exchange rate appreci-
ates. It would be indeed very interesting to pursue a fur-
ther research in that field – especially in international com-
parison. Unfortunately, research again faces a lack of
appropriate data. There is some anecdotal evidence that
such positive processes did indeed take place in certain
countries (e.g. Mexico after 1994, Russia and Ukraine after
1998), but the scope, depth and sustainability of changes is
very hard to measure. In some countries a collapse of the
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Table 6-1. Costs of crises in lost output relative to trend
Average recovery time Cumulative loss of
output (% of GDP)
Crises with output
losses (%)
Currency crises: 90’s sample 1.4 6.4 71
Currency crises: IMF (1998a)
sample
1.6   E(1.5) 4.3    E(4.8) 61   E(64)
Transition countries crises 1.1 4.8 69
FSU 1998-1999 crises 1.1 2.9 71
Asian 1997 crises 2.4 16.9 100
Latin Am. crises of the 90’s 0.8 1.8 50
Notes: Lists of countries included in samples can be found in Appendix 2.
In the IMF sample the numbers in parentheses refer to emerging economies group.
Average recovery time is calculated as the average time of returning to the trend growth path.
Cumulative lost of output is calculated as a sum of differences between observed and trend growth figures, until an economy returns to trend 
growth path.
Last column shows the percentage of countries that experienced output loss after a financial crisis.
Sources: Second row is from IMF (1998a); other data: authors' calculations based on IMF, WEO database.
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exchange rate can be seen as a mechanism removing exist-
ing imbalances, while not being able to impel significant
positive internal changes. There is clearly much variation
between countries. 
The impact on economic policies and, in particular, on
the will and ability of the authorities to pursue difficult
reforms is perhaps one of the most important topics of
study in transition countries. It is, however, a very difficult
task and certainly lies beyond the scope of this paper. We
can only make a few points at this stage. 
Financial crises can be seen as mechanisms of rapid
adjustment and bringing economies back to balance. Cer-
tainly, such an approach does not capture all kinds of crises
(as allegedly they may also result from speculative attack
when there are no fundamental imbalances). If one
accepts such a view, the next question naturally arises, of
whether the change brought by a crisis is sustainable. In
other words, it is very important to see whether crises
tend to permanently (i.e. for a long time) remove underly-
ing imbalances. Again, approaching such a question in
international comparison is quite difficult. One obvious
reason is that it is usually quite hard to recognize the
underlying causes of any particular crisis, not to mention a
large sample of crises. One thing that could be done is to
check the behavior of some standard indicators that are
commonly thought to be likely associated with financial
turbulence. The discussion of various crisis indicators can
be found e.g. in Tomczyñska (2001), Kaminsky et al.
(1998).
The idea is to check whether any particular indicator
was indeed observed before a crisis (interpreted as pres-
ence of some fundamental problems in related spheres)
and then to check whether the situation improved after a
crisis. Due to data limitations it was only possible to do
such an exercise for current account deficit (a survey of lit-
erature dealing with the role of current account deficits in
provoking financial crises can be found, e.g. in Sasin,
2001). The table below presents the outcome of the fol-
lowing procedure. The current account balance relative to
GDP (in percent) was studied in three years preceding and
three years following a crisis year. A 'problem' with current
account imbalance was defined as deficit larger than 4% of
GDP in any two of the three preceding years or deficit of
more than 6% of GDP in a year before a crisis. A current
account 'problem' after a crisis was defined in a similar
way: deficit larger than 4% of GDP in any two of the three
following years or deficit larger than 6% of GDP in the
third year after a crisis. Such a threshold allowed for iden-
tifying of 13 crises where current account was potentially
a problem beforehand. Of these, in 9 cases the situation
improved and current account deficits were reduced (or
turned into surpluses) in three years after crises, while in
4 cases there was no much improvement. Additionally, in
5 cases, the current account deficits widened significantly
after financial turbulence, while the model signaled no
problems before a crisis. Also, the data are not always
available for all three years after crises, so the statistics
might actually look even worse. The general conclusion
from that exercise is that financial crises in our sample
were quite varied phenomena in terms of current account
position. Consequently, for some countries, potential
imbalances were removed by a crisis, while for the other
they remained in place or even newly emerged. 
6.6. Conclusions
The review of literature carried in section two shows
that there is a substantial gap in existing writing on the
consequences of financial crises. In particular, transition
countries are rarely included in cross-country studies.
Also, due to data limitations, analyses attempting interna-
tional comparisons usually not include the most recent cri-
sis episodes, i.e. the Asian crises of 1997 and FSU crises of
1998 and 1999. 
This paper tries to contribute its part in research on
the various outcomes that are brought by financial turbu-
lence. In particular, an attempt is made to assess the per-
formance of transition economies in this respect and to
include the newest available data, so that the analysis can
cover the crises that emerged in 1997–1999. 
The results of graphical presentations carried in sec-
tion three remain broadly in line with other similar studies.
In some instances there is large variation in outcomes of
crises in different sub-groups. The available data do not
allow, however, for concluding that the crises of the last
decade or the crises in transition economies – in terms of
their consequences – differ from other financial crashes.
As for output trends, the general finding is that, on aver-
age, after the sharp drop in a crisis year, GDP growth
recovers gradually and starting from the second year after
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Table 6-2. Current account position before and after a crisis
Large CA deficit
before a crisis
‘Safe’ CA position
before a crisis
Large CA deficit after
a crisis
‘Safe’ CA position
after a crisis
No data after a crisis
13 4 9
16 5 8 3
Note: See text for more explanation.
Source: Own calculation based on IMF data (IFS for current account, WEO for GDP). 
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a crisis the rebound speeds up. Yet, available data do not
allow for stating whether this increase may be maintained
in a longer run. Also, taking a look at the development of
particular components of GDP for the whole sample, a
worrying factor is decelerating rate of investments already
in the third year after a crisis (following a rebound
observed in the second year). Another interesting obser-
vation is that net capital inflows remain depressed for a
long time after crises not reaching pre-crisis highs. This
factor also suggests that the recovery may prove weak. 
The evidence presented in this paper, although limited
by the data availability, shows that various costs associated
with financial crises are on average indeed high. A median
of crises included in the sample led to a significant loss of
output, increase in unemployment and also a fall in real
wages. There are also many other negative consequences,
such as sizable fiscal costs, deteriorating social stance, etc. 
With respect to the positive outcomes of financial tur-
bulence incidents, in some cases they provided stimulus
for a change in economic policies and speeding up reforms.
However, often too, post-crises reforms proceed slowly
because they are subject to social constraints and political
pressures. Lower growth in the aftermath of a crisis does
not help to overcome these problems. For example, in
Southeast Asia restructuring process still remains in dire
straits. Political tensions, if present, are unlikely to be
removed by a crisis with Indonesia being an excellent
example. The real sector, especially export oriented
branches, benefit from increased competitiveness
(although the data on export performance does not allow
for making strong statistical inference). The simple exer-
cise was carried in order to check whether crises are able
to remove existing imbalances in the economies, thus
reducing a threat of crisis reappearance. It proved that
while this seems to be the case in some instances; in gen-
eral, this cannot be demonstrated (the analysis was carried
for current account balances). 
Certainly, the scope for further research remains vast.
The experience of this paper shows that it is necessary to
strengthen the available databases that would allow a more
appropriate analysis of crises' impact, especially in the
social sphere. Also, the influence on economic policies and
institutions in crisis affected countries remains as a very
promising and very important (due to its bearing on devel-
opment) field for further research. 
Appendix. The Definition of a Crisis
The pressure index that we use in order to identify cri-
sis episodes is defined as follows:
EMPC,T = αC [(eC,T / eC,T-1) -1] - β [(rC,T / rC,T-1) -1] + γ
[(iC,T / iC,T-1) -1]
CrisisC,T =1 if EMPC,T > δ ∗ σEMP + µEMP
=0 otherwise,
EMP – exchange market pressure index,
e – exchange rate (domestic currency vs. US dollar),
i – domestic nominal interest rate,
r – reserves,
C – country 
T – time
α, β, γ, δ – weights,
δEMP – the sample standard deviation
µEMP – the sample mean
Appendix 2. The List of Countries
Included in the Analysis
ALBANIA, ARGENTINA, ARMENIA, AZERBAIJAN,
BELARUS, BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, BULGARIA, CHILE,
CHINA, HONG KONG, CROATIA, CZECH REPUBLIC,
ESTONIA, GEORGIA, HUNGARY, INDIA, INDONESIA,
KAZAKHSTAN, KOREA, KYRGYZ REPUBLIC, LATVIA,
LITHUANIA, MACEDONIA, MALAYSIA, MEXICO,
MOLDOVA, PHILIPPINES, RUSSIA, SINGAPORE, SLO-
VAK REPUBLIC, SLOVENIA, SRI LANKA, TAIWAN,
TAJIKISTAN, THAILAND, TURKEY, TURKMENISTAN,
UKRAINE, UZBEKISTAN, VENEZUELA.
Within the whole sample, the following sub-samples
were identified:
Transition economies (TE): ALBANIA, ARMENIA,
AZERBAIJAN, BELARUS, BULGARIA, CROATIA, CZECH
REPUBLIC, ESTONIA, GEORGIA, HUNGARY, KAZA-
KHSTAN, KYRGYZ REPUBLIC, LATVIA, LITHUANIA,
MACEDONIA, MOLDOVA, RUSSIA, SLOVAK REPUBLIC,
SLOVENIA, TAJIKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN, UKRAINE,
UZBEKISTAN.
FSU countries that underwent a crisis in 1998/99 (FSU
98): BELARUS, GEORGIA, KAZAKHSTAN, KYRGYZ
REPUBLIC, RUSSIA, UKRAINE.
Southeast Asian economies that underwent a crisis in
1997 (ASIA97): INDONESIA, KOREA, MALAYSIA,
PHILIPPINES, THAILAND. 
Latin American economies (LAM): ARGENTINA,
BOLIVIA, BRAZIL, CHILE, MEXICO, VENEZUELA.
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7.1. Introduction
The IMF has supported the transition process in a
number of FSU countries. This support involved conces-
sionary financing, policy advice and technical assistance.
Notwithstanding temporary conflicts, the cooperation
between the Fund and FSU countries throughout the peri-
od was described by the Fund as generally successful. It
was argued that it contributed to the macroeconomic and
financial stabilization [1]. Yet, the financial crisis of 1998
wiped out this stabilization and proved that previous poli-
cies were fully unsustainable. This paper attempts to
answer the crucial question why countries collaborating
closely with the IMF and implementing policies supported
by the Fund had to undergo deep financial crisis. The ques-
tion is made more intriguing by earlier research [2] show-
ing that this was a first-generation crisis – that is, one
caused by bad policies that led to macroeconomic imbal-
ances. While the core of the problems was domestic,
deterioration of external conditions was the trigger that
started the inevitable collapse. True, it is also well under-
stood now that vested interests, insufficient structural
reforms and lack of political were crucial factors prevent-
ing necessary policy adjustments. But has the Fund influ-
enced the pace of structural reforms and fiscal tightening?
Should the IMF have been more insistent on reforms
through tighter conditionality or have allowed for more
reform ownership? Finally, should it have withdrawn long
before 1998 and not underwritten unsustainable policies? 
Before we proceed with addressing these questions we
would like to make a short comment on the methodology.
In order to evaluate the impact of the IMF program on the
economic situation we have to distinguish some specific
questions. First, the original design of the program (assump-
tions and targets) and its adequacy for the economic prob-
lems of the countries under investigation are discussed. Sec-
ond, the implementation of the program is evaluated, espe-
cially the compliance with the performance criteria. Third,
if the IMF chooses to support the program even though
some of its key parameters are breached, we conclude that
the Fund is still sharing ownership for the final outcome.
One of the advantages of case studies, as opposed to large
multi-country studies [3], is the ability not only to test the
significance of the sheer existence of the program but also
to better evaluate its key parameters and consider the qual-
ity of its implementation. At the same time we believe that
the group of countries under investigation – Russia,
Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan (RUMGK) – is
large and diversified enough to allow for some generaliza-
tion of results.
There is also a problem of the baseline scenario against
which one can compare the outcome of IMF-supported
programs. In the literature [4] there are three major
approaches. The before and after approach simply com-
pares the situation in the country before and after the
adoption of the IMF-supported programs. This approach is
imperfect especially if the country has faced an important
exogenous shock or had to undertake fundamental
changes in its economic structure. For that reason, this
approach is not suitable for the evaluation of programs in
transition economies. Another popular approach is to
compare countries that adopted the IMF program with
countries of similar characteristics (in terms of economic
structures and exposure to external shocks) that did not.
In the case of FSU countries there is no such control group
as virtually all transition countries cooperated with the
IMF [5]. The only theoretically reliable method of assess-
ing the impact of this program is based on the construction
Part VII.
Financial Crises in FSU Countries: The Role of the IMF
Rafa³ Antczak, Ma³gorzata Markiewicz, Artur Radziwi³³
[1] The large majority of IMF documents related to programs in transition economies (at least until the 1998 crisis) began and concluded with the
praise of stabilization achievements and progress in structural reforms. Compare: IMF (MEP, LI, A4C, RED, SP), Camdessus (1994) and Fischer (1998).
[2] Compare country monographs prepared under this project: Antczak (2000), Markiewicz (2000) and Radziwill (2000), and also: Siwinska (2000).
[3] See Haque and Khan (1998) for discussion.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Among 26 transition countries, only Turkmenistan did not have at least one IMF-supported program.
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of the counterfactual scenario: "comparing the macroeco-
nomic outcomes of a program with the corresponding out-
comes obtained under an alternative set of feasible policies
is the most appropriate way of judging the effects of pro-
grams. However, the difficulties involved in using this cri-
teria should not be underestimated" [6]. Actually this
approach is especially difficult in the case of transition
countries. With a newly emerging and constantly changing
structure of the economy, it is impossible to build a full
structural model of the economy. However, throughout
the discussion of the political economy of reforms and
moral hazard we cannot avoid asking "what if…". The last
methodological point is more trivial and relates to scarci-
ties of data. As details of program arrangements, at least
until 1998, were generally confidential, it was "extremely
difficult for outside observers to prepare a serious quanti-
tative analysis appraisal of IMF policies" [7]. We try to over-
come the problem through extensive use of published
materials and materials released by the governments of the
countries in question.
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following
way. Chapter one presents the character and main causes of
the financial crisis in FSU countries. Chapter two discusses
what impact IMF policies could have had in crisis prevention.
It also presents the general logic of IMF programs and prior
experience of the Fund that contributed substantially to the
way it handled cooperation with transition countries.
Against this background, chapter three describes the design
and scale of the IMF programs in the region. Chapter four
identifies program deficiencies and shows their impact on
the policies. Chapter five concludes by commenting on the
institutional factors that could have contributed to these
weaknesses.
7.2. The Nature of Financial Crisis in FSU
Countries
The existing literature shows clearly that the financial
crisis that affected FSU countries in 1998 can be convinc-
ingly explained by fundamental macroeconomic imbal-
ances [8].  Loose fiscal policy and the lack of structural
reforms resulted in unsustainable internal and external
positions. Without rapid policy adjustments, this situation
had to lead to a financial crisis. For Russia the turmoil in
financial markets following the Asian crisis in 1997 com-
bined with the falling prices of oil constituted the trigger
that revealed existing imbalances and especially the accu-
mulation of debt service liabilities. For other countries, the
clear contagion pressures from Russia (operating both
through the trade and financial market channels) led to
open crisis only in economies with similar fundamental
weaknesses. Among these weaknesses the most easily vis-
Figure 7-1. General government balance (the cash basis), percent of GDP
Russia
Ukraine
Moldova
Georgia
Kyrgyzstan
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
0
-5
-10
-15
-20
-25
-30
Source: IMF (RED).
[6] Haque and Khan (1998).
[7] Jeffrey Sachs, cited in Bandow and Vasquez (1994).
[8] Compare footnote 2.
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ible was a deep fiscal deficit [9]. Fiscal imbalances were
permanently very large in all five countries studied here,
with the possible exception of Ukraine, where the deficit
was not above 5 percent of GDP since 1995. Figure 7-1
presents deficits on cash basis. If expenditure arrears are
also accounted for, imbalances are even larger. 
However, even under fiscal policy that is unsustainable in
the longer run, short-term monetary stabilization can be
achieved. This was accomplished by stabilizing exchange
rates in Russia, Moldova, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan beginning
in mid-1994, and in Ukraine beginning in mid-1995, and last-
ed until the August 1998 crisis. Stable exchange rates were
maintained at the expense of central banks interventions
(especially in Russia and Ukraine), while foreign currency
reserves were replenished by disbursements from the IMF.
The proceeds from sale of reserves served in turn as a
source of budget deficit financing in these two countries.
Moldova, Georgia and Kyrgyzstan relied mainly on govern-
ment official transfers and contracted foreign debt to sup-
port exchange rate stabilization and finance budget deficits.
As a result of exchange rate based stabilizations and
external sources of deficit financing CPI inflation (and infla-
tionary expectations) in RUMGK was lowered to moderate
levels during 1995–1998. Low inflation rates and stable
Figure 7-2. Changes in nominal exchange rates, monthly (1992-1999)
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[9] Dabrowski (1999b) writes "Experience of transition process gives a lot of evidence that fiscal policy performance reflects a quality of econom-
ic policy and systemic reforms in the specific country. Any inconsequence of the conducted policy, delay in transition on the microeconomic level, weak-
ness of government institutions and favorable political climate for intensive rent seeking negatively influence fiscal balances. Thus fiscal equilibrium
depends not only on the fiscal policy itself but also on the speed, quality, and consequence of overall reform process."
Figure 7-3. CPI inflation rate, end-period (percent)
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exchange rates also allowed for issuance of treasury papers
to residents and non-residents what attracted foreign port-
folio investors to finance fiscal deficits.
Changing the pattern of deficit financing was a step in the
right direction but was not followed by the hard budget con-
straints necessary for the market economy to function
properly. This inconsistency led to accumulation of high
debt burdens with an unfavorable structure (i.e., a large
share of short-term liabilities held by non-residents). The
prevailing view at the time was that deficits in transition
could be accepted as long as they are caused by transitional
expenditures [10]. However, the primary reasons behind
fiscal deficits in the countries under investigation were delay
in fiscal reforms and maintenance of pre-transition budget-
ing practices, and not the costs of reforms. As a result, addi-
tional resources and time were lost: foreign financing was
used for current spending and not for implementing neces-
sary reforms [11]. This left the countries extremely vulner-
able to change in risk perceptions on international financial
markets. 
7.3. The Role of the IMF
The crises in the region have originated mainly from irre-
sponsible fiscal policies. Therefore, the role that the IMF
played needs to be evaluated on the basis of the impact that
IMF-supported programs had on the fiscal stance. This
impact could be made through the following methods for
correcting imbalances:
– tight performance criteria (ceilings on budget deficits,
accumulation of debt and arrears, and financing from central
banks);
– relevant structural benchmarks related to reform of
the fiscal sector (tax system, expenditures and their prioriti-
zation, budgetary process) and policy advice;
– strict conditionality regarding compliance with perfor-
mance criteria and structural benchmarks. 
These three interdependent aspects could have enabled
governments to run restrictive policies, even if the current
political situation created pressure for unsustainable policies.
If domestic reformers were prepared to follow the path of
responsible policies, external binding commitment could give
them an additional political instrument. However, other
aspects of the program have to be taken into account too:
– unrealistic assumptions concerning GDP growth,
exports, and budget revenues that led to formulation of pro-
grams that were sustainable only if these assumptions were
realized;
– lax conditionality, undermining macroeconomic disci-
pline;
– a lenient approach to accumulation of arrears and debt;
– improving access to non-inflationary sources of deficit
financing;
– ineffective conditionality in the area of structural
reforms, stimulating "paper reforms" and not real restruc-
turing of the economy. 
In our view, this group of factors (discussed at length
later in this paper) was detrimental to necessary fiscal
adjustment and undermined the possible disciplinary effects
outlined before. This weakness was tightly linked to the
changes in the way the IMF has been operating since the
debt crisis in the beginning of the 1980s. 
IMF: evolution prior to transition
Of all international organizations, the IMF played the
most important role in the process of transition of post-
communist economies [12] . This is explained by the fact
that by the early 1990s the IMF acquired significant experi-
ence not only in macroeconomic policy but also in structur-
al and institutional reform. It was, therefore, perceived as
fully prepared to assume responsibility to monitor, manage,
and support the transformation process in the medium
term. But all these activities were quite different from the
tasks for which the IMF was originally designed for.  
The IMF was established in 1946 as the part of the Bret-
ton Woods system. The Fund's role was to provide short-
term financing to countries with balance of payment prob-
lems in order to avoid the repetition of interwar protec-
tionist practices and competitive devaluations. The IMF had
a systemic role in supporting the global exchange rate sys-
tem. Accordingly, it worked mainly with developed coun-
tries and its focus was constrained to the main monetary
and fiscal aggregates. Structural policies were largely absent
in IMF-supported programs and the importance of condi-
tionality was rather weak. Conditionality was formally
added to the Articles of Agreement only in 1968 and until
the mid-1970s included only macroeconomic aggregates.
However, after 1971, in the aftermath of the collapse of
Bretton Woods system, the IMF lost its core task. Floating
exchange rate regimes among most developed countries did
not require constant surveillance and support from the
Fund. As Milton Friedman put it [13]: "the IMF has lost its
only function and should have closed shop". Instead, in the
1970s the scope of Fund's activities started to move increas-
ingly towards cooperation with developing countries. The
[10] Compare Sachs (1994). For the contrary view see: Dabrowski (1995).
[11] Dabrowski (1999a).
[12] Dabrowski (1995) and Gomulka (1995).
[13] Friedman (1998).
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outbreak of the debt crisis in 1982 is generally seen as a
major turning point in this process (usually dubbed "mission
creep"). In the following years, Fund activities were concen-
trated on financial support and technical assistance for
developing countries affected by the crisis. This change was
reflected in the lengthening average duration of programs,
broadening of program objectives and change in the charac-
ter of conditionality. "In response to the substantial changes
in the nature and magnitude of economic disequilibria facing
members, IMF-supported programs have for several years
placed more emphasis on structural reforms and the
achievement of sustainable economic growth" [14]. This
was, in part, a response to the growing criticism of the IMF
as the "austerity" institution that focused excessively on
domestic demand reduction and not sufficiently on domes-
tic supply development.
The change in the hierarchy of goals and in the charac-
ter of problems in major client countries has led to the
lengthening of the duration of stand-by arrangements to
three years and the introduction of new medium-term pro-
grams such as EFF, SAF, and ESAF (see Table 7-2). The ratio-
nale for establishment of the EFF in 1974 was to address the
CASE Reports No. 41
Table 7-1. Goals of IMF-supported programs
Official goals:
• Improvement in the balance of payment (without policies detrimental for the growth of world trade)
- Inherent role of the IMF
• Increase in longer term growth
- Receiving increased attention after 1982
• Better utilization (allocation) of production potential
- Especially crucial in transition economies
Other goals, declared in program memoranda, public statements and staff papers:
- Poverty alleviation
- Environmental protection
- Containment of military expenditure
- Political considerations
Source: IMF (1987), IMF (LI, MEP).
[14] IMF (1987).
Table 7-2. The IMF basic facilities
Stand-by arrangement (SBA, since 1952)
- Financing for balance of payment deficit of temporary or cyclical nature
- Purchases: 6-36 months (initially 6-12 months), repurchases 3.5-5 years afterwards
- Originally conditionality limited to macroeconomic policies, since 1980s also structural elements
- Reviewed annually
Extended Fund Facility (EFF, since 1974)
- Financing for medium term adjustment of chronic or acute balance of payment deficit due to structural
distortions or weak growth performance
- Purchases: 3 years (can be extended to 4 years), repurchases: 4.5-10 years
- Conditionality includes more structural elements than SBA
- Reviewed annually
Structural Adjustment Facility (SAF, since 1986)
Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility (ESAF, since 1987)
- Highly concessionary financing for medium-term macroeconomic adjustment in low–income countries described
in the policy framework paper
- Purchases: 3 years (can be extended to 4 years), repurchases: 5.5-10 years
- Stronger conditionality, including structural policy criteria
- Reviewed semi-annually
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF, since 1999)
- Replacement for SAF and ESAF programs with strong focus on poverty reduction with the medium term policies
stipulated in the poverty reduction strategy paper
- Purchases: 3 years (can be extended to 4 years), repurchases: 5.5-10 years
- Strong conditionality, including structural policy criteria
- Reviewed semi-annually
Source: www.imf.org.
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problem of "an economy experiencing serious payments
imbalance relating to structural maladjustments […] or an
economy characterized by slow growth and an inherently
weak balance of payment position which prevents the pur-
suit of active development policy" [15]. Similarly the aim of
SAF was "the alleviation of structural imbalances and rigidi-
ties" in low-income countries, "many of which [had] suffered
for many years from low rates of economic growth and
declining per capita incomes". 
In order to compensate the IMF for the additional risk
that it faces when lending on concessionary terms to trou-
bled countries for longer periods, conditionality was con-
stantly intensified throughout the 1980s. The fastest
increase was in the area of structural benchmarks linked to
improving long term growth prospects. While in beginning
of the decade structural elements were exceptional, rough-
ly two thirds of the Fund's programs included some struc-
tural elements by the end of the decade, and the average
number of structural benchmarks reached almost three per
program [16].
Originally, the rationale for conditionality was to make
sure "that the member country is pursuing policies that
will ameliorate or eliminate its external payments prob-
lem" and therefore also "be able to repay IMF in a timely
manner – which allows the Fund's limited resources to
revolve and be available to other members" [17]. Howev-
er, as a result of introducing medium-term programs and
difficulties in healing the developing economies, condi-
tionality was turned to as an instrument for micro manag-
ing member economies. At the same time, IMF resources
started to be locked in several problematic countries.
Many governments became permanently dependent on
IMF resources. As Bird (2000) notes "the image of the
Fund coming into a country, offering swift financial sup-
port, helping to turn the balance of payments around, and
then getting out, is purely and simply wrong".  The length-
ening of the programs contributed only partially to this
dependence [18]. 
Another factor was the long series of generally unsuc-
cessful programs. For example, Brazil had eight separate
stand-by programs between 1965 and 1972, and Peru had
17 different arrangements between 1971 and 1977 [19]. In
general, evaluation of the IMF-supported programs in devel-
oping countries is controversial. While empirical research
shows frequently negative impact on growth and positive
impact on current account in the shorter run and positive
impact on growth in the longer run, results are generally
inconclusive [20].  Some authors argue that the willingness
of the Fund to support unsustainable policies actually led to
such policies [21]. The IMF strongly rejects the views about
CASE Reports No. 41
Figure 7-4. Average number of structural benchmarks per program (1987-1999)
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[15] IMF (2001a).
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[18] Return of the IMF to its original purpose, that is short-term, emergency lending was urged by many authors; compare Meltzer and Sachs (2000).
[19] McQuillan (1998).
[20] Haque and Khan (1998) offer the survey of evaluations of IMF-Supported programs.
[21] Meltzer (1998) suggests that "without the IMF and the U. S. Treasury, Mexico would learn to run better policies, would have less debt and, I
believe, would have made more progress".
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its negative impact on policies, but recognizes its limitations
in imposing good policies on member countries [22].
With this recent history of focus on delivering growth
to poorly developed economies and some reluctance of
governments of the recipient countries to impose austere
adjustment measures, the Fund started its support for the
post-communist economies. In these countries structural
reforms were particularly important due to the expecta-
tions that the initial decline of output would be followed
by rapid growth generated by the improved structure of
the economies. Therefore the role of the IMF as a techni-
cal assistance agency (as opposed to its systemic role of
maintaining liberal trade conditions) gained even more sig-
nificance. 
Expectations of future high rates of growth and consid-
erations about costs of reforms led to reluctance to impose
restrictive fiscal policies on transition economies. In our
opinion this neglect had a profound impact on future devel-
opments. It soon turned out that the countries that benefit-
ed from this cooperation with the IMF were the countries
with strong national ownership of reforms – mainly Central
European countries and the Baltic States. Characteristically,
these countries followed the path of more fiscal restraint
than the bulk of the FSU countries. Initial stabilization pro-
grams were generally successful, and at later stages the
process of accession to the OECD and especially the EU
drove more comprehensive structural reforms. Thus, IMF
financing was not needed any more in most cases. 
However, in the majority of FSU countries policies
remained undisciplined in spite of initial macroeconomic
stabilization and the end of hyperinflation. Conditionality
failed to steer policy, confirming the well-known assertion
that the IMF cannot effectively impose good policies. The
sequence of unsuccessful programs, double standards, and
long-term dependence on IMF resources has been repeat-
ed. Finally, the mirage of macroeconomic stabilization that
underpinned the IMF's willingness to support the
economies evaporated in the Russian crisis in 1998. The
next two chapters describe these developments in more
detail. 
7.4. IMF Programs in FSU Countries
The IMF stepped in to support transition economies
very forcefully. Virtually all countries undertaking reform
efforts received financial support. The table below presents
major programs that were received by countries investigat-
ed here. Generally speaking, external financing was provid-
ed in support to efforts to stabilize and reform post-com-
munist economies. Russia, due to its size and importance,
received the most sizable financing (in nominal terms) of all
transition countries, followed by Ukraine. However, the
importance of the IMF programs and their impacts on poli-
cies were higher in smaller countries like Kyrgyzstan,
Moldova or Georgia. Still, there are important common pat-
terns in the disbursement of IMF resources to countries in
the region.
IMF lending to FSU countries started with the SBA for
Russia in 1992. The program did not involve conditions, and
the Yeltsin-Gaidar reform strategy was concerned mainly
with liberalization, privatization, and institutional reforms,
and not at all with detailed stabilization policies. All other
countries started cooperation with the Fund with the Struc-
tural Transformation Facility (STF), a program designed spe-
cially for transition economies under severe trade and pay-
ment disruptions (between 1993 and 1995). This program
not only supported countries at the initial stage of transition
but also prepared them to receive standard Fund facilities.
The disbursements of funds under the STF were relatively
small and involved very little conditionality (mostly success-
fully implemented prior actions). Performance criteria were
loose, with fiscal deficits of up to 10 percent of GDP per-
mitted [23]. Afterwards, the series of short-term arrange-
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[23] Considerations about the interactions of the program conditionality, national ownership of policies and their quality are reflected in the cur-
rent debate within the IMF about changes in conditionality. Compare: IMF (2001a).
[24] D¹browski (1995).
Table 7-3. IMF facilities for investigated countries
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Russia SBA STF STF SBA EFF SBA
Ukraine STF SBA SBA SBA EFF
Moldova STF SBA SBA EFF PRGF
Georgia STF SBA ESAF PRGF
Kyrgyzstan STF SBA ESAF ESAF
Sources: www.imf.org.
Notes: Excluding CCFF.
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ments (SBAs) followed. It is common to view [24] STFs and
SBAs as the first generation programs that strove to estab-
lish basic short-term macroeconomic stability and stop
hyperinflation. The only structural measures for obtaining
these aims included price, exchange and trade liberalization,
and dismantling of the system of state orders. 
In contrast, medium-term EFFs and ESAFs were the sec-
ond-generation programs that aimed at providing a basis for
long-term growth and stabilization. Accordingly, these pro-
grams involved much more comprehensive conditionality.
Kyrgyzstan was the first country to sign such a program (in
1994), and the biggest wave took place in 1996, when Rus-
sia, Moldova, and Georgia signed their second-generation
programs. Ukraine was lagging behind other countries and
signed a medium-term program only shortly after the out-
break of the Russian crisis (beginning of September 1998).
Earlier it had three stand-by arrangements, reflecting its lack
of a consistent reform program and policy slippages rather
than any conscious cooperation strategy [25]. Among coun-
tries under investigation, EFFs were given to Russia, Ukraine
and Moldova, perceived as more developed countries, and
concessionary ESAFs to Georgia and Kyrgyzstan [26].
Another aspect of the financing is the overall size of net
financing received under various facilities. Georgia and Kyr-
gyzstan have received a relatively constant net inflow of IMF
resources, although there was a moderate declining trend
(especially in Georgia after 1997). More importantly, there
was no particular shock in 1998, as at least loose coopera-
tion with the IMF was unbroken up to the moment of the
Russian crisis. Moldova represents a somewhat different
pattern: after close cooperation with the Fund in the first
years of transition, when the country secured a relatively
high level of financing, later flows to Moldova more closely
resembled the volatile and unpredictable flows to the largest
countries – Russia and Ukraine. 
Although Russia started cooperation with the Fund and
switched to medium term programs much earlier than
Ukraine, financial flows to these two countries in the period
of 1994–1997 are almost identical, which may suggest some
sort of "financing contagion", usually attributed to political
factors. For Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova the gradual
decline in 1994–1997 is a sign of policy slippages and missed
disbursements. Only in 1998 we see a dramatic difference.
While Russia receives a record high last-chance package,
Ukraine receives minimal funds, and Moldova faces a dra-
matic and probably destabilizing net outflow of IMF funds.
Russia undergoes a period of substantial negative financing in
1999 and in 2000, as does Ukraine in 2000. In these years,
the perception of Moldova changed, and this country start-
ed to be eligible for the same concessionary programs as
Georgia or Kyrgyzstan.
Obviously, this is a very superficial picture. Financing
from the IMF reflected not only the donors' choices but also
– in theory at least – a combination of financing needs,
underlying assumptions of reform strategies and compliance
with conditionality. The following chapter describes in detail
the mechanisms of program financing and points out major
CASE Reports No. 41
[24] IMF (2001b).
[25] IMF (2001a) calls these facilities "a holding operation" and "an interim solution", respectively.
[26] In the aftermath of the crisis Moldova is qualified together with Georgia and Kyrgyzstan to PRGF, the successor of ESAF.
Figure 7-5. Net financing from the IMF (percent of quota)
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deficiencies. Still one crucial characteristic must be noted:
all five countries received funds from the IMF in every year
of the pre-crisis period [27].
7.5. Program Deficiencies and Their
Consequences
First generation programs (STF and SBA) that aimed to
establish basic macroeconomic stability generally achieved
their goals. Although at varying rates, inflation in all five
countries was brought down to lower two-digit numbers.
This stabilization was not, however, underpinned by fiscal
adjustments and was therefore short-lived [28]. Second-
generation programs aimed to close this gap. In this section
we discuss two factors that in our opinion underlay the fail-
ure of the second-generation programs: lax conditionality
and overoptimistic assumptions, whose fulfillment was a
necessary condition for program sustainability. These fac-
tors led to a certain myopia in the Fund-supported pro-
grams that caused short-term macroeconomic stabilization
to be perceived as a sign of the long-term sustainability of
the economic situation. 
7.5.1. Growth Assumptions 
Partly due to the legacy of the 1930s and to the expe-
rience in the Fund after the debt crisis in the 1980s, it was
almost impossible for the Fund to design a program that
did not assume prompt real economic growth, led by
exports. Assuming declines could raise questions con-
cerning the Fund's mission of bringing sustainable growth
and would bring criticism of austerity measures. Equilibri-
um with low levels of output and expenditures is largely
viewed within the Fund as suppressed disequilibrium [29].
Obviously, it is now even clearer than before that debt
service is viable only if there is real economic growth.
However, it is one thing to realize this fact, and quite
another to build programs on unrealistic growth assump-
tions, making them impossible to implement and, more
importantly, unsustainable in the longer term. While it
was understandable that "initially it was hoped that
reforms would quickly lead to a pick-up of economic
growth and inflows of foreign direct investment" [30], the
continuation of such predictions at later dates was simply
wishful thinking. 
Growth figures predicted (mainly) under the medium-
term programs (and program reviews) are presented
below. Two groups of countries can be clearly distin-
guished: Russia, Ukraine and Moldova (RUM) with EFF
programs, and Kyrgyzstan and Georgia with ESAF pro-
grams. In case of RUM, the IMF systematically overpre-
dicted real growth rates. This is especially true in the case
of the medium-term EFF programs, built on the assump-
tion that implementation of the recommended structural
measures would lead to growth. The growth perfor-
mance in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan was rather different. In
Georgia, the end of armed conflicts and the discovery of
gold fields at roughly the same time as the implementa-
tion of the ESAF program brought economic growth at
high rates. At later stages, however, projections overpre-
dicted growth, especially in Georgia. 
7.5.2. Fiscal Policy and Sustainability of Programs
These false assumptions had an important impact on
the sustainability of the programs. First, prospects for high
growth rates limited the pressure on adjustments, as debt
CASE Reports No. 41
[27] Although in Moldova in 1998 new disbursements only insignificantly exceeded repurchases.
[28] Compare "unpleasant monetarist arithmetic": in the longer term, fiscal and monetary policies cannot be separated, and debt is inflationary (Sar-
gent and Wallace, 1981).
[29] IMF (1987).
[30] IMF and WB (2001).
Table 7-4. Projected vs. actual debt in 1999
Moldova Georgia* Kyrgyzstan**
projected
in 1996
actual projected
in 1996
actual projected
in 1997
actual
External debt as %  of GDP 25 80 24 63 67 112
Debt, US$ mln 978 1041 1861 1720 1292 1382
GDP, US$ mln 3912 1304 7754 2728 1928 1232
Source: IMF and WB (2001).
* There was revision of GDP methodology in Georgia after 1996. ** Excludes non-guaranteed debt
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Figure 7-6. Real economic growth: predictions and reality (percent)
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Figure 7-7. Cash fiscal balances: IMF programs and reality (percent of GDP)
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accumulation did not significantly exceed real GDP growth
and was, therefore, not seen as an important problem.
According to the IMF, successful programs would require
"some combination of increasing output and reducing
absorption" [31]. Given high predicted rates of growth,
however, reducing absorption did not receive enough
attention. 
This is especially visible when projections of indebted-
ness are compared (Table 7.4). Moreover, there is a more
profound problem with this approach: in the economies
of former socialist countries, with hypertrophied public
sectors, growth without fiscal adjustment was impossible.
The public sector share had to shrink to make room for
the private sector, which is the main source of economic
growth. In transition countries sound fiscal policy was
therefore a precondition for achieving economic growth
in the long run. 
Second, if predictions for the revenue side of the budget
(dependent on growth) are too high, the extent of adjust-
ment in expenditure commitments necessary to achieve any
given deficit is underestimated. As long as policy-makers
tend to neglect realistic revenue forecasting, the chances for
sustainable and efficient fiscal policy are low. But revenues
were systematically below expectations [32], which led to
increasing deficits.
In addition, fiscal performance criteria were calculated
initially in the IMF programs on a cash basis. Accordingly, in
many FSU countries arrears appeared to be the most
important and persistent source of budget deficit financing
(calculated on the accrual basis). In response to lower than
expected revenues, the government was also more likely to
introduce across the board cuts in expenditures and freeze
pensions and wages of public employees. Such reduction in
expenditures was also often short-lived, as the period of
wage freezes was predictably followed by rapid growth of
wages [33]. The failure of government to collect projected
revenues and execute planned expenses also pushed the
governments towards involvement in dubious non-cash
operations that both decreased the efficiency of the govern-
ment and distorted economic life. Yet the IMF adopted (at
least until the crisis) quite a liberal approach to all these dis-
tortions, as these actions helped to keep cash deficits in
check. Accordingly Buiter (1998) stated that the cash deficit
indicators used widely by the IMF in its programs were
"myopic" and "more than useless" in the evaluation and
design of macroeconomic policy packages. Finally, the gen-
erally liberal attitude of the Fund towards fiscal slippages
could also be partly blamed for the unprogrammed high
budgetary outlays, as the external pressure from the IMF
that governments faced was not strong enough to oppose
domestic pressures for more expansionary fiscal policies. 
Due to the lack of necessary adjustments, the fiscal posi-
tions of all five countries were unsustainable throughout the
transition. Table 5 below presents the results of the IMF
study on fiscal sustainability conducted under relatively
favorable assumptions. Even given the small interest rate dif-
ferentials and relatively high rates of growth that indeed
characterized FSU economies in 1997, the fiscal adjustment
gap is exceeded by at least three percentage points in each
country. 
This is not to claim that the IMF did not express concern
about the fiscal position throughout the period. Indeed, fis-
cal adjustment was the declared aim of virtually all the pro-
grams, and the need for it was the basic message of all pro-
gram reviews and Article IV consultations. Additionally, the
CASE Reports No. 41
[31] IMF (1987).
[32] Programs also frequently assumed improvements in tax compliance.
[33] This is what happened in Russia in 1995 and in the beginning of 1996 before the presidential elections.
Table 7-5. Primary balances (percent of GDP)
1997 (actual) Sustainable
Russia -3.1 0.4
Ukraine -3.2 0.4
Moldova -3.1 0.8
Georgia -2.4 0.6
Kyrgyzstan -7.7 0.8
Source: IMF (1998b)
Notes: A sustainable primary balance is defined as the primary bal-
ance that would allow for stabilizing the public debt-to-GDP ratio at the
end of 1996 level, under assumptions of nominal GDP growth of 8 per-
cent and interest rate differentials of 2 percentage points.
Figure 7-8. Distribution of fiscal oriented structural benchmarks
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large and increasing share of the overall number of struc-
tural conditionality benchmarks was related to the reform
of the fiscal sector. The latter trend was peculiar to transi-
tion economies in the second half of the 1990s.
But as we have seen, this lip service was very poorly
reflected in performance criteria, which were relatively
lenient and exhibited poor conditionality. The fiscal adjust-
ment that the IMF advocated as the crucial element of sta-
bilization programs simply did not happen. Still, the IMF
continued to provide support to countries with very high
fiscal imbalances, often praising them for the progress
towards the market economy, stabilization, and long-term
growth. Even if fiscal slippages led to a program's going off-
track, new programs were granted almost immediately.
Therefore, we argue that fiscal outcomes have been so
weak partly because of the IMF's misconceptions about
growth prospects and its reluctance to insist on unpopular
and difficult fiscal adjustment measures. Nevertheless, while
long-term fiscal sustainability was somehow neglected, the
negative influence of budget deficits in the short term had to
be tackled in order to maintain shorter-term stabilization.
7.5.3. Myopia in Action
Expansionary fiscal policies led to excess aggregate
demand that was not met a by supply side response. Given
the very limited stock of domestic savings and low moneti-
zation constraining the accumulation of internal debt, this
pressure could be resolved either by increases in the price
level or by an increase in the current account deficit. The
first scenario was particularly likely if budget deficits were
financed by central bank credits, as the corresponding
increases in the money supply inevitably led to inflation. The
second alternative was more likely if budget deficits were
financed by foreign borrowing. Under this scenario, capital
inflows led to real exchange rate appreciation and growth of
imports. Therefore, the IMF had to decide whether to con-
centrate on fighting inflation or avoiding external debt accu-
mulation. Clearly, the chief consideration of the Fund in
making such decisions was consolidating the major achieve-
ment of the first-generation programs; namely, the short-
term stabilization, reflected in low inflation and stable
exchange rates. 
The focus on short-term inflation targets, with some
neglect of the debt problem, can be clearly seen if we com-
pare the outcomes of inflation and current account predic-
tions in the smaller countries with those in the bigger ones.
In the smaller countries monetary policy was much more
disciplined for several reasons: central banks were stronger,
the influence of the IMF greater and the external borrowing
smaller in absolute terms (is it easier to generate credits of
several million rather than several billion dollars). Accord-
ingly, the disinflation process under second-generation pro-
grams was generally successful. Unfortunately, monetary
discipline did not lead to improvement of fiscal balances,
CASE Reports No. 41
Figure 7-9. Share of overall number of structural benchmarks related to the reform of fiscal sphere 1987–1999 [34]
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Notes: The second and third bars in each set represent non-transition economies (recipients of concessionary and non-concessionary IMF facili-
ties, respectively, excluding programs for countries affected by the 1997 Asian crisis).
[34] The lower share of number of structural measures related to fiscal sector in transition economies in comparison to other recipients is the
result of great number of benchmarks related to the transition process, especially privatization.
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Figure 7-10. Current account balances: IMF programs and reality (percent of GDP)
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Figure 7-11. End-period  annual CPI inflation: programs and reality (in percent)
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
actual
proj 1995
proj 1996
proj 1997
proj 1998
proj 1999
proj 2000
proj 2001
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
Russia Ukraine
Moldova Georgia
Kyrgyzstan
0
50
100
150
200
250
0
50
100
150
200
0
20
40
60
80
0
10
20
30
40
50
0
10
20
30
40
50
Source: IMF (MEP, LI, A4C, RED).
Notes: Series "proj xxxx" contains projections made in year xxxx. 
For Georgia, official transfers are excluded. For Kyrgyzstan, grants are excluded.
138
Marek D¹browski (ed.)
and non-monetized budget deficits led to rapid accumula-
tion of external debt. Substantial current account deficits
(systematically over 10 percent of GDP in Moldova, Geor-
gia, and Kyrgyzstan) were the flip side of this coin. An inter-
esting example comes from Moldova, where in the first
quarter of 1998 the IMF saw a need for appreciation of the
exchange rate in order to maintain low inflation [35], as the
budgetary sector was continuing to borrow abroad. This
advice was given irrespective of a current account deficit
that had, in the previous year, exceeded 13 percent of GDP
and been covered mainly by short-term borrowing [36].
This is a somewhat surprising attitude given the original role
of the IMF as the balance-of-payments watchdog.
In Russia and Ukraine, current accounts did not consti-
tute a threat to macroeconomic stability, and program pro-
jections were generally met. This was due partly to the rel-
atively loose monetary policy: internal imbalances were
reflected mainly in inflation. These countries had stronger
negotiation positions vis-a-vis the IMF and weaker central
banks. Still, one quite spectacular event occurred with
respect to the Russian current account. Just before the cri-
sis, on July 20th, 1998, the IMF predicted that the current
account deficit would reach 9.6 billion US$ and 10.4 billion
US$ in 1998 and 1999, respectively (above 20 percent of
GDP). This shows again how unwilling the IMF was to
acknowledge the unsustainability of current policies. 
Our criticism is not intended to advocate more expan-
sionary monetary policies, but rather we argue that the IMF
was advocating delaying the crisis (adjustment) for too long,
while sending wrong signals both to governments and
investors. Unfortunately, such policy advice was welcomed
by domestic authorities, as "a finance minister faced with
this choice will almost always prefer to avoid the crisis now,
at the risk of a future larger crisis, than accept the crisis now
when may critics are ready to claim that the crisis is avoid-
able" [37]. 
High debt ratios are very costly because they press up
real interest rates and increase the debt service compo-
nent of the deficit. In the five countries under considera-
tion, debt-servicing expenditures became one of the most
important items on the expenditure side of the budget.
The long-term costs of short-lived disinflation under loose
fiscal policy appear to have been especially high for small
and highly indebted countries. Georgia and Kyrgyzstan are
following the path of long-term dependence on external
aid. Moldova, having disappointed initial hopes, is also set
to follow this path. 
When financial market participants finally refused to buy
new treasury bills, governments faced three choices: a
decrease in the fiscal deficit, an increase in seigniorage rev-
enues, and a delay in debt repayment. In all five countries
we observe a mix of these measures. Fiscal adjustment was
carried out with higher levels of debt, high real interest
rates, limited demand for treasury securities, under manda-
tory debt restructuring (e.g. Russia, Ukraine) and with
weakened central bank independence. 
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[35] IMF (1998c). The same document argues, however, that fiscal policy tightening is the major instrument for reducing macroeconomic imbal-
ances and points to the increasing risk of financial and currency crisis.
[36] Real exchange rate appreciation additionally aggravated the problem due to high elasticity of import with respect to exchange rate movements.
[37] Meltzer (1998).
Figure 7-12. Government external debt  (percent of GDP)
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7.5.4. Weak Conditionality
The IMF-supported programs, in spite of discussion of
fiscal problems, failed to bring any significant fiscal consol-
idation. This failure is linked to the important issue of
reform ownership. The most fundamental problems can
be solved only if national authorities with broad political
support assume the ownership and full responsibility for
reforms and necessary policy corrections. Unfortunately,
in countries of weak reform ownership, policies were
assumed (and reluctantly followed) just to please the IMF
and receive disbursements, rather than to solve the prob-
lems of the country [38]. But even in such cases, the pro-
grams could induce better policies, through enhancing the
credibility of reforms and helping reformist governments
to overcome political opposition to the program. But this
is possible only if the IMF program provides a binding
commitment. With "soft" conditionality this goal cannot be
reached, even if in most cases there was a relevant
(although standard) set of performance criteria. Usually,
the key quantitative benchmarks are as follows:
–  The upper limit for the cumulative change in net cred-
it (of the monetary authorities and/or the banking system)
[39] to the general government;
–  The upper limit for the cumulative deficit of the gen-
eral government (later also the accumulation of arrears);
–  The upper limit for the cumulative change in net
domestic assets (of the monetary authorities and/or the
banking system);
–  The lower limit for the cumulative change in net inter-
national reserves (of the monetary authorities and/or the
banking system) 
The IMF study shows that compliance with such perfor-
mance criteria is strongly associated with growth [40]
(although there is no causation established; rather, it is right-
ly supposed that reform ownership is a common immeasur-
able factor for the two).  This is borne out by the experi-
ence of the most advanced reformers in Central Europe,
which have, by far, the highest scores in this ranking.  But
compliance under the medium-term programs declined
sharply in all countries under investigation (with the excep-
tion of Kyrgyzstan), which partly explained the failure of
second-generation programs. However, non-compliance
rarely led to program suspension. 
Another aspect of conditionality is the implementation of
structural benchmarks. It is easily seen that the number of
structural benchmarks varies significantly across SBA programs
and is much higher in the case of medium-term programs
(both EFF and ESAF). This reflects the different logic behind
the second-generation programs. The share of benchmarks
applied to the key fiscal sector also varies greatly, but some-
what surprisingly there is no more focus on this sector in the
case of EFFs (with the exception of the EFF for Russia, with
almost half of the benchmarks related to fiscal reform) [41].
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[38] In some cases the letter of intent and economic policy memorandum are not prepared by the member country, but by the IMF staff, subject
to bargaining on selected performance criteria. This is in contradiction to official line of the IMF, whereby "each IMF-supported program is designed by
the member country in the close collaboration with the IMF staff" (IMF, 1998a).
[39] The choice of the monetary authorities or the banking system depends on the specific situation of each country and the rigidity of the pro-
gram.
[40] Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya (2000)
[41] Also in the EFF program for Ukraine, 35 of 88 condition were related to the fiscal sector, but this program was initiated after the crisis.
Table 7-6. Compliance with the IMF quantitative conditionality
Country Program Compliance
(full = 100 )
Russia SBA (1995) 100
Russia EFF (1996) 77
Ukraine SBA (1995) (off track) 76
Ukraine SBA (1996) 99
Ukraine SBA (1997) (off track) 62
Moldova SBA (1993) 86
Moldova SBA (1995) 100
Moldova EFF (1996) 82
Georgia SBA (1995) 100
Georgia ESAF (1996) 89
Kyrgyzstan SBA (1993) (off track) 70
Kyrgyzstan ESAF (1994) 86
Source: Mercer-Blackman and  Unigovskaya (2000).
Remarks: The index is calculated as the simple average of compliance on each performance criteria at each test date. Compliance on a given con-
dition at a given date is evaluated using the following scale: met=100, waived=50, met after modification=50, waived after modification=30, not
met=0. 
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The compliance index is consistently higher when medium-
term programs are considered.  Overall Moldova, Georgia and
(surprisingly) Ukraine are countries with the best record of
compliance with structural benchmarks, while Kyrgyzstan and
Russia improved their low compliance records only under
medium-term programs. This international comparison also
shows that implementation of the structural benchmarks in
transition economies was not extraordinarily low. A comment
is in order, however, concerning the role of structural bench-
marks in the assessment of reform performance. Apart from
the difficulties in measuring compliance, quite often fulfillment
of structural benchmarks implied only "paper reforms"; i.e.,
passage of laws that were never enforced. On the other hand,
detailed conditionality that captured particular elements of the
reform was missing the broad picture and the final aim of the
reform. Therefore, structural benchmarks reflected rather
purely fundamental improvements in the institutional set up.
What is characteristic, leading CEE reformers exhibit low
scores and there is apparently no link between compliance and
growth [42].
Table 7-7. Compliance with IMF structural conditionality
Number of structural benchmarksCountry Program
Trade/
Exchan-
ge
System
Pricing Public
Enter-
prise
Fiscal
sector
Financial
sector
Privati-
zation
Other Total
Compliance
(full = 100 )
Russia SBA 3 - - 1 - - 2 6 50
Russia EFF 2 1 1 18 7 6 2 37 73
Ukraine SBA 2 - - 1 1 5 3 12 68
Ukraine SBA 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 11 83
Moldova SBA 4 1 - 3 2 3 - 13 81
Moldova SBA 2 - 1 - - 2 - 5 75
Moldova EFF 6 1 1 2 1 4 1 16 90
Georgia SBA 1 - 3 8 2 3 - 17 77
Georgia ESAF - 2 1 5 5 4 5 22 79
Kyrgyzstan SBA - 4 - - - 1 1 6 0
Kyrgyzstan ESAF 1 - 7 10 8 4 5 35 79
Source: Mercer-Blackman and Unigovskaya (2000).
Remarks: The index of compliance (last column) is calculated as the simple average of compliance on each structural benchmark at each test date.
Compliance on a given benchmark at a given date is evaluated using the following scale: met=100, met to certain extent or with insignificant delay=50,
insufficient information about outcome=50, not met=0.
Figure 7-13. Compliance with IMF structural conditionality
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[42] Ibid.
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The official IMF evaluation of first- and second-generation
programs in RUMGK indicates rather high compliance with
IMF conditionality. In our opinion this is highly questionable.
Russia, the FSU country most generously financed by the IMF,
provides the most striking evidence of non-compliance. We
analyze this case in detail below. However, very similar patterns
were clearly visible in the other four countries [43].
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Box 1: IMF Conditionality: The case of Russia
The IMF decided not to put rigorous conditions on the SBA in 1992, and the Yeltsin-Gaidar reform program dealt
mainly with liberalization, privatization, and institutional reforms, and not at all with detailed stabilization policies. The one
distinctive feature of this stabilization plan was that neither the wage nor the exchange rate would serve as a nominal
anchor. The inflation objective was below 5 percent per month, which was not very ambitious. The political weakness of
the Yeltsin-Gaidar government became apparent with the nomination of Victor Gerashchenko, who represented inter-
ests of lobbies (industrialists, regions, FSU countries, etc.) demanding credits from the authorities, as Chairman of the
Central Bank of Russia. Monetization of an enlarged government deficit representing almost 20 percent of GDP and gen-
erous credit lines to the FSU countries led to CPI inflation of over 20 percent monthly in the fourth quarter of 1992. Obvi-
ously, all the IMF targets were exceeded at the very beginning of the program in September-October 1992. In the over-
all appraisal of the achievements of Yeltsin-Gaidar program, the defeats outnumbered the gains. The macroeconomic pol-
icy lacked monetary and fiscal tightening. The policy of the CBR was aimed at supporting production and propping up
financially inefficient state enterprises and cooperative farms. Foreign trade was only partly liberalized. Incomplete dereg-
ulation of prices (combined with the slow pace of demonopolization of the economy) caused shortages, and pressure for
massive state interventions (softening of monetary and fiscal policies) grew. The Yeltsin-Gaidar government decided not
to start privatization of agriculture. Finally, both the IMF and the Russian authorities followed an inconsistent policy relat-
ed to abandoning the ruble zone with other ex-Soviet republics, which led to huge transfers of the Russian GDP and fur-
ther boosted inflation. In December 1992 Yegor Gaidar was replaced by Victor Chernomyrdin, a moderate representa-
tive of the "red directors" lobby preferred by the majority of parliamentarians. 
The first Article IV consultation was concluded on April 21, 1993 [44]. On June 30, 1993, the Executive Board
approved an economic program to be supported by a two-tranche purchase under the Systemic Transformation Facility
(STF). Russia purchased the first tranche of SDR 1,078.3 million (equivalent to 25 percent of quota) from the IMF on July
6, 1993. The STF, as a brand-new IMF facility, made it possible to credit the new Russian government irrespective of the
failure of the previous program. Also, there were many new features in the program. Firstly, the STF specified that the
purchase from the IMF would not have to be added to the stock of Russia's official international reserves but would be
available to provide additional credit to the economy (and to the budget). This represented a major departure from the
IMF's primary goal of providing financial assistance to countries experiencing temporary balance of payments problems.
In doing so, the IMF entered terrain usually reserved for the World Bank and its agencies financing government projects
(or, more precisely, budgetary expenditures). The conditions of the STF program remained broadly the same as those of
the SBA, but this time included explicit targets rather than soft projections. 
The program got off to a good start, but as early as the third and the fourth quarters of 1993, targets were exceed-
ed by wide margins. The reason was that tight monetary policy was not accompanied by fiscal adjustment, as President
Boris Yeltsin vetoed the 1993 budget (with a deficit of 20 percent of GDP) and then dissolved the Supreme Soviet. In the
last months of 1993, Minister of Finance Boris Fedorov made an attempt to limit expenditures and refused to pay. The
result of sequestration was a buildup in government arrears, some of which would have to be repaid. Therefore, most
monetary and fiscal conditions were not fulfilled. Also, the fulfillment of the monetary conditions was spurious as the offi-
cial increase in the CBR interest rate brought preferential central banks credits below this rate. Accordingly, the next IMF
condition, concerning liberalization of the exchange rate, ended up in CBR interventions to maintain the exchange rate
of around 1000 rubles per U.S. dollar. Real appreciation of the ruble led to an increase in imports, dwindling reserves,
and finally depreciation of the ruble by 20 percent in September-October 1993. The second tranche of STF was to be
disbursed in September 1993, after a review of the program; however, the failures of 1992 were repeated, and all con-
ditions were broken within a quarter after the signing of the agreement.
[43] These cases are not included in this article in order to avoid repetition. 
[44] According to Article IV, Section 3 of the IMF Articles of Agreement, the IMF has the mandate to oversee the compliance of each member with
its obligations, and each member should provide the IMF with necessary information.
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On April 20, 1994, the IMF Executive Board approved the next program of the new Russian government [45] sup-
ported by a second tranche of SDR 1,078.3 million under the STF. The major goal of the program was to safeguard the
fragile achievements in the Russian reforms, especially in the areas of price and exchange rate liberalization, and foster
structural reforms, including privatization, foreign trade liberalization , increased competition, and transparency. Gradu-
alism was officially the key operating concept both for Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and the IMF. Again, condi-
tions of the second STF program were similar to those of the first STF.
The second STF combined the macroeconomic conditionality of the first STF with structural reforms, especially mass
privatization, managed by Anatoly Chubais, who was in charge of the State Privatization Committee. In the second quar-
ter of 1994 program implementation was on target. The monthly inflation rate fell to 6 percent in June 1994 and to 4.5
percent in August 1994. The government managed to keep its borrowing from the central bank within the program tar-
gets, but mainly through aggressive sequestration of expenditures as budget revenues collapsed. In the third quarter, how-
ever, credits from the central bank surged as revenues fell in relation to GDP and subsidies to agricultural sector, the North-
ern Territories, and other customary recipients of budget financing rose sharply. The government's ability to use seques-
tration diminished and the Parliament rejected most of the revenue measures specified in the second STF. In mid-1994, the
authorities ran down official reserves in an attempt to offset the impact of the surge in net credit to the government on
the monetary base and inflation. After international reserves dropped by almost US$4 billion in the third quarter of 1994,
foreign exchange market participants started to speculate against the ruble. Market participants were fully aware of the
inconsistencies in the expansionary fiscal policy and quasi-tightening of monetary policy, which limited credits to banks but
expanded financing of the deficit. On October 11, 1994, the ruble tumbled in the Moscow interbank market by over 20
percent against the U.S. dollar. "Black Tuesday" became the first currency crisis in post-communist Russia. In the fourth
quarter of 1994, the central bank limited credit expansion to banks and the government, and the Ministry of Finance
restricted expenditures but also started issuing government securities well below the market rate [46]. The credit crunch
led to a rise in interest rates, but inflation continued to increase reaching a monthly rate of 16 percent in December 1994
- twice the STF projection. Fiscal targets were exceeded by wide margins, the stock of international reserves dropped
below the target, the exchange rate depreciated by 45 percent during the second half of 1994, and the majority of liber-
alization measures was not implemented. The second STF failed as completely as its predecessor.
The rise in inflation, the accumulation of government arrears, and the exchange rate crisis on October 11, 1994, led
to the next reshuffling of the Russian Cabinet. Finance Minister Sergei Dubinin and CBR governor Victor Gerashchenko
were fired. Anatoly Chubais was appointed First Deputy Prime Minister in charge of economic policy, Yevgeny Yasin
became Minister of the Economy, and Tatyana Paramonova became Acting Chairperson of the CBR. Negotiations with
the IMF resumed, this time concerning a program that would be supported by a stand-by credit of up to SDR 4,313 mil-
lion (100 percent of quota). As in previous years, a major tightening of monetary and fiscal policies took place at the begin-
ning of 1995. In January, the stock of credit to the government was frozen, the CBR increased reserve requirements, and
– as international reserves kept declining – the monetary base shrank by 9 percent. Inflation slowed to 10–11 percent in
February-March. On March 10, 1995, in a letter to IMF Managing Director Michel Camdessus, President Boris Yeltsin
expressed his support for the new arrangement. On April 11, 1995, the IMF Executive Board approved the stand-by
arrangement supported by a credit of SDR 4,313.1 million for a period of 12 months. Additionally, the IMF waived Arti-
cle V, Section 3(b)(iii), and increased the limit of lending to 200 percent of the Russia's quota. According to official state-
ments, the SBA was aimed at decisive progress in stabilization and structural reform during 1995 and envisaged the same
measures as in the previous programs, both from macroeconomic and structural perspective.
In the course of the stand-by program quantitative targets were all met month by month with comfortable margins.
The most vulnerable situation remained in the fiscal sector, because of substantial revenue shortfalls that persisted
throughout 1995. Measures to improve revenues were implemented only partially or with a lag. Major revenue cate-
gories barely exceeded the program's projections in nominal terms in spite of substantially increased inflation, and for
1995 the ratio of revenue to GDP turned out to be nearly 3 percentage points below the programmed level. Under these
circumstances, in order to meet the deficit target the authorities contained spending (in relation to GDP), keeping it
below programmed levels. On the monetary side, while credit targets were met, large capital inflows put pressure on
the ruble, leading to nominal and real appreciation and/or growth of the monetary base (given limited capacity for ster-
ilization). Growing confidence in the ruble and the increase in reserves allowed for introduction of an exchange rate cor-
[45] Victor Chernomyrdin remained Prime Minister and Sergei Dubinin was nominated as Minister of Finance.
[46] Issuance of new kinds of government bonds, including medium-term ones, was planned in the second STF program with a goal to establish a
market for government securities and increase the portion of non-inflationary financing of the budget deficit.
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ridor on July 5, 1995 (4,300 - 4,900 ruble per U.S. dollar). However, in the second half of October, pre-election pressure
became evident as fiscal policy started to drift away from targets. The previously accumulated margins (with respect to
the cumulative ceilings for the credit aggregates, fiscal deficit, and international reserves) allowed the targets for October
and November to be met. In December (especially in the last ten days of the month), the authorities probably used "win-
dow dressing" to achieve the targets. Therefore, the tendency of policies to drift in the last quarter continued in 1995,
and as with the previous programs, it had a negative impact on inflation (3.5 percent in December 1995, instead of 1 per-
cent). 
Structural reforms, especially bank restructuring, were considered relatively sluggish. This became evident when an
interbank liquidity crisis emerged toward the end of August 1995. The pace and scale of privatization fell short of expec-
tations, and transparency of the whole process due to the introduction of the loans-for-shares scheme became doubtful.
Finally, little progress was achieved in the area of land reform. 
Summing up, in 1995 the Russian authorities apparently decided to fulfill macroeconomic targets but abandon struc-
tural reforms that conflicted with the interests of various lobbies and were therefore politically difficult. The relative suc-
cess of the 1995 stand-by (in comparison with the performance of the previous arrangements) allowed the Russian
authorities to request IMF support for the medium-term program of macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform.
In a letter dated March 6, 1996, the Russian government requested a three-year arrangement under the EFF in the
amount of SDR 6,901 million, or 160 percent of the quota. The ongoing stand-by program would then be cancelled as of
the date of approval of the extended arrangement. This trade off yielded positive results: almost immediately, on March
26, 1996, the IMF Board approved the program (and again waived Article V). 
The proposed strategy for 1996–1998 aimed at establishing a foundation for sustainable growth by lowering inflation
to a single-digit annual rate, implementing key structural reforms, and achieving medium-term viability of the balance of
payments. The 1996 program was based on quite optimistic forecasts, such as a high annual rate of GDP growth (6 per-
cent starting in 1997), 1 percent inflation monthly beginning at the end of 1996, recovery of money demand, repatriation
of flight capital, increase in foreign direct investments, and a comprehensive restructuring of debt obligations (US$7 bil-
lion). The debt service burden was especially large for the federal budget, as the accumulation of maturities and arrears
during the following years was already foreseen in 1996. However, the critical element of the medium-term strategy was
a further reduction in the overall fiscal deficit of the general government from around 6 percent of GDP in 1995 to 4 per-
cent of GDP in 1996 and 2 percent of GDP in 1998. Local governments and off-budget funds were to balance their bud-
gets or finance deficits from non-inflationary sources (without credits from the CBR). A net increase in revenues of close
to 5 percentage points of GDP was planned for the medium term (via an increase in tax rates and broadening of the tax
base through elimination of tax exemptions and preferential treatment, especially for fuel producers). The monetary
framework targeted the same parameters as previous programs, limiting the pace of credit expansion and monetization
of the budget deficit. The programmed domestic assets expansion would not result in growth of the monetary base
because it was exactly offset by a decline in the monetary authorities' net international reserves. The same was true of
the 1995 program – the sale or use of government reserves was included as part of the monetary authorities' net credit
to the federal and enlarged governments. Therefore, the IMF's intention was clearly non-inflationary deficit financing.
The period of 1996–1998 reflected elusive macroeconomic stabilization. Since 1995, Russia had not been able to
achieve its main fiscal policy objectives, which were a reduction in the unsustainably high deficit, a reversal of the decline
in budget revenues, and a reduction of expenditures. The general government primary deficit rose from 2.6 percent of
GDP in 1995 to 3.1 percent of GDP in 1997, and the overall deficit increased from 6.1 percent to 7.7 percent of GDP in
the same period. At the same time, general government revenues only increased from 33.5 percent of GDP in 1995 to
35.5 percent of GDP in 1997, whereas expenditures increased from 39.6 percent to 43.2 percent of GDP in the same
period. This reflected a number of fundamental factors, but perhaps the most important among them was a continued
recourse to non-monetary fiscal operations and tax offset schemes on the revenue side and expansion of interest pay-
ments on the debt on the expenditure side [47].
In mid-1998, the accumulation of macro- and microeconomic problems coincided with the cumulating maturity of
debt payments due in the third quarter of 1998, amounting to one third of budget revenues, and with a current account
deficit resulting from a decline in world fuel prices. Moreover, the Asian crisis in 1997–1998 had increased financial mar-
ket volatility and investor pessimism about the performance of the Russian economy. 
Some adjustment measures implemented at the beginning of 1998 by the government of Prime Minister Sergei
Kiriyenko, especially sequestration of expenditures and proposed changes in tax law, were not effective (the Parliament's
CASE Reports No. 41
[47] See Antczak (2000) for an analysis of the Russian crisis in 1998.
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willingness to support the government's plans was very limited). Capital flows remained volatile and market confidence
was not restored. The Russian authorities proposed to implement radical measures and expected support from the IMF.
On July 16, 1998, a Memorandum of the Government of the Russian Federation and the Central Bank of the Russian Fed-
eration on Economic and Financial Stabilization Policies was signed with the IMF. The government program was basically
identical to those supported by the IMF but not realized throughout the previous five years. It aimed at radically tighten-
ing the federal budget and lengthening debt maturity, and the authorities expected "substantial foreign financing" for the
program. The proposed package of measures for 1998 was partially based on the ongoing EFF arrangement. However,
the Duma rejected the proposed changes in tax policy (broadening the base of the Personal Income Tax and transferring
a higher share of PIT revenues to the federal budget, increasing the land tax, and balancing the budget of the Pension
Fund). The Russian government was to provide a supplementary memorandum to the IMF on July 20. On July 31, the IMF
tried to avert crisis by disbursing a SDR 3.4 billion tranche, irrespective of the lack of a formal agreement. However, this
CASE Reports No. 41
Figure 7-14. Russian Federation, compliance with the IMF quantitative monetary, fiscal, and exchange rate targets 
in 1993-1999 (%)
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Figure 7-15. IMF net disbursements to Russia in 1992-2001 (millions of US$)
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in fact only hastened the inevitable deep correction of the exchange rate made necessary by accumulated macroeconomic
imbalances.
With the crisis of August 1998, Russia exceeded all quantitative targets established in the EFF program. IMF dis-
bursements to Russia came to a halt. The latest program, an SBA for SDR 3.3 billion (55.5 percent of quota) for a period
of 17 months, was signed on July 28, 1999. Through the end of 2000, Russia has made only one purchase. Quantitative
performance criteria for the end of July, the end of September, and the end of December 1999 were reached (many with
large margins). However, there were many shortfalls relative to structural benchmarks for the third and fourth quarters
of 1999. 
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The example of Russia (to which we could easily add
similar cases from the other four countries) clearly shows
that from the very beginning of the transformation the IMF
was not insistent enough on its conditionality, especially in
the area of fiscal adjustment. It also shows that the condi-
tionality was effectively much weaker than is suggested by
the relatively high scores on compliance presented by IMF
sources. This inconsistency stems from issues of trans-
parency in the performance criteria. The attempts to cir-
cumvent imprecision were also one of the reasons for the
proliferation of arrears, sequestration, explicit and implicit
guarantees, and quasi-fiscal operations. It is important that
the majority of "more than useless" indicators were created
in the crucial sector of public finance. While the promotion
of public awareness and responsibility should be one of key
functions of the Fund [48], it has long given a rather ideal-
ized picture of the FSU countries. The public could not gen-
erally access surveillance data or memoranda on policies or
criteria breaching. Instead, as Boris Fedorov put it, "the IMF
was pretending that it was seeing a lot reforms. Russia was
pretending to conduct reforms" [49]. Similarly, The Econo-
mist (1996) quotes an anonymous Russian minister's com-
ments on the March 1996 negotiations to the effect that
"bookkeeping tricks were pulled on both sides". 
A further factor in the weakening of conditionality was
the changing weight given to performance criteria and pro-
gram reviews. Performance criteria (and prior actions)
should generally be very precisely defined and provide a
ready test for the compliance of policies with the program.
Non-implementation can still be accepted through the
issuance of a waiver; however, conditionality based on per-
formance criteria is generally less lax and less likely to be
affected by political considerations. On the other hand, pro-
gram reviews that mix ex-post evaluation with expectations
towards future actions provide much more room for dis-
cretion. Coupled with the increasing number of waivers and
modification in the program criteria, this undermined the
"binding commitment" role of conditionality. The final, and
probably most important, factor behind lax conditionality is
the ease with which the Fund continued to work with coun-
tries with very bad track records. Again, the case study of
Russia shows this very clearly, but a similar pattern can be
observed in most of the countries under investigation here:
new programs were continually covering up the fundamen-
tal weakness of the FSU economies.
To sum up, the conditionality exhibited excessive lenien-
cy, allowing recipient countries to  avoid fiscal and other
kinds of necessary adjustment. While flexibility is important,
as it allows for corrective measures in cases of external
shocks, it has been clearly abused in the case of the FSU.
Again, the prior experience of the IMF appears to be at
fault. Instead of promoting good policies in a decisive man-
ner, the Fund was showing that it "pays due regard to the
domestic social and political objectives" [50] - even if these
objectives were detrimental to long-term growth and stabi-
lization. 
7.5.5. Soft Financing
Throughout this paper we have argued that the IMF was
not insistent enough on fiscal adjustment. We now wish to
take this argument further and show that the IMF programs
were actually detrimental to true fiscal adjustment. As the
IMF was consistently softening governments' "hard budget
constraints" by providing non-monetary sources of deficit
financing, the political support for fiscal tightening was even
more difficult to generate than would have been the case in
the absence of IMF programs.
The support of the IMF for the development of non-
monetary deficit financing in RUMGK was twofold. First, the
IMF was willing to indirectly finance FSU governments. The
STF in 1993 specified that the purchase from the IMF would
not have to be added to the stock of Russia's official inter-
national reserves but would be available to provide addi-
tional credit to the economy (and to the budget). The same
[48] Compare, for example, Brown (1998).
[49] Cited in McQuillan (1998).
[50] IMF (2001a). Compare also Camdessus (1994): "(…) policies may indeed need to be adjusted pragmatically in light of circumstances and devel-
opments. One example has been fiscal policy. (…) In many cases, after careful assessments, the Fund has agreed in these circumstances to the tem-
porary relaxation of fiscal deficit targets in programs it has supported, while of course continuing to focus on the requirements of lowering inflation
and achieving medium-term fiscal sustainability". Developments proved, however, that it is extremely difficult to achieve sustainability when adjust-
ments are repeatedly delayed and "temporary relaxations" persist.
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was the case of the 1995 program: the sale or use of gov-
ernment holdings of reserves was included as part of the
monetary authorities' net credit to the federal and enlarged
governments. In so doing, the IMF was attempting to finance
the budget deficit in a non-inflationary manner. Indeed, in
our five countries, all of whose central banks were directly
financing the budgets, the IMF funding was transferred to
the budget and consumed. Ukraine serves as a good exam-
ple. The Ukrainian EFF program included a target for cen-
tral bank gross purchases of treasury bills from the primary
market. Agreements with the IMF also allowed for negotia-
tions with debtors on rescheduling of payments. Such
reschedulings were to constitute a source of balance of pay-
ment financing referred to as "exceptional financing". Russia,
as the legal successor to the debt (as well as the assets) of
the USSR and net creditor to the rest of the FSU countries,
received the largest rescheduling of debt payments. The
existence of the ruble area until July 1993, inter-republican
trade and financial links, and the similarity of transformation
problems led to the adoption of a common approach to all
FSU countries by the Western governments and interna-
tional financial institutions. In practice, informal rescheduling
of the Russian debt payments was often conditioned on the
Russian government's rescheduling of debt payments it was
owed by Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, or Kyrgyzstan. This
multilateral credit approach was used in relations amongst
most FSU countries. Therefore, the IMF disbursements can
– together with exceptional financing (i.e., debt relief and
arrears) – be treated as a form of financing of the twin
deficits (balance of payments and budget deficits). 
The unjustified "seal of good housekeeping" further soft-
ened budget constraints, as the economic policy memoran-
da with the IMF opened the door to cooperation with other
multilateral and bilateral donors. IMF programs constituted
a stamp of approval for government policies, tending to
bring improvements in the countries' ratings and new capi-
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Figure 7-16. Balance of payment gap and financing (1994-1999)
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tal inflows. This catalytic role is explicitly recognized as one
of the main functions of the IMF in support of adjustment.
However, when the IMF underwrites unsustainable policies,
the effect is disastrous for the borrowing country: external
debt accumulates and incentives for adjustments are dimin-
ished. 
For smaller countries this foreign financing led to a debt
trap. Wrong signals sent to private creditors and govern-
ments had a highly detrimental impact on the economic sit-
uation of these countries. Policies based on increasing debt-
to-GDP ratios were unsustainable, but could be maintained
as long as financial markets did not fully realize this. An
interesting example of such an attempt to change market
sentiment was the arrangement negotiated for Russia in
1998, which aimed to use external financing to prolong the
fragile stabilization [51]. Later on, however, the IMF admit-
ted that crisis was inevitable unless the "steadier process at
work" were fundamentally reversed [52]. 
Worse, a general sense of implicit guarantees ("too big
to fail"), especially in case of Russia, was built up over the
course of years. While the role of IMF in the modern world
should be the prevention of crisis through the surveillance
of national policies, transparent information and reduction
of moral hazard, the practice was exactly opposite. Meltzer
(1999) concludes: "Moral hazard lending to Russia, encour-
aged by the bail out of foreign lenders to Mexico, permitted
Russia and other countries to finance large unbalanced bud-
gets by borrowing externally. The result is a much larger
financial problem for international lenders and for the
economies of other countries". In consequence, the IMF's
opening of access to external savings delayed the change in
direction of capital flows and therefore induced reluctance
to apply remedies. Without the IMF, Russia and other coun-
tries in the region might have had better policies.
7.6. Conclusions: Political 
and Institutional Considerations
How could the IMF have made such mistakes? The
answer to this question is basically beyond scope of this
paper. We will simply note that it is most likely of a political
nature. As Meltzer (1999) [53] explains: "The G-7 govern-
ments either were unwilling or believed themselves unable
to obtain funding for the transformation from their parlia-
ments. The IMF agreed to accept responsibility. In doing so,
it reached far beyond its competence". The influence of pol-
itics over economics, and especially on the quality of condi-
tionality, can be summarized in the popular adage that "sav-
ing Russia from communism matters more than the niceties
of monthly bookkeeping" [54]. Another group of factors
that could contribute to this problem is related to the sys-
tem of incentives facing the IMF bureaucracy [55].  The IMF
as an institution has a stake in the "success" of the program.
It is, therefore, difficult for its officials to declare the pro-
gram a failure, even if it cannot impose its real implementa-
tion. Finally, the IMF wants to stay in the country, as it con-
siders some influence on policy to be better than no influ-
ence at all. This is, however, not the case if it leads the Fund
to underwrite bad policies. 
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[51] Stanley Fischer (1998) stated at the beginning of 1998 that "the Russian economy has broadly achieved stabilization and the future should bring
much more peaceful days".
[52] IMF (RED) on Russia, issued in September 1999.
[53] Compare also Dabrowski (1995). Several authors argue that a politically independent IMF would be more effective at promoting international
financial stability; compare De Gregorio et al. (2000).
[54] The Economist (1996)
[55] Vauber (1994)
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